Skip to main content

Historical documents

227 Moodie to McIntyre

Letter CANBERRA, 17 February 1949

personal and confidential

You may be interested to hear something about the Asian Conference
in New Delhi. I am also writing to people at several other posts.

As you probably gathered, there was considerable doubt in
Ministerial circles as to whether participation would be
justified. The method of calling the Conference was very sudden,
arising out of a speech [1] made by Nehru in Allahabad in one of
his more impetuous moods. Thereafter the Government of India was
committed and also, I imagine, there was a desire to take the
initiative ahead of any other country in the area. Things were
complicated here by the fact that our Minister [2] was on the high
seas, the Prime Minister [3] was holidaying in Hobart and Mr.

Dedman, who was in charge in Canberra, felt some doubt as to the
desirability and extent of our participation. (The Prime
Minister's original proposal was that Mr. Dedman should go.) I
personally think we were committed by our previous action and
events proved the wisdom of our not limiting participation to
observer status.

The press here was extremely suspicious and critical of 'little
men running all over the world talking out of turn and too much'.

However, Burton was looking forward to attending the Conference
and I was pleased to be returning to New Delhi, a pleasure
tempered with apprehension about the hard work inevitably arising
from any association with that human dynamo we have for a
Secretary. Also I had a theory-quickly dispelled-that I might be
able to have a couple of weeks' spell in India after the
Conference and go up to the North-East frontier, or call in
Afghanistan to deliver an overdue wedding present to some friends.

The Conference turned out well-far beyond the expectations of
either of us. In the first place, the Indian organization was
admirable. Things that I had expected would break down regularly
(like transport) functioned smoothly all the time, except when we
bungled it ourselves. We did have, of course, to contend at the
lower levels with the inevitable Indian anxiety to please, coupled
with inability to deliver the goods; but the people actually
running the Conference were really good. Even John admitted this.

Nehru himself was Chairman all the way through and knew his facts.

Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations, acted as principal adviser, and a younger
man I knew before, called Dayal, was Secretary. This triumvirate
were mainly responsible for the effectiveness of the arrangements.

We had anticipated arriving in New Delhi well equipped with
documentation and ideas and finding all sorts of gaps in the
Indian information and no very clear idea in their minds of what
the Conference should do. However, at our preliminary discussions
with Bajpai it was politely but firmly made clear to us that the
Indians were well able to run their Conference without any
preliminary help from us. Events proved that they were correct.

They had the whole thing mapped out, on the theory that if you do
the work for other people they will generally accept the fruits of
your labours.

The second impressive thing was the moderateness of all delegates.

There was no tendency either in public or private sessions to
indulge in tirades or advocate impracticable schemes. We suspected
that the Indians must have done some effective behind the scenes
organising, but be that as it may, no country at any time
suggested that anything should be done outside the United Nations,
or even that there should be discussion on the form sanctions
imposed by the Security Council against the Dutch might take. This
was no small achievement with a collection of countries ranging
from Ethiopia to the Philippines. In addition, in the private
sessions everyone spoke briefly and to the point.

Four countries did most of the effective work: India, Pakistan,
Ceylon and Australia. All four were put on the Drafting Committee
which actually prepared the text of the resolutions [4], although
here again Bajpai quickly asserted himself as primus inter pares
and invariably had draft resolutions ready for discussion whenever
the drafters met. The Pakistan party were led by Zafrullah Khan,
who was perhaps the outstanding man at the Conference and
obviously the Arab States represented there looked to him to give
them a lead. There were no signs of bickering between Zafrullah
Khan and Nehru in spite of the many differences between the two
countries. In fact, in the Committee stages, everyone showed a
marked readiness to compromise. Several times Nehru gave way to
Australia on matters which we did not wish to have included in
resolutions, e.g. consultation on questions other than Indonesia
or a specific commitment to turn this Conference into an accepted
regional organisation. In fact, they were leaning over backwards
to ensure that they should not get tied to such a wide regional
organisation.

The only discussion which might have become acrimonious developed
over the question of a permanent regional organisation for all the
countries represented at the Conference. Pakistan clearly favoured
it and Syria also spoke strongly in support and asked why some
countries were afraid of closer relationship. However, Zafrullah
Khan did not wish to press the point. Hence the fairly innocuous
wording of the third resolution about exploring means of
collaboration, having regard to the areas concerned.

I am not sure of the Indian attitude on this point. I do not think
they mind much whether there is one regional organisation or two,
provided that they have a place in each. The fact that they took
the initiative immediately the Conference was over in seeking
formally the views of Governments represented proves that they
want quick developments one way or another. [5]

Our position is rather uncertain. The Minister has said publicly
that he favours a regional organisation for South East Asia, the
idea presumably being that we would work in partnership with
India. In practice, however, this would be difficult. On the one
hand there are considerable doubts at home and in the Government
as to the advisability of getting too closely tied to Asiatic
countries. On the other there is India's own approach. India does
desire to become the leading power in Asia and has no wish to have
us, or anyone else, as her associate on equal terms in this
process. She would be agreeable to a closer association with us in
all sorts of ways, including defence, but she will want to be in
the box seat herself. She will want to have the main say, despite
official protestations to the contrary. I suspect this may not
square with our line.

This brings us to a fundamental point, and one on which my ideas
are pretty tentative. I would have liked two or three weeks in
India to confirm them. The place has changed remarkably since I
left in July, 1947, not only in geographical and political
configuration, but in the attitude of the Indians themselves. In
the period 1944 to 1947 their energies were concentrated on
attaining independence and they seized very willingly on any
gesture at all of sympathy and friendliness. Now that they have
got their independence they have gained confidence and shed a good
deal of their historical introspection. Indian political leaders
don't feel any sense of isolation, and are satisfied that they
have a good deal to give the world. (It is difficult without
having lived in India to realise the contempt many educated
Indians have for the Western countries which have been involved in
two world wars in three decades.) All this means that they will
collaborate with other countries but on their own terms. They do
not feel any strong desire to join hands in equal partnership. The
Hyderabad episode [6] makes it plain that they are capable of
determined and ruthless action. So we needn't feel that they will
feel any strong sense of gratitude just because we say nice things
about them.

Nehru himself is undoubtedly a great inspiration, although vain
and impetuous. I do not altogether trust some of his entourage-and
this includes Bajpai-his sister, Mrs. Pandit, and some other
members of the family group are not a good influence on him. I had
several talks with a few people well placed in the administrative
machine, like Lall, Secretary to the Governor-General and Bai,
Nehru's Principal Private Secretary, and I gathered that India's
official affairs are run on a somewhat 'personal' basis, also that
no one in the Indian Government, except Nehru and Ayengar, has
many clues on foreign affairs.

This new Indian attitude calls for different qualities in the
people who are sent there. Our participation in the Conference was
a good thing and John Burton made an extremely good impression on
Nehru and the other Indians he met. That was quite obvious from
the very marked contrast in their attitudes when we came and when
we left-suspicion and caution in the first place, and smiles and
friendliness at the end. But really that was primarily because we
had served their purpose and I don't think we should count too
much upon the goodwill we may have acquired at present. It could
easily be dissipated.

Incidentally, the private sessions of the Conference were held in
Hyderabad House, which shows that the Indians have not got much
sense of humour.

1 See Document 3.

2 H.V. Evatt.

3 J.B. Chifley.

4 Document 144.

5 See note 2 to Document 181.

6 See note 2 to Document 298 in Volume XIII.


[AA : A1838, 383/1/25]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
Back to top