68/1949 Supplement 2 [MELBOURNE], 15 September 1949

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STRATEGIC PLANNING IN RELATION TO BRITISH COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE THE
BASIC OBJECTIVES OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE POLICY AND
GENERAL STRATEGY

At its meeting on 16th August, 1949, the Defence Committee
endorsed a paper prepared by the Joint Planning Committee [1],
relative to the Basic Objectives of British Commonwealth Defence
Policy and General Strategy, for use at a conference with the New
Zealand Chiefs of Staff, with the United Kingdom Planners in
attendance (Minute No. 162/1949).

2. The Conference which was held in Melbourne from 22nd to 26th
August, 1949, considered the paper in question, which embodied the
main features of United Kingdom document COS(49)49-'Defence
Appreciation as a basis for Military Planing between Commonwealth
Staffs' [2]-and also included certain minor variations from that
document.

3. Attached is copy of the paper, revised as a result of the
Conference which incorporated the main principles and important
matters on which agreement was reached.

4. The United Kingdom Chief Liaison Officer informed the
Conference that note would be taken of the variations from
COS(49)49 embodied in the revised paper. He stated that they would
be brought to the notice of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff,
with a view, if they agreed, to COS(49)49 being revised to become
the basic document on this subject, for the use of Defence
authorities of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

Submission:

5. The Conference was of the opinion that the revised paper would
provide a suitable basis for making a submission to higher
authority, as appropriate, and this subject will be listed for
further consideration by the Defence Committee on receipt of the
observations of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff.

Attachment

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THE BASIC OBJECTIVES OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE POLICY AND
GENERAL STRATEGY
(Revised 26th August 1949 following discussions between the
Defence Committee and the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff)

INTRODUCTION
In December 1948, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Defence
approved recommendations which had been made in a report by the
Defence Committee [3] after consideration of United Kingdom Paper
PMM(48)1, 'The World Situation and its Defence Aspects'. [4] The
recommendations referred to were that:

'... the Government should authorise an examination by the Defence
Committee, in conjunction with the United Kingdom and New Zealand
Liaison Staffs of the following:

(a) The basic objectives of British Commonwealth Defence policy
and general strategy;

(b) A suitable basis for the distribution of strategic
responsibility and war effort.

When Government approval has been given to the conclusions reached
in staff discussions under (a) and (b) above, general outline
plans to meet immediate and long term dangers should be prepared.'
2. This paper deals specifically with subject (a) above, but only
in general terms with subject (b) which will be dealt with in a
separate submission.

3. The undermentioned documents have been taken into consideration
by the Committee in its examination of this subject:

(a) Memorandum by the United Kingdom Government-The World
Situation and its Defence Aspects (PMM(48)1, 23rd September,
1948).

(b) A report by the Defence Committee on the United Kingdom Paper
PMM(48)1 at (a) above (Attachment 'A' to Defence Committee Minute
No. 25 2/1948).

(c) Comments by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff on Australian
Chiefs of Staff Appreciation, September 1947 (Attachment [5] to
letter from United Kingdom Prime Minister of 29th December 1948
[6]).

(d) United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff Committee-Defence Appreciation
as a basis for discussion between Commonwealth Military Staffs
(COS(49)49, 9th February 1949).

WORLD SITUATION AND THREAT TO SECURITY
4. To determine the basic objectives of British Commonwealth
Defence Policy and General Strategy, it is necessary first to
consider the world situation and the threat to security.

5. The following outstanding factors of military significance from
United Kingdom Paper PMM(48)1 which are still cogent, formed the
basis of the Defence Committee's report which was approved by the
Prime Minister and the Minister for Defence, and forwarded to the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom with a letter dated 10th
December 1948 [7]:

'(a) The establishment of collective security under the United
Nations has not been achieved.

(b) Soviet policy and aims are a threat to all free nations who
are in danger of being subjugated one by one.

(c) Soviet policy, if pursued, will inevitably lead to a clash.

(d) The Soviet can engage in a land war at any time. The
probability of the Soviet engaging in war may be affected for the
time being by economic or relative air power factors, but if she
felt confident of attaining her primary objectives rapidly,
economic considerations themselves would not prevent her from
engaging in war.

6. It was stated in United Kingdom Paper PMM(48)1, that, in the
present world situation, the United Kingdom Government had thought
it necessary to pursue the following policy:

(i) To stimulate political resistance to the spread of communism
and to promote economic recovery in those countries threatened by
it, and
(ii) Recognising that no one country can safely stand alone, to
join with the United States and the countries of Western Europe
and the Commonwealth in organising all deterrent forces, in
building up effective defences, and in
working out appropriate collective security arrangements in
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

With regard to the latter aspect of policy, the Committee recalled
that, on the 13th December 1948, the Australian Government had
signified its approval to the recommendations on the subject of
Commonwealth consultation [8] which it had been agreed at the
Meeting of Prime Ministers in London in October 1948, would be
submitted to all Commonwealth Governments for approval. These
recommendations included the following:

'In furtherance of the general aim of co-operation between all
peace-loving nations to deter and to resist aggression, there will
be close consultation between Commonwealth Governments to arrange
co-operative action in matters of defence, including those matters
which arise from a common interest in the security of a particular
region. The military advisers of those Governments will consult
together to frame proposals and plans for submission to their
respective Governments.'

DEFENCE POLICY
7. The Committee was of the opinion therefore that the following
policy, which has been recommended by the United Kingdom Chiefs of
Staff and conforms to United Kingdom Government policy, should be
adopted as Australian Defence Policy:

(a) To join with the other Commonwealth countries, the United
States and the countries of Western Europe in organising essential
deterrent forces, in building up effective defences and in working
out the necessary plans, preferably on a regional basis, in
accordance with Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.

(b) To resist the spread of Communism by all means short of war.

WAR Aims
8. With a view to building up effective defences and working out
the necessary plans, it is necessary first to determine the war
aims toward which Allied strategy should be directed. In this
connection we are in agreement with the following views of the
United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff:

'We consider that it is not possible to limit the Allied War Aim
to the narrow one of restoring the situation to that immediately
preceding the outbreak of war, or even to that of driving the
Russians out of territories over which they have acquired control.

We therefore define the Allied War Aims as:

(a) to ensure the abandonment by Russia of further military and
ideological aggression;

(b) to create conditions conducive to world peace.'

MILITARY MEASURES TO ACHIEVE THE AIMS
9. Air Offensive: Because of the geographic characteristics of
Russia, and the great numerical superiority of her land forces,
the only means of taking offensive action initially is by a
strategic air offensive.

10. Bases and Sea Areas Essential for the Strategic Air Offensive:

To launch an air offensive, the bases from which it must be
mounted and the vital sea and air communications necessary to the
maintenance of the Allied war effort must be protected. Air bases
must be selected so that all the important targets in Russia are
within range. Nearly all the major targets in Soviet territory
could be reached from bases in Western Europe, the Middle East,
Pakistan, and the Japanese Islands. At present it is not possible
to plan on using Pakistan bases, at least from the outset, as
there is no defence arrangement with that country. It may be,
however, that the situation will change and these bases become
available.

11. Defence of Areas Essential to the Allies: In addition to the
land areas required for air bases, the retention of certain other
areas is vital to the allies. These fall into three classes:

(a) Home territories of the Allies.

(b) Support Areas.

(c) Areas to give depth in defence.

12. Home Territories of the Allies: Each allied nation will
naturally consider the security of its own country as its first
strategic aim. Nevertheless, if the Allies are to achieve victory,
their resources must be concentrated on the defence of those areas
which are essential to overall strategy. In the long run, it is by
an allied victory in the principal theatres of operations that the
ultimate security of the home territories of all the Allies will
be achieved.

13. Support Areas: Certain areas are the sources of manpower, raw
materials and industrial resources, to which the Allies must have
ready access if they are to be able to prosecute the war. It is
obvious that such areas must be defended.

14. Areas to give Depth to Defence: Certain additional areas must
be held in order to give defence in depth to our bases and support
areas in war. The decision as to which areas these are will be
brought out in the detailed plans for each area.

15. Control of Sea and Air Communications: To hold the air bases
essential for launching the air offensive, sea and air
communications between these air bases, and the main support areas
must be controlled. Similarly, to deploy forces as required by the
overall strategy, and to utilise materials and resources to the
fun, control of certain sea and air routes will be essential.

CONCLUSIONS ON ALLIED STRATEGY
16. We are in agreement with the conclusion of the United Kingdom
Chiefs of Staff, that the following military measures are
essential to implement allied strategy:

(a) To deliver the strategic air offensive from the outbreak of
war;

(b) To hold the air bases and sea areas essential for our air
offensive. These are:

(i) The United Kingdom.

(ii) The Middle East.

(iii) Japan.

(c) It would also be desirable to hold as bases for our air
offensive:

(i) Sea areas for possible carrier offensives.

(ii) Pakistan
(d) To defend the main support areas which are:

(i) United States of America and Canada.

(ii) Australia and New Zealand.

(iii) South Africa and certain other parts of the African
continent.

(iv) The Argentine and certain other parts of South America.

(e) To ensure the internal security and local defence of support
areas of less importance.

(f) To hold those areas necessary to give defence in depth to
allied air bases and support areas.

(g) To retain firm control of the essential sea and air
communications, and of land areas necessary to ensure this
control.

17. Indian-Sub Continent: Should it be possible subsequently to
make appropriate arrangements with India and Pakistan, under which
the Indian Sub-Continent could be included as a support area, this
would be most advantageous.

THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM IN THE AUSTRALIAN AREA
18. In the event of a major war in the foreseeable future, it
would be global in character, the major conflicts taking place in
Europe and the Middle East, and to a lesser degree in the Far
East. The fate of Australia would be decided by the result of
those conflicts.

In paragraphs 12 and 16 above, the security of Australia has been
shown to be essential to the war aims, firstly, as a 'Home
Territory' and secondly, as a 'Support Area'. It is essential to
strike a correct balance between the requirements of local defence
and the contribution to decisive overseas theatres, on which the
security of Australia depends.

19. The strategic importance to Russia of Europe and the Middle
East is such that the major effort of her armed forces is likely
to be made in those theatres. We note and agree with the views
expressed by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff in the attachment
to the United Kingdom Prime Minister's letter of 29th December,
1948, that:

'...The most immediate and dangerous Russian threats will be in
Western Europe and the Middle East... The successfiil defence of
the Middle East depends on the rapid build up of Commonwealth and
American Forces. We estimate that we shall be hard put to deploy
adequate forces in time.'

Australia is most unlikely to be an objective of high strategic
priority in Russian plans. In addition, geographic factors and the
inferiority of Russian surface naval forces, decrease the
probability of serious attack. The security of the Australian
mainland will depend, therefore, on:

(a) the distance from Australia of possible enemy air bases; and
(b) the control and security of sea and air communications in the
Pacific, South-East Asian Area and Indian Ocean.

20. The Australian Chiefs of Staff in their Appreciation of the
Strategic Position of Australia (September 1947) [9] defined the
danger line for hostile penetration as a line which includes the
Philippines and Malaya. The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff were in
general agreement with this view. Provided there is an adequate
superiority of Allied Naval and Air Forces in the Pacific and a
secure hold is maintained on the Philippines and Malaya, there is
no threat of invasion and the scale of air attack will be
negligible.

21. This view is in agreement with the United Kingdom Chiefs of
Staff comments forwarded with the United Kingdom Prime Minister's
letter dated 29th December, 1948, as follows:

'We agree with the Australian Chiefs of Staff that Australia's
security is unlikely to be directly threatened in the early stages
of a war. Should the war develop in such a manner that the
security of Australia is directly threatened it is appreciated
that Australia will require considerable assistance from her
allies.

The amount of such assistance and by whom it would be provided
could only be decided by the Allied Higher Direction in the light
of the situation at the time. Australia's security, however,
depends ultimately on an Allied victory. Russia's strength is such
that victory can only be achieved if all the allies make the
maximum possible contribution to implement the Allied plan, and to
meet the threat as soon as, and wherever, it develops.'

22. Insofar as the military threat is concerned, it is considered
that the extension of Communist influence in Asia will make
available to Soviet Russia further potential air and submarine
bases from which attacks could be mounted against sea
communications in South-East Asia, and thus lead to an increase in
the probable scale of attack in this area. The degree of
subversive activity in South-East Asia will also increase.

However, the appreciation of the Australian strategic position,
outlined in paragraphs 19 and 20 above, is not materially affected
by the foregoing during the period under review (i.e. up to 1957).

23. The security of the zone of immediate strategic interest to
Australia, south of the line through the Philippines and Malaya
therefore, requires the following in relation to the probable form
and scale of attack:

(a) Protection of sea and air communications.

(b) Seaward and air defence of vital areas.

(c) Measures to ensure internal security.

24. Outline Plans for seaward and air defences of vital areas in
Australia are under consideration and an assessment of the forces
required to implement these plans has been made. The Defence
Committee's views on the measures required to ensure internal
security in Australia have been formulated and incorporated in a
separate paper.

Plans for protection of sea and air communications are currently
under consideration in conjunction with the United Kingdom and New
Zealand Service Liaison Staffs and will be completed in the near
future.

25. In the light of this situation, we consider it essential to
prepare for participation of Australian forces, surplus to those
required for Australia's home defence, in British Commonwealth
emergency and long range plans.

TIME FACTOR
26. In previous wars, deterioration of the world situation has
usually provided a considerable period of warning prior to the
advent of war. It has been possible to collect, well in advance,
evidence of preparation for war. In addition, the ready
availability of United Kingdom forces has provided a cushion of
time during which this country has been able to organise and
mobilise her armed forces.

The principal factors which affect the present situation are:

(a) The speed of modern warfare has increased immeasurably. This
provides an aggressor nation with an opportunity for much greater
strategic gains in the opening stages of war; and
(b) Russian Armed Forces are maintained in a high degree of
mobilisation, and could engage in war at any time. Their strategic
location is such that they can launch offensive operations without
moving forces overseas.

For these reasons the period of warning of the possible outbreak
of hostilities is likely to be very short. In certain
circumstances there may be no warning at all.

27. In view of the time factor it is essential for plans to be
fully developed in peace for the deployment of adequate Allied
forces to protect vital strategic areas with maximum speed in an
emergency. Armed forces must be maintained in a higher state of
readiness for war than has previously been necessary.

28. Allied general strategic plans will directly influence the
composition, strength and armament of the Australian Services, and
the material resources which Australia should provide in war. The
maximum effectiveness of Australia's contribution, in a future
war, will only be achieved if the composition, strength and
armament of the Services in peace is based on their probable role
in the general strategy for war. It is essential, therefore, that
there should be an early examination, in conjunction with the
United Kingdom and New Zealand Authorities of the part which
Australian Armed Forces may play in British Commonwealth emergency
and long range plans.

BASIS OF PLANNING
29. It is considered that plans for Australian participation in
British Commonwealth Defence should be developed initially on a
regional basis in conjunction with the United Kingdom and New
Zealand. At an appropriate stage of development, the plans would
need to be coordinated with American plans for the defence of the
Pacific. It is desirable also that plans for the defence of the
area of vital strategic importance to the security of Australia
should be linked ultimately with the plans of other friendly
nations having possessions in the South-West Pacific Area.

30. Information with regard to United States intentions in the
Pacific will have a major effect on planning. The information now
available to us is a satisfactory basis for the preparation of
plans and alternative plans on a Service level, but ultimate
consideration and acceptance of such plans by the Australian
Government would appear to be contingent on an agreement between
the United Kingdom, the United States and Australian Governments
as to how defence responsibilities are shared in the Far East,
South-West Pacific Area and the Middle East.

31. As has been stated in paragraphs 27 and 28 above, plans, and
alternative plans if necessary, for the employment of all
Australian forces likely to be engaged in war both at home and
abroad, must be fully developed well in advance of events if the
Australian contribution to Allied strategy is to be effective.

Subject to it being clearly understood that the preparation of
plans for the employment of Australian Armed Forces will not
commit the Australian Government unless it subsequently accepts
specific plans, it is recommended that approval be given for
emergency and long range plans to be developed, initially on the
Service level, in conjunction with the United Kingdom and New
Zealand Liaison Staffs. Proposals arising out of this planning
should be submitted to the Minister for Defence in accordance with
the procedure [10] agreed at the 13 th Meeting of the Prime
Ministers in 1948.

RECOMMENDATION
32. The Committee recommended:

(A) That the defence policy and general strategy, upon which
planning is to be based, be:

(a) Defence Policy:

(i) To join with the other Commonwealth countries, the United
States and the countries of Western Europe in organising essential
deterrent forces, in building up effective defences and in working
out the necessary plans, preferably on a regional basis, in
accordance with Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.

(ii) To resist the spread of communism by all means short of war.

(b) War Aims:

(i) To ensure the abandonment by Russia of further military and
ideological aggression.

(ii) To create conditions conducive to world peace.

(c) Military Measures to implement Allied Strategy:

(i) To deliver the strategic air offensive from the outbreak of
war;

(ii) To hold the air bases and sea areas essential for our air
offensive. These are: The United Kingdom.

The Middle East.

Japan.

(iii) It would also be desirable to hold as bases for our air
offensive:

Sea areas for possible carrier offensives.

Pakistan.

(iv) To defend the main support areas which are:

United States of America and Canada.

Australia and New Zealand.

South Africa and certain other parts of the African continent.

The Argentine and certain other parts of South America.

Should it be possible subsequently to make appropriate
arrangements with India and Pakistan, under which the Indian Sub-
Continent could be included as a support area, this would be most
advantageous.

(v) To ensure the internal security and local defence of support
areas of less importance, as necessary.

(vi) To hold those areas necessary to give defence in depth to
Allied air bases and support areas;

(vii) To retain firm control of the essential sea and air
communications, and of land areas necessary to ensure this
control; and
(B) That, subject to it being clearly understood that the
preparation of plans for the employment of Australian Armed Forces
will not commit the Australian Government, unless it subsequently
accepts specific plans, approval be given for emergency and long
range plans to be developed, initially on a Service level, in
conjunction with the United Kingdom and New Zealand Liaison
Staffs. Proposals arising out of this planning should be submitted
to the Minister for Defence [11] in accordance with the procedure
agreed at the 13th Meeting of the Prime Ministers in 1948. [12]