Summary Record CANBERRA, 13 August 1947, 2.30 p.m.

Present: The Minister for External Affairs, the Rt. Hon. Dr. H. V.

Evart, Sir Frederic Eggleston (Chairman), Professor K. H. Bailey
(Vice Chairman), Mr. K. E. Beazley, M.P., Brigadier A. S.

Blackburn, V.C., Mr. R. J. F. Boyer, Hon. P. J. Clarey, M.L.C.,
Mr. B. H. Corser, M.P., Miss Constance Duncan, Hon. E. J.

Harrison, M.P., Sir Douglas Mawson, Professor A. H. McDonald, Mr.

Barry McDonald [1], Hon. J. McEwen, M.P., Colonel R. S. Ryan,
M.P., Professor A. L. Sadler, Mr. T. Sheehan, M.P., Senator
Dorothy Tangney, Mr. P. R. Wilkins. [2]

At the beginning of the sitting, Mr. Harrison asked the Minister
whether there was any likelihood of an Asian bloc being formed at
the peace conference. The Minister said the possibility had not
occurred to him: it was a British bloc many countries feared. He
opposed the inclusion at the working conference of nations which
did not actively participate in the war against Japan, though it
should be possible to call all countries at war with Japan
together to hear their views and have them sign the treaty.

On voting procedure, the Minister explained that when Australia
struggled for a simple as against a two-thirds majority, or for
the latter against a veto, it was to get decisions made step by
step en route to unanimity. Unanimity must be obtained in the end.

The U.S. would not agree to the demand of the U.S.S.R. that the
Council of Foreign Ministers should draft the treaty. In the
Minister's opinion, the attitude of the U.S.S.R. might be dictated
in part by the fear that the disproportionate gains of the
U.S.S.R. at Yalta might be called into question by a peace
conference run along different lines to that in Paris. However the
Minister did not see how the Yalta Agreement could be questioned.

The Minister then pointed out how the Cairo and Yalta Agreements
had altered the strategic position in Asia. Whereas Japan
previously had salients thrusting out in various directions, now
the U.S.S.R. had salients into Japan. General MacArthur's view and
the general impression in Japan was that the U.S.S.R., with its
influence in Manchuria, its control of the two railways and Port
Arthur, will control Korea as part of the continent. It would be
better for Australia, the Minister felt, if the U.S. controlled
the Bonins, Volcanoes and Ryukyus, thus adding two more salients
into Japan. Under these circumstances Japan would be practically
helpless from a defence point of view. Moreover, if, as some
people thought, there might be a danger of U.S.S.R. aggression in
the Pacific, then the frontier lay across Japan, much further
north than our northernmost possessions in the Admiralties.

Turning to the occupation, the Minister stated that the physical
demilitarisation was almost complete, and the framework of
democracy had been constructed in Japan. With powerful neighbours
waiting on every doorstep, it would be very difficult for Japan to
make a military come back.

On the supervision to ensure Japan abides by its provisions after
the treaty has been signed, the Minister said we should not try to
do too much. On the other hand we should ensure that industries
which might be used for warlike purposes do not come into
existence in Japan. The control must be effective; nothing could
be worse than ineffective control.

Replying to Colonel Ryan's query regarding the progress of
democratisation the Minister indicated that the framework of
democracy had been laid and the Japanese appear to be conforming
to it, but he reserved his judgment on extent to which the
Japanese wished to follow the ways of democracy. The peace treaty
must contain provision for the continuance of democratic
principles, but democracy cannot be imposed from outside by force.

For this reason the Supervisory Commission must be not only a
directing but also an advisory body.

Replying to questions by Mr. McEwen and Mr. Harrison the Minister
said he believed the United States wished to reduce their forces
of occupation but would probably maintain bases in the Bonins and
Ryukyus and selected points in Japan. They did not intend to allow
U.S.S.R. to gain control of Japan.

Asked by Mr. Corser if any consideration had been given to the
possibility of Japan shifting people and industries to such places
as Thailand, Burma and Indonesia, the Minister said he knew of no
provisions to meet such a possibility.

Replying to a question from Mr. McDonald, the Minister stated he
did not think it was practicable to raise the question of the
Emperor's war guilt at the Peace Conference.

Miss Duncan asked about the rehabilitation of the Japanese
economy, and the Minister indicated SCAP reported the people were
underfed, 2 million were unemployed, many others only partially
employed, but industry was reviving.

On land reform the Minister asserted very little had been done.

The American view is that 1 million officials would be needed to
enforce land reform.

Asked by Mr. Beazley if the Japanese knew they were on the verge
of defeat before the atom bomb was dropped, the Minister said that
he believed that generally speaking they did and that they had
been tremendously impressed by the events of the last few years.

The Minister said criticisms of SCAP by some newspapermen were
unfair as they failed to distinguish between what an occupying
force can do in the way of physical disarmament and
demilitarisation and the long term programme of land, political
and constitutional reforms. That the latter reforms were not
completed is not a fair criticism of SCAP.

When Mr. Boyer said that it seemed a long period of control was
necessary to lay the foundations of democracy in schools and
elsewhere, the Minister pointed out that, having provided the
framework, no more could be done: one cannot make a democracy of a
people and the occupation should not be carried so far that the
people will rise up against it.

To Professor Sadler's suggestion the political parties may not be
more than mere names, the Minister said it was a possibility but
it argued the existence of a very big conspiracy and ought not to
be assumed.

On whaling, the Minister pointed out that General MacArthur had
emphasised SCAP was acting under instructions from the American
Government in authorising the Antarctic whaling expeditions and
that these were provisional only. While he thought the resumption
of whaling by the Japanese, except with the consent of all
countries concerned, should be prohibited in the peace treaty, the
provisional attitude had much to be said for it as we were not
whaling ourselves.

Sir Douglas Mawson asserted Britain, Australia and New Zealand had
opened up the Antarctic region and should have a priority on
whaling there. We should ensure that whales are not over fished.

The Japanese before the war stated openly they did not intend to
observe the precautions against over fishing. Australia should
object to Japanese passing through our waters to the Antarctic and
assert our pre-eminent right. Mr. Beazley objected to American
films which asserted the Japanese abided by the whaling
regulations. When Mr. Beazley asked whether, with the acquisition
of Karafuto [3],the treaties giving the Japanese fishing and other
concessions in Sakhalin were abrogated, the Minister stated the
manifest intention of U.S.S.R. was to keep the Japanese out.

Mr. Corset raised the matter of protecting the pearling industry
of Australia, and the Minister indicated that it had been proposed
to introduce a clause into the peace treaty preventing pearling in
waters adjacent to Australian territories and mandates without the
Australian Government's consent.

When Mr. Wilkins said that as Japan had lost control of large
areas of land and had limited natural resources, it was doubtful
whether she could have a balanced economy in the future, the
Minister said that, subject to the necessity of preventing the
possibility of Japan re-arming, a balanced economy should be
encouraged in Japan.

Mr. Harrison suggested that on the removal of European armies from
Japan and as a result of a hard peace, there may develop a strong
pan-Asian movement. The Minister asserted the important thing was
to get a lasting peace rather than a treaty to be periodically
adjusted. We must avoid bringing the Allied powers into contempt;

terms which are too rigorous may be as dangerous as those which
are too soft.