Preliminary Notes on Provisional Agenda by Evatt CANBERRA, August
1947

TOP SECRET

1. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS.

(a) Countries to Participate in Pacific Peace Conference

1. For the Pacific settlement, treaty making should not be limited
to a few major Powers. There should be a democratic procedure on
the principle that such matters should be settled by discussion
among all States which made direct contributions to defeating the
aggressor nations, and which are directly concerned in the actual
terms of the settlement. This principle was recognised, in
relation to the policies governing the occupation of Japan, with
the establishment of the Far Eastern Commission.

2. The Australian Government advocates the drafting and conclusion
of the settlement with Japan by a representative conference with
membership corresponding substantially to that of the Far Eastern
Commission.

(b) Level of Representation

3. The Australian Government believes that, at the initial
proceedings of the conference, such as that suggested by the
United States Government on 11 July, each Government should be
free to determine its representation. For its part the Australian
Government could not contemplate the establishment of an expert or
deputy committee system until the basic directives had been
previously decided at the highest level.

(c) Method of Reaching Decisions

4. The practice and principle of veto should not be admitted in
international conferences.

5. Final decisions in the peace conference for Japan must be as
nearly as possible unanimous. Committee decisions should be
reached either by majority vote or, preferably, two-thirds vote,
always remembering that the objective is unanimity. Committee
decisions should be subject to confirmation in Plenary Conference.

(d) Time of Peace Conference

6. In view of the obvious tendency to unilateral decisions
affecting the whole future of Japan (and indeed the Pacific area
as a whole) and the related tendency to piece-meal settlement, and
in view of the fact that the present phase of military occupation
has completed its primary task of disarmament and
demilitarization, the Australian Government has been and is
impressed with the urgency of international action to draw up the
final settlement with Japan.

7. Dates are now being considered and the Australian Government
has expressed the view that the conference should be immediately
before or after the meeting of the United Nations Assembly.

(e) Venue

8. A Pacific location would be most suitable. There is a strong
case for a United States location. San Francisco or Pearl Harbour
seem preferable to Washington.

9. Australia would oppose any suggestion that the treaty be made
or signed in Japanese territory.

(f) Single Instrument or more (Final settlement or settlement by
stages?).

10. The matters for consideration include:

(i) Interim settlement providing for continuance of existing
supervision, with some modifications, followed in about five years
by a general settlement.

(ii) Four-power treaty, limited to disarmament and
demilitarization of Japan as suggested by former U.S. Secretary of
State, Mr. Byrnes, in June, 1946, to be followed later by a
general settlement.

(iii) Alternatively to (ii) a regional Pacific draft treaty within
United Nations framework providing for action against an aggressor
subject to the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

(iv) It is understood that in some circles it is thought that
settlement might be effected by two instruments:

a. Agreement between Allied powers for supervision, both economic
and military of Japan.

b. Peace treaty to be negotiated separately to which Japan would
be a party.

(v) Single instrument providing for all questions including
disarmament and territorial provisions, and envisaging the
continuance of supervision by an inter-Allied body, with gradual
relaxation of the supervision.

(g) Adherence of other countries which declared war on Japan

11. It will be necessary to provide for adherence of countries
which declared war on Japan but which did not actively participate
in the Pacific War or which are not members of the F.E.C. group.

These countries will wish formally to bring to an end the state of
war with Japan when the Treaty is concluded.

The United States Government, in an aide-memoire to other F.E.C.

countries on 11thJuly, 1947, Proposed a conference of the eleven
F.E.C. countries to discuss a peace treaty for Japan, and that
'after the draft has reached a sufficiently advanced stage, it
should be considered by a general conference of all the States at
war with Japan'.

(h) Obligations of Neutral Countries in Relation to Certain Parts
of the Treaty

12. The Japanese Government should be obligated not to enter into
commercial or other relations with former neutral countries,
except in accordance with the principles of the Treaty and, where
appropriate, with the consent of the Supervisory Commission.

2. BASIC OBJECTIVES OF THE ALLIED POWERS
13. (a) In the Potsdam Declaration of 26th July, 1945, it was laid
down, inter alia, that there must be eliminated for all time the
authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the
people of Japan into embarking on world conquest;

that until there is convincing proof that Japan's warmaking power
is destroyed, points in Japanese territory, to be designated by
the Allies, must be occupied;

that the Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the
revival and strengthening of the democratic tendencies among the
Japanese people;

and that Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as
will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just
reparations in kind but not those which would enable her to re-arm
for war.

14 (b) 'Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan', adopted by the Far
Eastern Commission on 19th June, 1947, states the following
ultimate objectives:

15. The ultimate objectives in relation to Japan, to which
policies for the post-surrender period for Japan should conform
are:

a. To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the
peace and security of the world.

b. To bring about the earliest possible establishment of a
democratic and peaceful government which will carry out its
international responsibilities, respect the rights of other
states, and support the objectives of the United Nations. Such
government in Japan should be established in accordance with the
freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

16. These objectives will be achieved by the following principal
means:

a. Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu,
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Skikoku and such minor outlying islands as may
be determined.

b. Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarised. The
authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will
be totally eliminated. All institutions expressive of the spirit
of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed.

c. The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for
individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights,
particularly the freedom of religion, assembly and association,
speech and the press. They shall be encouraged to form democratic
and representative organizations.

d. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will
sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in
kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To
this end access to, as distinguished from control, raw materials
should be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world
trade relations will be permitted.

17. At the time of adoption of this paper the following Australian
statement was placed on record with F.E.C.:

'The policies laid down in this paper are subject to and without
prejudice to discussions which will take place during the
negotiation of the Peace Treaty with Japan and the provisions of
the Peace Treaty with Japan.'
The Australian representative at the meeting said Australia
adopted the paper on this understanding.

18. (c) The Australian Minister for External Affairs stated on
26th February, 1947:

'Japan must never again be permitted to develop the means of
waging aggressive war. First and foremost therefore, ... we have
placed security ... secondly, we believe that a country which has
a genuinely democratic form of government is unlikely to embark on
a policy of aggression and is more likely to pursue means of
adjusting its interests to those of other countries ... Allied
aims for Japan fall into three main classes, namely military,
political and economic.'

19. The Australian Minister for External Affairs stated further on
6th June 1947:

'It is plain that the future control and supervision of Japan will
be the most important question for the peace conference to decide.

By no pretext should Japan be permitted to imitate the example of
Germany after World War I and again emerge as a menace to the
security of the Pacific or South East Asia ...

'But a merely negative policy towards Japan would be quite
inadequate. There is no reason why the Japanese people, provided
always that there is adequate control, should not gradually
develop into a peaceful democratic state. Constructive reform of
Japan's social, political and economic pattern is equally
important, and particular stress is being laid on the formulation
of provisions to deal with the review of the Japanese constitution
and the gradual democratisation of that country, including the
continued encouragement of trade unions, progressive reform of the
educational system and a more drastic reform of the system of land
tenure than that already instituted.'

3. CONTROL OR SUPERVISION OF JAPAN

(Machinery for securing achievement of basic objectives of the
Allied Powers).

(a) Supervisory Commission for Japan

20. For the purpose of securing the carrying out of the basic
objectives of the Allied Powers and the specific undertakings
given by Japan in the Treaty, there should be a Supervisory
Commission for Japan. This Commission should consist of
representatives of selected Governments of the States signatory to
the Treaty.

(b) Functions of Supervisory Body

21. The Commission would supervise the implementation of the terms
of the Treaty.

22. Where the Commission was satisfied that the Japanese
Government had failed to comply with any provision of the Treaty,
it should instruct the Japanese Government to take action in
accordance with its obligations under the Treaty.

23. Where the Commission decided that the Japanese Government had
evaded or failed to comply with its instructions in respect of
breaches of the Provisions of this Treaty, it should decide what
consequential directives should be issued.

24. The Commission could determine from time to time in respect of
particular provisions of the Treaty that the Japanese Government
had fulfilled these provisions and that supervision in respect of
these provisions was therefore no longer necessary.

25. The Commission would also determine from time to time of which
international bodies, agencies, etc., the Japanese Government
should apply for membership and at what date.

26. If the Supervisory Commission considered that the Japanese
Government was failing to fulfil satisfactorily its economic
obligations under the Peace Treaty it would consult with the
Japanese Government on possible modifications of policy, and, if
necessary, instruct the Japanese Government on economic policy.

27. The Commission should be empowered to establish the machinery
of supervision and inspection necessary for the fulfilment of its
purposes and functions.

28. The Commission's inspectorial staffs and secretariat should be
international in character and recruited from nationals of members
of the Supervisory Commission.

29. Costs of the secretariat, inspectorial staff, and military
occupation force should be borne by the Japanese Government,
salaries and allowances of representatives on the Commission by
member Governments appointing them.

(c) Voting

30.Decisions of the Commission should be taken by simple majority
or two-thirds vote.

(d) Means of Enforcement

31. An Allied force of some character should be associated with
the Supervisory Commission. These forces should be under undivided
command. Their composition should be agreed at the time of the
settlement. The Supervisory Commission should have power to impose
certain defined economic restrictions.

(e) Extent of Military Occupation

32. Alternatives after the signing of the treaty, appear to
include:

(i) Japan to be occupied by forces of the Allied countries until
the Supervisory Commission decided these forces should:

i) be limited to certain points in Japan, or
ii) be evacuated altogether.

Meanwhile the occupying forces not to be restricted to any
specified areas. These forces could at the discretion of the
Supervisory Commission, be supplemented by forces garrisoning
adjacent island bases.

OR

(ii) Small garrisons of the Supervisory Commission for Japan might
be placed at certain designated areas in Japan. These forces might
be supplemented by forces garrisoning adjacent island bases.

OR

(iii) All Allied troops to be withdrawn from the main Japanese
Islands. Garrison forces under the control of the Supervisory
Commission to be stationed in adjacent island bases. The
Supervisory Commission for Japan to have the right to land forces
in Japan for the purpose of preserving order or ensuring
compliance by the Japanese Government with the terms of the
Treaty; and full rights to patrol Japanese waters and the air
above Japan with its naval and air forces.

4. TERRITORIAL PROVISIONS

(a) Boundaries of Japan-Main Islands

33. As provided in the Potsdam Declaration, Japan's sovereignty to
be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku and inner
adjacent islands thereto, including Tsushima.

34. Any suggestions by the Japanese for plebiscites in territories
of their former Empire should be rejected, except possibly in the
case of islands which lie very close to the four main islands, and
which are not strategically important.

35. Japan to renounce all rights in and to Korea, Manchuria,
China, the island of Sakhalin (Karafuto), the Kuriles (Chishima
Islands), Formosa (Taiwan), the Pescadores Islands, the Ryuku
(Loochoo) Islands, the Bonin Islands, the Volcano Islands, Marcus
Island, Quelpart (Saishu) Island, the Marshall Islands, Caroline
Islands and the Mariana Islands, the Spratley Islands, the
Falkland Islands dependencies, and Antarctica.

(b) Manchuria including Dairen and Port Arthur

36. (i) Japan to recognize the restoration of Manchuria to China.

Equal treatment in Manchuria for the commerce, and subjects or
citizens of all member states of the United Nations to be
guaranteed.

(ii) Dairen
37. The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalised, as
provided for in Clause 2(b) of the Yalta Agreement. Dairen should
be a free port, open to the shipping and unrestricted commerce of
all nations. The administering authorities should guarantee to
provide just and adequate access to wharves and warehouses in the
port.

(iii) Port Arthur
38. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14th August, 1945, concerning
agreement on Port Arthur provides for the joint use of Port Arthur
as a Naval Base by the U.S.S.R. and China. The terms of this use
are provided for in Articles II-IX of the above agreement, and in
the Appendices to the Agreement.

(c) Korea (Chosen)

39. The terms of the Moscow Agreement of December, 1945, should be
implemented.

Quelpart Island should be recognised as part of Korea.

(d) Southern Sakhalin and Kuriles

40. Southern Sakhalin should be restored to the U.S.S.R., and the
Kuriles ceded to U.S.S.R. in accordance with the Yalta Agreement.

(e) Formosa and Pescadores

41. These should be restored to China in accordance with the Cairo
Declaration.

(f) Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas

42. The trusteeship of the U.S.A. over these islands, approved by
the United Nations in 1947, should be recognized.

(g) Ryukyus, Bonin, Volcano and Marcus

43. United States sovereignty or control of Japanese islands
outside the four main islands should be favoured. The islands
might be held under trusteeship under the 'strategic area'
provisions of the Charter.

44. Civil rights should be granted to nationals of members of the
United Nations and Japanese nationals in the territories taken
from Japan. If so, procedure for enforcement of rights should be
established.

45. The Japanese should, in view of their dependence on fishing
for their national economy and food, be granted fishing rights and
the right to shelter in the territorial waters of adjacent islands
and territories, subject to conditions and restrictions to be
imposed by the Supervisory Commission.

5. DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARISATION

(a) Military, Naval and Air

46. Japan should remain completely disarmed and demilitarised.

Internal disorders should be prevented by a nonmilitary police
force. This force should be prohibited from setting up 'special'
branches or agencies that might take in the functions of political
police. Careful inspection should be exercised by the Supervisory
Commission for Japan.

(b) Atomic Energy

47. A policy decision by F.E.C. prohibits all Japanese research
and activity in atomic energy. Supervision should be exercised by
the Supervisory Commission for Japan.

(c) Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare

48. The Supervisory Commission for Japan should ensure that
preparations are not being made, or stocks built up, for chemical
and bacteriological warfare.

(d) Manufacture

49. All armament manufacture should be forbidden. The Supervisory
Commission for Japan should undertake constant inspection, and
supervision should be exercised over heavy industries to ensure
the performance of such limitations as [may] be imposed in the
Economic Provisions ([7] below).

(e) Naval Shipbuilding

50. Japan should be prohibited from building any kind of naval
vessel.

Super-vision of this provision should be exercised by the
Supervisory Commission for Japan.

6. POLITICAL PROVISIONS
A. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND DEMOCRATIZATION

(a) Review of the Constitution

51.. The Japanese Government should undertake to maintain the
principles of the Constitution of 3 May 1947, as defined in the
F.E.C. policies of 2 July 1946 and 25 September 1946.

52. The constitution should be reviewed by the Diet not sooner
than one year and not later than two years from 3 May 1947, in
accordance with the principles of the F.E.C. decision of 17
October 1946. The Supervisory Commission should also review the
constitution within the same period, and may require a referendum
or some other appropriate procedure for ascertaining Japanese
opinion with respect to the constitution.

(b) The Purge

53. Japan should undertake to exclude from public office all those
persons who have already been so excluded because of their ultra-
nationalistic or militaristic affiliations.

54. The Japanese Government should however have the right to
submit to the Supervisory Commission for Japan the names of purged
individuals who, in its opinion, should, subject to the approval
of the Supervisory Commission, be permitted to resume public
office.

55. The Supervisory Commission should also have power to order the
exclusion of any person deemed unfit for public office because of
his nationalistic or militaristic activities.

(c) Public Service

56. There should be no discrimination in recruitment to and
promotion in the Public Service.

(d) Education

57. Japan should undertake to implement the F.E.C. policy decision
on education.

(e) Ultra-Nationalistic Societies

58. Japanese should undertake that secret and other ultra-
nationalistic societies shall remain disbanded, and new ones
prevented. The Supervisory Commission for Japan should secure
compliance with this.

(f) Special Police and Para-Militaty Organisations

59. The Japanese Government should undertake not to re-establish
any special police and para-military organisations, and this
undertaking should be supervised by the Supervisory Commission for
Japan.

(g) State Shintoism

60. The Japanese Government should not re-adopt the system of
providing State subsidies for Shinto shrines, clergy, or
organisations, nor should there be other financial connections,
direct or indirect, between Shintoism and the Japanese State.

(h) Protection of Civil Rights

61. Provision should be made for the protection and enforcement of
civil rights within Japan.

B. TREATIES, ETC.

(a) Japanese Rights and Interests Outside Japan

62. Japan should renounce all rights and interests, both public
and private, located outside Japan. These to be expropriated by
the local administrations.

63. Government and private assets should be set off against
Reparations claims.

(b) Treaties

(i) Bilateral
64. Each Power signatory to the treaty to inform Japan, within six
months of the Treaty coming into force, which of the pre-war
bilateral treaties it desires to keep in force or revive.

(ii) Multilateral
65. With the approval or at the direction of the Supervisory
Commission, Japan should be re-instated as a signatory of such
agreements as the Madrid Convention on Telecommunications of 1932,
health conventions, etc., after examination of the individual
agreements.

66. With the approval or at the direction of the Supervisory
Commission, Japan should also subscribe to agreements to which she
was not a party (such as the Convention of Copyright of 1928).

67. Such instruments as the Declaration of Human Rights should be
adhered to by Japan.

(iii)Peace Treaties
68. Japan should recognise the peace treaties already signed and
yet to be signed between the Allies and their enemies (European,
Siam, etc.).

(iv) Other Treaties
69. Japan also to recognise in the peace treaty such other
existing treaties as may be considered desirable (e.g. Sino-Soviet
Treaty of 14 August 1945).

(c) Recognition of Occupation Acts

70. Full legal validity should be given to acts of the occupying
authorities, whether before or after the coming into force of the
peace treaty. Full legal validity should similarly be given to all
acts of Japanese nationals done in accordance with directions or
policies of the occupying authorities.

C. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

71. Japan should be permitted to enter into diplomatic and
commercial relations with foreign countries, subject to approval
in each case by the Supervisory Commission.

72. Japan should be allowed to seek membership of the United
Nations and the International Court when permitted by the
Supervisory Commission.

73. Japan should also be allowed to seek membership, when
permitted by the Supervisory Commission, in international economic
organisations such as F.A.O., I.L.O., etc., and in such
international organisations as U.N.E.S.C.O.

74. The Supervisory Commission should in any case have power to
require Japan to observe duties and obligations placed on members
of the organisations and to take appropriate action to further the
aims of the organisations, and in particular to provide such
information as is required by international economic
organisations.

75. While Japan must not maintain any armed forces, she should
make available bases and general facilities to the United Nations,
for security purposes.

7. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

(a) Trade Unions and Employers' Associations

76. Every encouragement should be given to the development of
Trade Unions in accordance with the F.E.C. policy decision of
December 6, 1946. There should be complete freedom of working
groups to form associations, improve their occupational status,
hours, wages, and conditions of work. There should also be
complete freedom of these associations to take industrial action
to achieve their objectives and take constitutional political
action and to form political parties for similar purposes.

77. Manufacturers and trade associations, aimed at protecting the
interests and independence of employers, should also be encouraged
but they should not be allowed to adopt excessive restrictive
practices.

(b) Land Reform

78. As a political basis for land reform small rural landholders
and tenants should be encouraged to form groups or associations
and political parties. The Japanese Government should be required
to implement a policy of land reforms such as was proposed by the
British Commonwealth Member to the Seventh Meeting of the A.C.J.

[1] Such a policy should provide for an increase in land ownership
and improve tenancy conditions. There should also be a policy
seeking, as a general goal, the provision of fiscal and financial
aid to farmers, the reduction of agricultural operating costs and
an increase in agricultural productivity.

(c) Dissolution of the Zaibatsu

79. The Zaibatsu should be dissolved and for the time being all
Zaibatsu holdings should be controlled by the State. Key
industries, including heavy industries, should be taken over by
the State, and control of banking and investment should be
concentrated in a central bank. After there has been an
opportunity for wider distribution of incomes and savings,
consideration should be given to the control of the smaller and
lighter industries by co-operatives, small independent
entrepreneurs and joint stock companies. Operations of this
nature, however, should be subject to agreement between the
Japanese Government and the Supervisory Commission for Japan.

80. Consideration should be given to making arrangements for
democratically elected local government bodies to take over public
utilities.

(d) Economic equality

81. The Japanese Government should promote improved conditions of
work, and greater equality in the distribution of wealth. It
should, therefore, endeavour to eliminate substandard conditions
of labour throughout its jurisdiction and to improve social
security standards. It should also encourage co-operative
enterprises, particularly in agriculture, and the extension of
ownership and production to make full use of Japan's national
resources.

82. In furtherance of these ends, the Japanese Government should
adopt, among other things, an appropriate fiscal policy including
a system of progressive taxation.

(e) Maintenance of Domestic Employment

83. Japan should act in accordance with the principles of the
United Nations Charter in achieving and maintaining full and
productive employment.

(f) Transition controls

84. In order to maintain a stable economy over the transitional
period (say until 1950) the Japanese Government should be required
to enforce effective control of prices and raw materials and
should be required to ration equitably essential consumer goods.

(g) Access to Raw Materials

85. As determined from time to time by the Supervisory Commission,
Japan should have access to the raw materials necessary for its
peace time needs. For security purposes the Supervisory Commission
for Japan should have the power and duty to refuse access to raw
materials which it considers are not essential to these needs. In
particular the Commission should supervise imports of iron and
steel, bauxite and aluminium, and oil. Japan should not be allowed
to obtain control of raw materials in other countries.

(h) Commercial Policy

86. The limitation of the volume of export trade by associations,
the allocation of export quotas among members of these
associations, and the forcing of trade into exclusively Japanese
channels by the limitation of the associations' membership, should
be eliminated completely. The Supervisory Commission should have
power to declare that the Japanese Government is using
discriminatory practices and to instruct it to modify its trade
policy.

87. As a safeguard against the development of war potential behind
trade barriers, the Japanese Government should not be permitted to
impose protective import duties or restrictions on Oil, steel,
iron, aluminium, and chemical fertilizers, without the consent of
the Supervisory Commission.

88. The Commission should investigate tariffs to ensure that they
are not being imposed for disguised strategic reasons, and the
fact that a tariff supports production which is apparently
uneconomic in the long run should be sufficient grounds for
undertaking an investigation of it.

(i) Fiscal Policy

89. The Supervisory Commission should be able to supervise public
accounts in order to detect expenditure for undesirable ends, such
as export subsidies, potential military organisations or
unauthorised productive capacity. It should also be able to
supervise the taxation system in order to ensure it is equitable
and to prevent rapid inflation. To this end the Japanese
Government should be required to prepare any report the Commission
directs.

(j) Fishing, whaling and sealing

90. There should be a strict control by the Supervisory Commission
of Japanese fishing, whaling and sealing, to prevent depletion of
resources. In particular Japan should be required to subscribe to
the International Whaling Agreement of 1946 and to a renewal of
the Convention for the Protection of Fur Seals of 1911.

Consideration should be given to the areas within which Japanese
fishing, whaling, and Pearling are permitted. Japanese whaling in
the Antarctic should either be prevented or made subject to
approval of interested Allied Powers and to conditions laid down.

Japan should not be allowed to whale from factory ships, and
should be confined to land bases in Japan.

(k) Pearling

91. Japanese pearling should not be permitted without approval,
and, if permitted, should contribute to the revenue of the state
in whose waters the pearling is carried on. Pearling should not be
permitted south of 10 N.

(l) Shipping

92. Japanese shipping should be limited to vessels not exceeding
5,000 gross registered tons of which all newly constructed or
acquired vessels should have a single deck only. The construction
of vessels should be limited to those not exceeding a stipulated
speed. In general the total merchant shipping tonnage owned by
Japan should be limited to a maximum sufficient for satisfactory
conduct of trade between Japan's own islands and such oversea
traffic as the Allied and Associated Powers deem necessary.

(m) Heavy Industries

93. The capacity of industries which have a bearing on Japanese
war potential should be limited to the amount necessary for
Japan's legitimate peace time needs, with such additional
restrictions or limitations as might be necessary in the interests
of Allied security.

(n) Civil Aviation

94. Japan should be forbidden to possess or operate aircraft or to
have any aviation manufacturing industry, including plant for the
manufacture of gliders and lighter than air craft. Internal
aviation should be run by an International Corporation and the
Supervisory Commission for Japan should consider the question of
Japan joining the I.C.A.O.

(o) Property, Rights and Interests

95. The property, rights and interests of the United Nations
nationals and United Nations assets frozen in Japan should be
restored.

96. The payment of debts owing to United Nations nationals by the
Japanese should be enforced by the Japanese Government subject to
the supervision of the Commission.

97. The rights of United Nations nationals in copyrights, patents,
trade-marks and designs existing at the outbreak of war should be
preserved. Similar rights held by Japanese nationals outside Japan
at the time of the surrender should be expropriated.

98. Contracts which involve wartime trading with the enemy should
be dissolved as from the date at which enemy character became
apparent. Periods of prescriptions should be considered as having
been suspended during the war. With regard to negotiable
instruments no prejudice or invalidity should arise owing to
failure to present protests, etc. during the war. Member
Governments of the United Nations should have power to examine
Japanese judgments including prize court judgments made during the
war and the Japanese Government, at the request of member
Governments of the United Nations, should ensure cancellation of
any judgment not made according to law.

8. REPARATIONS, RESTITUTION, AND COSTS OF OCCUPATION

(a) General Reparations

99. Reparations should be calculated on broad political lines and
based on justice, taking into account the relative contribution of
each nation to victory and the physical losses and damage
sustained.

100. The following categories of Japanese assets might be
considered for reparations:

(a) Capital equipment.

(b) Shipping.

(c) Gold, silver, other precious metals, and gems.

(d) External assets.

(e) Current production.

101. Out of its share of reparations from Japan, special provision
should be made as far as practicable by each country for
compensation for prisoners of war (including internees) and/or
their relatives, in cases where war crimes or cruelties, committed
in violation of the rules and practices of war and humanity,
caused death or permanent injury to the sufferer.

(b) Restitution

102. The Japanese Government should undertake to make full
restitution in accordance with F.E.C. decisions to United Nations
nationals of all property identified as having been located in an
Allied country at the time of occupation of that country, and
which was removed by fraud or duress by the Japanese or their
agents.

(c) Occupation Costs

103. The Japanese Government should meet the costs of occupation
of Japan.

H. V. EVATT.