STRATEGIC PLANNING IN RELATION TO CO-OPERATION IN BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE
UNITED KINGDOM DEFENCE APPRECIATION AS A BASIS FOR MILITARY
PLANNING BETWEEN COMMONWEALTH MILITARY STAFFS

INTRODUCTION
At its meeting on the 3rd March, 1949, the Defence Committee took
note of a Defence Appreciation (C.O.S.(49)49) [2] which had been
approved by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff as a basis for
discussion between Commonwealth Military Staffs. It was decided
(Minute No.32/1949) to refer the Appreciation to the Joint
Planning Committee for:-

(a) examination and report as to whether it could be accepted,
from the Australian Service point of view, as a basis for detailed
planning with military staffs of other Commonwealth countries; and
(b) consideration, subject to any commitments under (a) (above),
in conjunction with the United Kingdom and New Zealand
representatives, in connection with other matters related to
strategic planning, on which the Joint Planning Committee is to
report in accordance with Minute No.20/1949 [3], and which were
also referred to in Minute No.28/1949.

REPORT BY THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE
2. The Committee noted a report (No. 19/1949) which had been
submitted by the Joint Planning Committee, with United Kingdom and
New Zealand representatives in attendance, in respect of (a)
above, i.e., the question of acceptance of the Appreciation as a
basis for detailed planning with military staffs of other
Commonwealth countries.

CONCLUSION
3. The conclusion arrived at by the Committee was that, subject to
certain observations, the United Kingdom Defence Appreciation
(C.O.S.(49)49) is acceptable generally, from the Australian
Service point of view, as a basis for discussion between
Commonwealth Military Staffs.

RECOMMENDATION
4. The Committee recommended that the attached report which
embodies its observations on Defence Appreciation C.O.S.(49)49 be
forwarded to the United Kingdom Chief Liaison Officer, for
transmission to the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff and also to the
New Zealand Liaison Officer, for the information of the New
Zealand Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
TOP SECRET
REPORT BY THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE COMMITTEE ON UNITED KINGDOM
DEFENCE APPRECIATION C.O.S. (49) 49 DEFENCE APPRECIATION AS A
BASIS FOR PLANNING BETWEEN COMMONWEALTH MILITARY STAFFS

GENERAL
In its examination of United Kingdom Defence Appreciation
C.O.S.(49)49, the Defence Committee recalled that the following
outstanding factors of military significance from United Kingdom
Paper PMM(48) 1-The World Situation and its Defence Aspects [4]-
formed the basis of the Defence Committee's report [5] which was
forwarded to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom by the Prime
Minister with a letter dated 10th December, 1948 [6]:-

'(a) The establishment of collective security under the United
Nations has not been achieved.

(b) Soviet policy and aims are a threat to all free nations who
are in danger of being subjugated one by one.

(c) Soviet policy, if pursued, will inevitably lead to a clash.

(d) The Soviet can engage in a land war at any time. The
probability of the Soviet engaging in war may be affected for the
time being by economic or relative air power factors, but if she
felt confident of attaining her primary objectives rapidly,
economic considerations themselves would not prevent her from
engaging in war.

In the light of these factors, the Defence Committee was of the
opinion that the undermentioned views of the United Kingdom Chiefs
of Staff on 'Allied Defence Policy', in paragraph 41(a) of the
United Kingdom Defence Appreciation which were put before the
meeting of Prime Ministers in United Kingdom Paper PMM(48)1 at the
Conference of Prime Ministers in London in October, 1948, are
militarily necessary:-

'41. ...

(a) We should plan to prevent war in two ways:-

(i) by showing that the Commonwealth and its Allies possess forces
and resources on a scale adequate to convince the Soviet Union
that war is unprofitable and further that the Allies are fully
prepared to act offensively from the outset;

(ii) by taking all possible means, short of war, not only to
resist a further spread of Communism, but also to weaken the
Russian hold over the countries she now dominates.'

The policy proposed in paragraph 41(b) and (c) (hereunder) is the
logical conclusion from the strategic viewpoint.

'41. ...

(a)...

(b) The policy of each Commonwealth country should therefore be-
(i) to join with the other Commonwealth countries, the United
States, and the countries of Western Europe in organising
essential deterrent forces, in building up effective defences and
in working out the necessary plans, preferably on a regional
basis, in accordance with Article 52 of the United Nations
Charter;

(ii) to resist the spread of Communism by all means short of war.

(c) In order to make these measures fully effective it is
desirable that the plans drawn up on a regional basis should be
founded on an agreed concept of the Allied strategy in war.'

OBSERVATIONS ON VIEWS REGARDING 'ALLIED STRATEGY IN WAR' IN U.K.

C.0.S.(49)49
2. The Defence Committee was in general agreement with the views
of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff Committee on 'Allied
Strategy in War', including the war aims defined as-

'(a) To ensure the abandonment by Russia of further military and
ideological aggression.

(b) To create conditions conducive to world peace.'

Military Measures to Achieve the Aim
3. The Committee's comments on the military measures necessary to
implement Allied strategy, which are summarised in paragraph 40
(hereunder) of the United Kingdom document, are set out below-

'40. We conclude that the following military measures are
essential to implement our strategy-
(a) To deliver the strategic air offensive from the outbreak of
war.

(b) To hold the air bases and sea areas essential for our air
offensive. These are
(i) The United Kingdom;

(ii) The Middle East;

(iii) Japan;

(iv) And possibly sea areas for the carrier offensive;

(v) Pakistan, if political conditions allow.

(c) To defend the main support areas-
(i) United States of America and Canada;

(ii) Australia and New Zealand;

(iii) South Africa and certain other parts of the African
continent;

(iv) The Argentine and certain other parts of South America.

(d) To ensure the internal security and local defence of support
areas of less importance.

(e) To hold those areas necessary to give defence in depth to our
air bases and support areas (paragraph 36).

(f) To retain firm control of the essential sea communications
(paragraph 38), and of the land areas necessary to ensure this
control (paragraph 39).'

4. While it was agreed that the only means of taking immediate
offensive action is by a strategic air offensive, it was felt that
some indication should be given as to whether the strategic air
offensive would continue to be the principal method of achieving
the war aims, or whether a land offensive might ultimately be
necessary, in addition to those land operations which would be
complementary to the strategic air offensive.

5. Uninterrupted sea communications between Allied bases, main
support areas and other areas of strategic importance were
considered to be essential in a future war, but the Committee was
of the opinion that control of air communications between such
bases and areas would be equally important.

Middle East Air Base
6. The importance of Egypt in British strategy was fully
recognised, but it appeared to the Committee that the Allied
position in Egypt and the question of obtaining adequate, timely
co-operation from the Egyptian Government were uncertain. The
prospects of holding and using Egypt as a base should, therefore,
be assessed. The Defence Committee desired advice of any
alternative plans which might be contemplated in the event of the
retention of Egypt as a base proving impracticable.

Japanese Air Base
7. It was agreed that the bases on Okinawa and in Japan are
comparatively easy to defend as they have no land frontier, but
the possibility of a considerable internal security problem, in
the event of the Japanese population not being co-operative in a
future war, should be home in mind. This would be accentuated by
economic problems resultant upon shortages of food and raw
materials, aggravated by enemy action.

Support Areas
8. it would appear that the Indian sub-continent is equally
important as the 'Argentine and certain other parts of South
America' as a Support Area which must be defended, and should not
be omitted from the list of areas to be defended.

9. It was noted that the extent to which the oil resources of the
Middle East are vital to the Allied war effort will largely
determine the strategy to be followed in the Middle East. It would
appear that if it is necessary, for protection of the South
Persian and Iraqi oil fields, to hold the line of the mountain
passes leading out of Turkey and Persia, there would be a much
greater commitment than for defence of the Middle East air base.

This in turn may have an important effect on Allied strategy
elsewhere. The results of the current examination of oil resources
are of particular interest and importance to Australia.

Areas to Give Defence in Depth

For Defence of Support Areas
10. If the Philippines and Malaya are held as a forward line,
adequate defence in depth for Australia and New Zealand would be
provided. Advice would be appreciated as to why Formosa was
included as being also essential for that purpose. It appeared to
the Committee that the main significance in the inclusion of
Formosa lies in its importance in relation to the protection of
sea and air communications.

Control of Sea and Air Communications
11. If support for the Middle East from Australia and/or New
Zealand proved necessary as planning proceeded, it would be
essential to command the sea communications through the Indian
Ocean. An explanation of the terms 'firm control of and 'a high
degree of control of, was desired by the Defence Committee to
enable it to appreciate their purport.

Land Areas Necessary to Ensure Control of Sea and Air
Communications

Defence of Sea and Air Communications in the Indian Ocean
12. It was noted that in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean, the
land areas mentioned as necessary [7] to ensure control of sea
communications were coincident with those necessary for the
control of recognised air communications for air transportation,
as distinct from Service aircraft reinforcement.

13. It was considered that the following should be added to the
list of land areas, the control of which would be essential for
the defence of sea communications in the Indian Ocean [8]:-

Cocos Islands, Chagos Archipelago, Seychelles.

This would also ensure the availability of air communications
across the Indian Ocean through bases now under British control,
in the event of the existing route-through Netherlands East
Indies, Malaya, India and Pakistan-not being available.

Defence of Sea and Air Communications in the Pacific Ocean
14. The Committee observed that there were no areas listed as
being essential for the defence of sea communications in the
Pacific Ocean. From the Australian viewpoint, control of the
following is considered essential for sea and/or air
communications:-

Hawaiian Islands, Midway Island, Wake Island, Marianas (Guam and
Saipan),
Bonin Islands (Iwo Jima), Admiralty Islands (Manus), Philippines,
Malaya,
Netherlands East Indies, Fiji, Phoenix Islands (Canton).

Control of the following would be desirable:-

Galapagos Islands, Johnson Islands, Marshall Islands (Kwajalein),
Samoa.

CONCLUSION
1[5]. The Defence Committee was of the opinion that the United
Kingdom Defence Appreciation C.O.S. (49)49 was generally
acceptable from the Australian Service point of view as a basis
for discussion between Commonwealth Military staffs, and
recommended that the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff Committee be
informed of the foregoing comments and observations.