The object of this and following telegrams K.36 and K.37 is to get
the benefit of your own, the Minister's, and if you consider it
desirable, the Prime Minister's opinon. Grateful if you could let
me have these by to-morrow as I am returning to Djokjakarta early
on Sunday for a specially convened meeting between the Committee
Soekarno, Hatta (brought from Sumatra by the Dutch consent),
Sjahrir (similarly brought from Singapore) and Cabinet. I will
therefore be out of telegraphic communication from 6 a.m. Sunday.

2. Following their rejection of the Committee's Christmas proposal
[1] t[he] Dutch have issued an ultimation on the threat of
resuming 'liberty of action', that the Republic accept without
delay the Dutch proposals for a truce on the understanding that
the Dutch themselves will accept the twelve political principles
as a starting point for immediately following political
discussions.

3. These principles and the Dutch truce agreement are set out
respectively in two following telegrams.

4. The Dutch have agreed to yield minor modifications of their own
truce plan but by and large have rejected suggestions of the
Republic and the Committee and indeed state that the Republic must
accept or reject the plan and principles as they stand at Sunday
conference.

5. Van Zeeland believes that if the Dutch proposals are accepted
unconditionally [...] [2] one exception to this namely that the
Dutch will add provision to the truce agreement that the Republic
have three seats out of nine in the Cabinet of the Interim
Government which was agreed to be immediately set up by the
Conference between the Dutch and non Republic[an] States last
Sunday.

6. It will be clear from attachments that the proposals of the
Netherlands, although in accordance with United Nations
principles, and although they appear reasonable, do not go as far
as the present situation requires. A further examination of the
Committee's Annex two will show the importance of the items the
Netherlands have rejected of the Committee's proposals. in
addition to refusing to consider the withdrawal of any of their
Military forces they have completely rejected principles 2 and 3
of Annex 2. [3] It will also be noticed that paragraph 3 of the
Netherlands principles is so worded that it would not be necessary
to prevent continued unilateral formations of states within Java,
Sumatra and Madura. [4] Even if the Republic were granted three
seats in the Interim Government, it is difficult to see how this
could be considered adequate particularly as there has been no
clarification as yet of the Interim Government's powers and
functions, nor how far the Interim Government will be under the
direction of the Netherlands representative (Van Mook) or the
Triumvirate (which will probably consist of Van Mook, Neher and
Van Vredenburch). [5] Any settlement satisfactory to Indonesian
freedom and Republican aspirations seems to me improbable while
Van Vredenburch retains some initiative in the formulation of
policy.

7. Van Zeeland is most anxious that the Republic accept the
Netherlands ultimation which undoubtedly has the backing of the
Prime Minister Beel and his Cabinet Ministers [6] who were
visiting Indonesia recently. He has strongly advised the Republic
to that effect and myself at an informal meeting. He has also
agreed privately with Graham and myself that if the Republic
accepts he will give a personal pledge to work with other
Committee members to put pressure on both parties:

(a) To agree to have a United Nations agency observe conditions
here from the time the Committee ceases its task until sovereignty
is handed over;

(b) To ensure free legislation of the provisions of Annex 1, which
is also included in Dutch proposals implemented;

(c) That the Dutch cease the formation of new states except by
democratic process (see paragraph 6 of this telegram);

(d) To have more specific and full provisions regarding United
Nations observation of demilitarised zones in the truce agreement;

(e) That once the Republic has accepted the cease-fire and
publicly disowned sabotage, intimidation, etc. it cannot be held
responsible for any incident occurring on the Dutch side of the
Van Mook line. [7]

8. Graham has been on the fence but has been slowly turning
towards advising the Republic to accept. [It] seems clear that his
State Department advisers have been informing him that little hope
can be placed in the Security Council to help the Republic. In the
event of a Republican refusal I would expect Graham to support the
greater part of my viewpoint, but in his present wobbly state it
would be a mistake to pin overmuch faith in this.

9. I personally, have left it to the Republic to make their own
decision but have leaned towards rejection by assisting them with
a draft reply to be ready in that event. The reply would cover
obvious points of the argument and would ask the Security Council
to adopt one of two courses.

(a) To set out the terms, either military or political, or both,
upon which hostilities should cease;

(b) To delegate to the Committee the power so to act.

10. I shall also suggest that they might express indignation and
[8] (surprise at the recent developments; that whereas they
compromised to accept the Christmas suggestions of the Committee
without delay, without condition and without the ultimation of
Dutch intimidation), they might therefore have expected that
pressure would be placed on the Netherlands to accept but instead
the Netherlands have not only refused to make any compromise at
all but have submitted their own unilateral and inflexible
suggestions as an ultimation and have gone to the extreme of
suggesting it would [be] delinquent to even ask for time to
consider this ultimation. However, there is a real risk that I
might be the only member to support the Republic in this.

11. In the event of the Republic deciding to accept the Dutch
proposals I would suggest to them that they do so in a strong[ly]
worded letter to the Committee emphasising that acceptance had
been forced upon them under greatest Military and economic duress.

This acceptance could then be used in Security Council debates in
an endeavour to obtain as much as possible
12. Whether the Republic accept or reject the Dutch proposals, Van
Zeeland considers that the three members of the Committee should
fly to New York and report to the Security Council in person. They
would be at liberty to express their personal views. I believe in
view of Van Zeeland's intentions it is very important I should
also be present at the discussions to express as strong[ly] as
possible our point of view irrespective of the Republic reply.

Please advise if this is approved so that I can on Sunday inform
the Republic.

13. It is apparent that Van Zeeland has his speech or speeches
already prepared; in the event of Republic refusal he proposes to
state that the Dutch military action has been justified in the
light of Republic guerilla activities, he also states that the
French have told him that they will use the Veto when they
consider necessary, for example, if the Security Council instructs
the Dutch to comply with a cease-fire order. However, I am sure
that the Dutch will not immediately resort to military action but
will state that they have retaken 'liberty of action' which would
mean accepting no longer good offices of the Committee.

14. The decision before the Republic this weekend is a critical
one. On present indications they will reject the ultimatum on the
basis of my suggested reply and also on the following grounds-
(a) The unsatisfactory nature of the proposals which, in the
absence of confidence in the good intentions of the Dutch, offer
them no real safeguards for the future.

(b) Possible difficulty of obtaining full support within the
Republic for such wide concessions to Netherlands (this might be
overcome).

(c) The strong feeling that an agreement on the cease-fire would
seriously weaken the influence of the Security Council which in
the present Republic opinion remains by far the strongest sanction
on the Netherlands aggression in Indonesia. This course clearly
puts the responsibility and hope of obtaining something better for
the Republic on the Security Council. While I have taken the line
that it would be futile for the Committee to consider the Security
Council impotent, I also realise the danger of expecting too much.

15. As I personally have not the slightest idea whether Security
Council will have the guts or even the desire to order the Dutch
to withdraw to 4th August lines or impose political conditions on
the present lines, I would welcome the advantage of your opinions
as asked for in paragraph 1 before I leave for Djokjakarta on
Sunday morning.