When I went to say good-bye yesterday to M. Baudet, the Head of
the Pacific Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he
expressed certain views which I think I should report to you.

As you know, Baudet has a rank of Minister and is the principal
adviser to M. Bidault on Pacific and Far Eastern questions. Baudet
began by speaking of the considerable interest which your recent
statements on South East Asian affairs have aroused in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and said that he hoped you would be
aware of this.

He went on to complain that public opinion in France generally and
other Departments of the Administration, such as the Ministry of
France Overseas, is insufficiently aware of the importance of
developments in the Pacific area and that the French Parliament is
particularly unrealistic in its approach to them. He said that a
solution to the Indo-Chinese problem, for example, is never sought
on its own merits but always from the point of view either of the
Right or the Extreme Left, the two groups who are most vocal on
the question. If a Liberal approach is attempted, the Right can
raise the cry that France's historic Mission is being betrayed
and, on the other hand, if firmness is shown towards the Viet Nam
Extremists, the Communist Party feels bound to come to their
rescue for purely party reasons.

Baudet said that in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which as yet
has little say in the Indo-Chinese question, they have come to the
view that France alone will be incapable of effecting a solution.

There have been hints that this view is shared by the Minister of
France Overseas, M. Moutet, but Baudet was very specific. In his
opinion, France has not the power to continue military efforts
indefinitely and the only circumstances in which a settlement can
be achieved are those which will enable the Viet Nam leaders to
save 'face'. He therefore believed that international action would
be necessary and he added that, in his own opinion, the time was
approaching when some form of general settlement in South East
Asia, in which every interested Power took part, would be perhaps
the best plan.

As it had often seemed to us in the Department and here in the
Legation that this belt of weak territories-Indo-China, Siam and
Burma, Malaya and Indonesia-standing between Australia and the
great Asiatic countries, could only form an effective buffer
region for Australia strategically if it were in some way
organised on co-operative lines and perhaps offering bases to the
United Nations in the area, I encouraged him to develop this idea
further. He said that, while he had not yet had a chance of
speaking to Bidault on the subject, he proposed to do so and, in
his own view, perhaps even some form of confederation was not
entirely impracticable and might, indeed be quite desirable. He
thought, however, that the idea would have to be taken up once the
necessary soundings had been made among the local peoples by some
statesman of world stature, such as yourself. As this seemed to be
calculated and meant to be passed on to you, I now do so for what
you may think of it.

Baudet has always struck me as a rather taciturn individual and I
have been almost irritated by his reserve and unwillingness to
commit himself, even in a general discussion, on topics such as
the above. His anxiety to talk on this occasion was therefore all
the more interesting.