I refer to a Minute from yourself to the Secretary, Department of
the Army dated 31st October, 1947, concerning the amalgamation of
overseas signal services in which you expressed concern at the
position and directed that the Army correspondence on this matter
be brought to my notice as Minister for Defence. This was done by
Army Department memorandum 40654 dated 21st November.

2. In view of your observations I have had a statement prepared
which summarises the action already taken to examine the question
of the integration or co-ordination of signal services. Copy of
this statement is attached. It will be seen that this matter has
been prominently before the Defence Committee and that the time
taken for a solution is not due to causes arising from any or all
of the Services. Further progress depends on two factors, firstly
the receipt and practical use of modern equipment by the Services,
and secondly the plans of the United Kingdom for the integration
of its strategic overseas communication facilities. In regard to
the first factor, the earliest date by which the Services will
have installed automatic telegraphy equipment and commenced
training therewith will be the end of 1948. In regard to the
second factor no agreement has been reached in the U.K. regarding
integration of strategic communications, and even if such
agreement were reached, resultant plans for consideration by the
Dominions whose participation is desired would probably not be
available until late in 1948.

3. I note your observation that it is 'difficult to appreciate why
a decision on these matters must necessarily be given by the U.K.

Government before any amalgamation of the overseas signal services
can be effected in Australia'. You will be aware that one of the
most important principles for co-operation in British Commonwealth
Defence, originally laid down by the Imperial Conference of 1926
and re-affirmed at later Conferences, is standardisation to the
greatest practicable extent in organisation, equipment and
training. Uniformity is of vital importance from the operational
aspect of defence co-operation and it has an even wider
significance in regard to British Commonwealth Forces that may be
placed at the disposal of the United Nations under Article 43 of
the Charter. The present trend in these matters is towards
integration on an Empire basis subject to sovereign control of
Policy of each part of the Empire by its own Parliament and
Government. The recently established Defence Signals Bureau is an
example of this type of organisation.

4. A strategic signal network is an essential war requirement
which could not be implemented at short notice on the outbreak of
hostilities. In the strategic network now under consideration in
the United Kingdom that country would be the hub and Australia one
of the links, and it would be impracticable for communication
technical reasons for Australia to take unilateral action to
effect integration. On the other hand if the United Kingdom
decides to proceed with the plans to integrate its strategic
communications, it is probable that a substantial degree of
integration of overseas signals communications would be effected
in Australia. A further report on this matter is to be prepared by
the Defence Committee as soon as sufficient information is
received from the U.K. to permit of some progress being made, or
at the latest by December 1948. In the meantime the Committee is
proceeding with its examination of the extent to which it might be
possible to integrate internal signal services in Australia in
rear areas, that is between specific places where static
establishments belonging to more than one Service are located.

5. I shall keep you advised of developments affecting the
integration of signal services insofar as this Department is
concerned.