Ministerial Dispatch 5/1947 (extract) TOKYO, 12 December 1947

SECRET

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS IN JAPAN

I have the honour to submit the following notes of my
interpretation of General MacArthur's views and policies on a
number of topics. As you can imagine, it is difficult to recall
exactly the Supreme Commander's flow of carefully selected words,
and the expressions attributed to him below should be taken as a
paraphrase only.

1. The Occupation
General MacArthur's view, based on his reading of history, is that
any military Occupation is apt to deteriorate after three or four
years. The one example that comes to his mind of a successful
occupation is that of Caesar's in Gaul. The Romans succeeded in
imposing their institutions and ideas and a sense of loyalty to
Rome, which lasted for centuries. Caesar accomplished his purpose
by a firmness, tolerance and understanding and this would be the
pattern which General MacArthur would like to think was being
imposed on Japan.

General MacArthur believes that the Allied Occupation of Japan is
not yet going bad in the sense that the Japanese are tired of it
or the Allied forces becoming demoralised. With this view I would
concur. The Occupation brings to the Japanese a great stock of
material benefits including some $250 million of food and supplies
each year from the United States, which far more than offsets the
only real burden on the Japanese, namely, the provision of housing
for the Allied Armies and their dependents.

General MacArthur fears, however, that if the Occupation lasts too
long Japan might end by becoming an American colony. As he sees
it, the United States might become an imperialistic power despite
itself and without any positive wish of the people. If the
Occupation dragged on as an international undertaking, it would be
hard to continue to justify its cost to the American people and
the tendency would then be for America to look for some concrete
return.

The Supreme Commander remarked that should such a situation
develop, namely, the Occupation of Japan as a purely American
affair, he believed that Australia and the British Commonwealth as
a whole would understand. Australia was closely linked with the
United States politically and economically and, in any case, her
main interest in Japan was a security one which would be well
looked after.

I have learned confidentially, but on good authority, that the
subject of the Emperor's most recent interview with General
MacArthur, which was kept most secret, was the continuance of
American interests in Japan. The leader of the Liberal Party, Mr.

Yoshida, had previously suggested bluntly to the Supreme Commander
that America should sign at an early date and unilaterally a peace
treaty with Japan with a provision under which the Japanese would
call on America for armed support. I am told that the Emperor
later made an impassioned plea for the same course of action. The
suggestion was turned down but it was revealing of the opinion of
conservative Japanese as to where their best interests lie. It is
revealing also of the Emperor's conception of the functions of a
constitutional monarch.

2. B.C.O.F.

On the subject of the continued participation of the British
Commonwealth Forces in the Occupation, General MacArthur has
stressed that the retention of these forces is essentially a
matter for decision by the Governments concerned. He was careful
to say that he could not be quoted as expressing a view which
should be communicated officially. Entirely unofficially and
personally, however, he said that he hoped that Australian Forces
would be retained even though in a diminished form. He remarked
that the United Kingdom troops were being withdrawn and that, of
course, the New Zealanders could not stay without Australians. He
realised that there were many people in Australia who opposed the
maintenance of a standing army and that our budgetary commitments
for defence had to be carefully watched. If an army were to be
maintained, it might as well be in Japan. The headquarters
establishment and the name BCOF could stand as a sign for the eyes
of the world.

I believe that General MacArthur's views should be given due
weight when the time comes for reviewing our Australian
commitments in Japan. I am aware that it is the opinion of certain
of the highest ranking Australian Army officers that the retention
of the Australian forces in Japan serves no useful purpose. This
view is based largely on the belief that the Japanese resent the
presence of our troops and that the Occupation is burdensome. I
would repeat that I have seen no evidence of active Japanese
resentment over the presence of our troops who are, on the whole,
extremely well behaved. I consider it important that they should
be retained firstly, in view of our close relations with the
United States and with General MacArthur and secondly, because of
our particular interests in this area.

3. The Allied Council for Japan
It is now apparent that the Occupation will continue for longer
than had been considered likely four months ago and the functions
of the Allied Council during the coming year require
consideration.

I have discussed this question with General MacArthur and with the
Chairman of the Allied Council, Mr. William J. Sebald. [1] General
MacArthur had not given much thought to it as he did not, in the
first instance, want the Council nor does he regard it as of any
great importance. He claimed that he had tried in every possible
way to make the Council a useful body but that it had become a
mere sounding board for international differences. He said that
this was due largely to the fact that the proceedings were public
and therefore open to exaggeration by the press. He believed that
the Council would be more useful if it met informally and
privately in his own rooms. It would be impossible to alter the
provisions in the Council's rules of procedure prescribing that
formal meetings be held in public, (which, by the way, had been
inserted originally on American initiative), but he thought it
might be possible to cut down the number of formal meetings.

Discussions in his rooms would be on trends of policy rather than
on details of administration. He expressed the view that the
Council had been set up originally to advise SCAP on directives to
the Japanese Government and that now the Japanese Government
itself was functioning with only limited advice from GHQ, SCAP.

General MacArthur remarked that my predecessor had had an
erroneous idea of the functions of the Council which, he had
thought, should have had some functions of government itself. He
said that Mr. Ball had, in effect, acted as a 100% opposition,
even to the extent of obviating the need for the Soviet member to
criticise. He said that there had been only one occasion on which
he had received helpful advice from the Council and that was when
he had called it together in his own rooms to ask their advice as
to whether there should be a general election. This was shortly
after he had prohibited the general strike. [2] General MacArthur
said that while the Council had done no constructive work, it had
done no harm. He went on to remark on the complete lack of
interest in the work of the Council in America and elsewhere and
said that the same thing applied to the F.E.C. The F.E.C. tried to
perform many of the functions which the Allied Council for Japan
might have carried out but the F.E.C. had now become a sort of
representatives club which seemed merely to analyse and reword
into Directives the policy which SCAP had already been following.

Mr. Sebald said that he had not discussed the future functions of
the Allied Council with the Supreme Commander but he foresaw
difficulties in altering the terms of reference, including the
provision for meetings to be held not less than once a fortnight.

He personally held the view that it would have been better, if
possible, to abandon the Council altogether but that the USSR
would not agree to such a course.

Mr. Sebald revealed he had hoped to continue presenting to the
Council a series of SCAP, GHQ reports on different aspects of
development in Japan. The Supreme Commander had, however, been
annoyed by the reaction of the Council to the last report on
education which had been the subject of a long critical reply from
the Soviet member. General MacArthur said he considered that the
Council was merely setting forth national view points and not
advising disinterestedly on policy.

Mr. Sebald concluded by saying that he was willing to try to
continue to make a go of the Council and suggested that discussion
should not be on details of administration but on general lines of
policy. He said that he would be interested to hear if we had any
views as to its future status and work.

The position now is that the Allied Council over the past three
months has been fed with GHQ reports presented by the Chairman on
which other members of the Council have expressed their views.

Apparently the comments made in the Council have been considered
by the Supreme Commander as too critical and not sufficiently
constructive. In my view, the Council discussions have served some
useful purpose by acting as some stimulus not only on the Japanese
Government, but on the particular Sections of SCAP, GHQ concerned.

Proceedings of the Council are reported at length in the Japanese
vernacular press and I have noticed that Japanese political
leaders and officials are always aware of what is going on at the
meetings. So far as GHQ is concerned, I am told that a number of
studies and projects have been altered and abandoned because of
views expressed at Council meetings.

On the other hand, I am aware that outside Japan the proceedings
of the Council (as other happenings in Japan) have little interest
and that on the highest levels in SCAP the Council is regarded at
the best as a necessary evil. It would, however, be both
impracticable and undesirable to have any alteration in the terms
of reference of the Council on the lines tentatively suggested by
the Supreme Commander and the Chairman. It must be taken that the
Council will continue to hold formal fortnightly meetings in
public, whatever informal meetings the Supreme Commander should
choose to call. Should SCAP persist in his present unwillingness
to continue presenting detailed reports on aspects of the
Occupation, the Council may well find itself -as it did on its
last meeting on 10th December-with no business to perform. This
meeting lasted only about 30 seconds. The question then arises
whether the Australian Government or the Governments of the other
British Commonwealth countries which I represent on the Council
are prepared to take the initiative in bringing matters before the
Council. On this question I would merely point out the proved
sensitivity of the Supreme Commander to comment and criticism
expressed in the Council. Any matter brought up would have to be a
question of general policy and care would have to be taken to
avoid the charge that national interests were being ventilated.

4. Peace Treaty
On 9th December I called on General MacArthur at my own request
before leaving for Australia. In discussing the Peace Treaty with
Japan, he asked me to assure you that his view remained exactly
the same as it had been four months ago. He talked of the
difficulties which had arisen over the recent revelations of the
attitudes of China and the USSR. He said that the Chinese were
indulging in political blackmail and he was convinced that their
bluff could be called. His view was that the State Department
should go ahead with holding preliminary talks as planned.

Invitations should be issued to everybody and left open if certain
people did not at once choose to attend. The preliminaries for a
conference might take maybe six to nine months, during which time
China and Russia could reconsider their viewpoints. He was sure
that the Chinese would decide that they could not afford to stay
out. As for the Russians, at present they saw themselves in the
position of being able alone to hold things up completely and they
also might change their minds after they saw that other people
were determined to go ahead.

General MacArthur said that he would not yet give an opinion as to
whether the Peace Treaty could be signed without the USSR.

Certainly the preliminaries could be carried out and a decision on
the ultimate drafting and signature made later. There were pros
and cons about having the Russians in, but it would be obviously
better if they were included. On the other hand, it would be open
to argument when the time came if they were still intransigent.

General MacArthur said that the only advice he could give to you
was to tell you to keep up the pressure. He digressed at length
about Secretary of State Marshall whom he described as a
bottleneck. He said that Mr. Marshall all through his military
career had had the same reputation. He was not able to concentrate
on the salient points but had to wade through a mass of material.

He could only concentrate on one thing at a time. The question of
the peace conference had therefore bogged down in the State
Department through inertia. The only thing that moved Mr. Marshall
was press opinion. The Supreme Commander said that his only advice
could therefore be to keep public opinion and the press stimulated
although he admitted that in America, as in Australia, there was
little public interest in the question of the Japanese Peace
Treaty. He repeated that you should know that his position was
exactly the same as it had been four months ago and he thought
that you should press strongly for immediate action by the State
Department.

In referring to the location for a Peace Conference, General
MacArthur said that Washington would be the worst possible place
as the Russians would not go there in any circumstances. He
brushed aside San Francisco and said that Pearl Harbour had too
many bad memories for Americans. Shanghai, which I suggested, he
said could not guarantee security or proper arrangements. Although
he had once had in mind Tokyo, he now believed that a Conference
would disrupt the Occupation too much, although some sort of
concluding ceremony might possibly be held there. As a tentative
position, he put forward Baguio in the Philippines as a suitable
site. The present UNECAFE Meeting would have provided some
experience in holding such conferences. No nation could object to
a situation which was not the capital of any country and was in
the centre of the area concerned. 5. U.S.S.R.

General MacArthur is much more restrained in his comments on the
USSR than the majority of the members of his staff. He has,
however, a deep underlying fear and suspicion of Russian
ruthlessness and ambitions. His world viewpoint is very much an
Asiatic one and he has even spoken of Europe as a western
extension of the Asiatic continent. Seen in this perspective,
Japan's role can well be regarded as that of a stabilizing force
for the whole of Asia against what would be regarded as the
destructive ideas of Russian Communism. General MacArthur once
described what he called 'The Russian' as the most ruthless and
efficient person in the world, the second of which adjectives
probably would not bear too close an analysis. He regards the
Japanese as ruthless only when wrongfully led, as they have been
over the past decade.

Granted his fundamental concepts of the relations of the USSR and
Japan in Asia, General MacArthur is comparatively free from the
intemperate outbursts of other American military and political
leaders. On the other hand, it must be recalled that shortly after
the arrival of General Derevyanko in Tokyo, the Supreme Commander
warned the Soviet member on the Allied Council that if he or his
staff overstepped at all the limits of their functions they would
'be sent back to Russia in irons'. The Supreme Commander is
convinced that what the USSR wants most in Japan is to remove him.

This he believes would be a strong motive in encouraging the
Soviet Union to participate in talks for the early conclusion of a
peace. The way would then be open for an increase in Russian
propaganda activity which at the moment is rigidly curbed by the
American forces.