Historical documents
Letter BATAVIA, 22 February 1949
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Cochran's attitude on his return was disappointing. Last year his
super-optimism, patience and supreme confidence in his own ability
to bring the parties together were finally dissipated by the
Netherlands Military action of December 19. Absence from Indonesia
and his return via The Hague have restored these qualities at
least to the degree that he will insist on a wait-and-see attitude
until the end of the month.
2. Briefly his approach may be summarised as follows:-
(1) Van Royen's statement [1] in the Council on 28th January was
as satisfactory an acceptance of the Resolution [2] as might be
expected in the circumstances and should not be regarded as a
rejection.
(2) The Netherlands might not be able to make a forthright
statement accepting the Resolution, but the final test should be
Netherlands actions, not their words.
(3) The Netherlands might satisfactorily clarify their policy with
regard to the Security Council Resolution.
(4) In particular there were hopes that the Netherlands Government
would implement the major requirements of the Resolution, namely
the release of Republican leaders and early negotiations under the
auspices of the Commission.
(5) The resignation of Sassen was of special significance.
(Cochran, most confidentially, gave himself credit for this.)
(6) The Netherlands Government had considered the Commission too
insistent in addressing too many communications too frequently to
the Netherlands Delegation so quickly after the passing of the
Resolution. They had complained to the State Department of
needling by the Commission.
(7) The Netherlands cabinet might fall if, on February 15, the
Commission should strongly condemn the Dutch for their non-
compliance.
(8) There was considerable doubt whether the United States would
support sanctions against the Dutch and there was every
possibility that a move for sanctions in the Council would fail.
(9) Consequently every effort should be made to induce the
Netherlands to accept the Resolution and in view of the political
difficulties at The Hague they should be given further time.
3. I need hardly say that I disagreed strongly with Cochran on
practically all his arguments. It seems to me:-
(i) Van Royen's statement and subsequent official statements at
The Hague and at Batavia have indicated that the Netherlands do
not intend to implement the Resolution.
(ii) The Resolution calls for immediate action which the
Commission has every right to expect.
(iii) Release of Republican leaders is not enough. Their
administration must be restored at Djokjakarta with full freedom
of communication. The Republican Government must maintain its full
prestige if it is to exercise a decisive influence so urgently
required in Indonesia for the restoration of order. Sukarno has
stated that restoration of the Government at Djokjakarta must be a
first step before any decisions can be made by the Republican
leaders.
(iv) Cochran seems to over-estimate the significance of the
Sassen-Beel clique and the effect on Government policy of the
resignation of Sassen.
(v) Cochran's views of the political dangers of a strong report by
the Commission are not persuasive.
(vi) Postponement by the Commission of its report will encourage
the Netherlands in their policy of delay, a policy which they have
come to rely upon.
(vii) Delay must be used by the Netherlands to exert further
pressures on Indonesians and enable the Dutch to continue their
unilateral policy by forming a new state in Middle Java.
(viii) Delay will lift the pressure on the Netherlands and give
the Dutch heart in their policy of bucking the Security Council.
It will also encourage them to try to get by on a vague scheme for
an early transfer of sovereignty.
(ix) The Commission, if it remains passive in Indonesia will lose
the initiative given it by the Security Council at a vital time,
when only strong action by the Commission or the Security Council
can bring a solution to the Indonesian problem.
(x) In the past such limited concessions as the Dutch have made
have all been the result of pressure. Only the continuation of
strong pressures on the Netherlands is likely to bring successes.
If this pressure fails at least the Commission and the Security
Council can be sure that no other course would have succeeded, and
they will have placed responsibility where it belongs.
4. Fortunately, since his return Cochran has been influenced
towards our point of view. The vagueness of the Dutch statements,
the reservation of the Netherlands Government regarding the
release of the Republicans, the proposed return of Beel and the
realities of the situation in Indonesia could not be overlooked.
He as good as admits that at The Hague he under-estimated the
importance of re-establishing the Republican Government at
Djokjakarta, but he has now made a point of correcting any wrong
impression he may have given.
5. However, Cochran cannot be won over easily. He retreats trench
by trench. Furthermore, in his case pressure must be applied
tactfully. I believe that the course of events will force him to
accept our views and that there is every reason to expect a strong
report at the end of the month. He stresses that he has not been
misled by the Dutch and that they will have to more than step
lively if they are to circumvent a critical report from the
Commission. Already he is speculating as to what action the
Security Council can take.
6. At all costs we must avoid a situation in which Australia will
remain a minority on the Commission. Divided by the European and
Asiatic influences, the State Department has probably not yet
formed a firm policy on Indonesia, but will depend largely on
Cochran's advice. As suggested above, I believe he can be won
over.
7. Cochran's appointment [3] to Pakistan, announced last Friday,
was decided while he was in Washington, when it was agreed that he
should stay on in Indonesia until at least a preliminary
settlement was reached. I have not failed, of course, to point out
the importance Pakistan attaches to a satisfactory settlement
here.
8. It is still abundantly clear that developments since the police
action have not gone as the Dutch planned. Militarily there are
difficulties in wide areas of Indonesia. Economically co-operation
is being refused by the Republicans. Politically the Republic is
remaining steadfast and the Federalists are becoming decidedly
restive and, in some cases, even aggressive. The Netherlands if
they are to pursue their own interests, must take drastic action
now. Financially their difficulties are acute. There is no
immediate prospect of a balanced budget, let alone a start on
rehabilitation. Certainly 1949 will be a year of strict economies
and tightening belts in Indonesia.
9. Roughly, the overall political situation appears to be as
follows:-
(1) military action has brought disorders to large sections of
Indonesia,
(2) the Netherlands are incapable of restoring order, at least
without international assistance,
(3) there can be no settlement in Indonesia without the Republic,
(4) restoration of the Republic, with headquarters at Djokjakarta
is essential,
(5) in their own interests, the Netherlands should come to a quick
settlement; they should therefore be prepared to implement the
resolution or make a grand gesture offering clear cut independence
in the near future,
(6) the Netherlands Government has not yet faced up to the basic
issue. It is therefore likely there will be further international
pressure on the Dutch, with which the United States will probably
be forced to associate,
(7) Meanwhile the situation in Indonesia, already serious, will
continue to deteriorate.
Federalists
10. In previous letters I have mentioned my intentions to write to
you about the 'Federalists'. The following outline of their
position is obviously incomplete, but may be of assistance in
understanding the present rather confused position.
11. The B.F.O. (Assembly for Special Federal Consultations) which
the Dutch have recently pushed into the limelight developed from
the famous Bandung Conference. You will recall the Committee
reported [4] to the Security Council on the Bandung Conference on
the 27th May, 1948. Strictly the B.F.O. is a direct continuation
of the so-called 'Small Bandung Conference' which the Dutch
arranged to follow the Bandung Conference when the former recessed
for Ramadan and when the Netherlands found that the Bandung
Conference was unwieldy and not producing results. Subsequently
the Small Bandung Conference was used by the Netherlands to
justify the B.I.O. Decree. [5]
12. According to the Netherlands the Small Bandung Conference was
convened in July on the initiative of the Wali Negaras and Heads
of State of West Java (Pasundan) and East Indonesia (Indonesia
Timor) with a view to making an independent contribution to the
solution of the various problems concerning the formation of the
United States of Indonesia. (See Second Report on Political
Developments in Western Java (S/960) of 2nd August.)
13. As first explained, the Small Bandung Conference, consisting
of the Heads of States and Prime Ministers of the Negaras and
autonomous districts, was to deliberate alongside the main Bandung
Conference on specific issues. Gradually, however, this Conference
with the Heads of States was given increased importance until
today the B.F.O. is the sole policy directing body of the
'Federalists' in Indonesia.
14. The B.F.O. which may be subject to changes through the co-
option of new members and as newly organized political entities
come into being, numbers 16 Delegations, of which 14 have the
right to vote. These are:-
The Negara of Pasundan (West Java)
The Negara of Djava Timur (East Java)
The Negara of Madura
The Negara of Indonesia Timur (East Indonesia)
The Negara of Sumatera Timur (East Sumatra)
The Negara of Sumatera Selatan (South Sumatra)
The Daerah Istimewa of Riouw
The Daerah Istimewa of Bangka
The Daerah Istimewa of Billiton
The Daerah Istimewa of Kalimantan Barat (West Borneo)
The Daerah Istimewa of Kalimantan Timur (East Borneo)
The Daerah Istimewa of Bandjar
The Daerah Istimewa of Borneo Tenggara (South-East Borneo)
The Daerah Istimewa of Dajak Besaw (Greater Dajak).
The two areas of Padang and of the Recomba of Middle Java have as
yet not been constituted into self-governing political entities,
although such a status is projected and they are therefore
represented without right of vote.
15. It will be clear from the composition of the conference that
the Dutch policy of forming states in Java and Sumatra in
contravention of the Renville Agreement [6] is the basis of the
federal organization. Furthermore, the formation of small
autonomous areas such as Riouw, Bangka and Billiton, with separate
votes, means that many 'representatives' are given an importance
far beyond what could be justified by the population of the areas
they represent.
16. Strictly, therefore, the B.F.O. is an organization created by
the Netherlands in opposition to the Republic. Netherlands
influence, for example, is clearly discernible in the telegram [7]
inviting consultation which was conveyed to Republican leaders on
February 3. The Representatives of East Sumatra and South Sumatra
are firmly in the Dutch pocket. The chairman of the Conference,
the Sultan of Pontianak (West Borneo), seems just as dependent,
although prominent Indonesians inform me he is tending to adopt a
wait-and-see policy.
17. On the other hand, there are equally clear indications that
weight of public opinion and the force of nationalism are lending
strong support to the Republic even in the Dutch-constructed
administrations. Wherever elections have been relatively free,
Republicans have, of course, scored heavily. Representatives of
East Indonesia and West Java in particular have made it clear that
they are not prepared to follow blindly a pro-Dutch policy against
the Republic. A short note on the political and military position
in West Java is attachment 1 [8], and I particularly draw your
attention to the decision of the Pasundan Parliament announced
today, recommending, inter alia, acceptance of the Security
Council Resolution as a basis for the B.F.O. talks. In East
Indonesia the Prime Minister, Anak Agung Gde Agung has stated that
he cannot go along with the formation of an interim government
without the Republic and may also come out clearly in support of
the Resolution.
18. Many of the smaller states are also uncertain as to their
policy and present Dutch indecision is strengthening opportunities
for support[ing the Republic]. Even Bangka since the Republican
leaders were interned there has tended to join the Pasundan - East
Indonesian camp.
19. Last week I was informed by one of the Netherlands officials
'running' the B.F.O. that unfortunately 'many of the
representatives were afraid to say what they thought, that the
Dutch knew that representatives of West Java and East Indonesia
were "Republicans" but that Mansoor of East Sumatra and Malik from
South Sumatra were stout fellows of ability'.
20. So, as you yourself have suggested, the Dutch after
painstakingly building a massive facade are discovering that they
have used too much sand with the concrete. Unless they do
something very quickly to command the support of the Federalists,
States such as East Indonesia and West Java may openly revolt
against the Dutch and demand implementation of the Security
Council resolution under the Commission. If they do so they hope
to take with them all of Borneo, save West Borneo, East Java and
Madura. They also think they will gain support from Daerahs such
as Bangka.
21. It is interesting to speculate whether the formation of a
state of Central Java will be of assistance to the Dutch.
Republican sympathisers have been so active in Semarang of late
that this new state could easily be pro-Republican in its views.
22. To the Republic the B.F.O. presents serious problems. On the
one hand Republican leaders cannot afford to assist the
Netherlands to strengthen a front which has been constructed
against them. On the other hand, encouragement must be given to
those federal representatives who realize the importance of the
Republic and the fact that there can be no lasting settlement of
the Indonesian problem without the participation of the Republican
leaders, and in particular Sukarno and Hatta. Although Sjahrir has
been critical of the willingness of Republican leaders while
interned on Bangka to meet representatives of the B.F.O., I
believe that Hatta has so far adopted an effective and tactful
formula.
Freedom of the Press
23. With my letter [9] of 8th February I attached a memorandum by
the Commission's Press Officer, dealing with restrictions on
Indonesian newspapers. Today I enclose a revised and enlarged
report on the Republican Press as Attachment 2. [10]
[AA : A1838, 401/1/2/6, i]