INDONESIA

In the light of latest developments and assuming that the
Commission at Batavia will be sending the Security Council today a
strongly critical report of Dutch non-compliance with the Security
Council's Resolution [1], there seem to be three things on which
we have to determine our attitude:

(i) How far can we try to urge the Security Council to go?
It seems to me the Security Council has only three alternatives:

(a) To discuss the Commission's report, and at the end merely take
note of what the Dutch have not done and call on them again to do
it, while at the same time shrinking from any sanctions or any
other enforcement measures.

(b) To take note of Dutch proposals and lay down a time limit
within which they are to be carried through.

(c) To get down to, or at least to discuss, means of forcing the
Dutch to obey the Resolution to the letter.

Of these, the first would clearly be the most futile and the worst
for the reputation of the Security Council. The second, while
possibly the most 'realistic', could be represented as complete
retreat by the Council, leaving the initiative in Dutch hands and
giving them carte blanche to go ahead with their plans. The third
brings us back to how far we are prepared to go on enforcement
measures. It will be dangerous to 'go to town' on enforcement
unless we have some clear idea of what is feasible and how far we
are ourselves prepared to go. (We might of course decide that we
can go on record strongly in favour of sanctions in the knowledge
that the Council will not agree to real sanctions anyway.) I feel
that the least we can do is to press our earlier suggestion that
the Council ask its Commission for recommendations on what
enforcement measures might be taken against the Dutch.

(ii) Should we take part in an informal meeting of the New Delhi
Conference countries in New York before the Security Council
considers Indonesia?
If only for consistency there is every reason why we should. But
before doing so we should preferably have our ideas clear in
respect to (i).

(iii) Should the Commission accept Dutch invitation to the
proposed Round Table Conference at The Hague?
The danger is that, if it does not do so, the Dutch may succeed in
putting something over the Republicans and the B.F.O. by pressure
tactics in The Hague atmosphere.

2. I attach some suggested drafts. [2] I really think that the
only factors-short of real sanctions-that are going to bring the
Dutch up short, and take the initiative out of their hands, are
sustained guerilla activity by the Republicans, combined with
refusal of the B.F.O. (non-Republican States), to go along with
the Dutch plans. The Republicans seem to be convinced that their
guerillas are giving the Dutch a great deal of trouble, and this
is probably true, though I do not think it would be decisive.

3. Critchley's recent telegrams suggest however that the B.F.O.

(without whose support and co-operation the Dutch cannot set up
even a puppet government that would look convincing) could
usefully be worked on and stiffened up.