Following is account by State Department officials of U.S.

assessment of probable course of Security Council action.

(a) U.S. resolution [1] now has support of China, Colombia, and
Syria. Argentine and Canadian position is unclear. U.S.

Ambassador, Ottawa, has been instructed to see Pearson and press
for support which is hoped. Soviet-Ukrainian position not yet
known. In view of Hatta's action against communists U.S.S.R.

apparently hesitated as to line they should take, but probably
will call for condemnation of Dutch and complete withdrawal of all
Dutch forces from Indonesia. if this is defeated they will
probably support U.S. resolution, which would then pass. Belgian
opposition assumed, but in view of Herremans' association with
Cochran and Critchley today Belgium might abstain. Assumed U.K.

and France will support cease-fire and abstain on withdrawal.

French veto not feared.

(b) U.S. fear Netherlands will continue to deny jurisdiction of
Council and will not withdraw. They doubt whether Dutch will even
allow opportunity for Good Offices Committee to make authoritative
report. This would make even clearer Dutch defiance. U.S. would in
that event be disposed to support resolution condemning Dutch
(they do not think this should be included in present resolution).

(c) U.S. does not consider majority could be secured for Security
Council resolution to impose economic sanctions although U.S.

might support such a resolution if it had a chance of success. At
most, support might be obtained for sanctions directed against
Dutch in N.E.I. only. Another possibility would be resolution
approving action taken by United Nations members in support of
Council decision but not calling on members to participate.

However, U.S. considers that if
(a) Council passes cease-fire and withdrawal
(b) Dutch do not comply
(c) Council condemns Dutch,
this would amount to approval by Council of whatever steps
Governments decided to take unilaterally or on a regional basis
(such as action already taken by Ceylon and India. [2] United
States understands India may break off diplomatic relations with
Netherlands.)
2. Our impression is that United States does not wish to take any
economic measures other than the suspension of ECA authorizations
to NEI now in effect. State Department officials claim that
administration does not have constitutional power to upset
contracts once concluded or to stop deliveries. (Our reading of
Sections 118 and 119 of the ECA Act is that delivery of supplies
scheduled could be terminated although question is complicated by
differing procedures, e.g., whether by subsequent reimbursement or
by letter of commitment. Also, in order to terminate deliveries,
assistance would have to be terminated for the Netherlands and not
merely N.E.I. It would also require finding either that
Netherlands had not adhered to its ECA agreement or that
assistance is not consistent with the national interest of the
U.S.) So far the U.S. Government have scrupulously avoided any
such finding and has based suspension purely on the ground that
there is no assurance that aid can be distributed efficiently!