I understand that Critchley used to send a weekly letter to the
Department to supplement his cable reports. I shall follow this
practice and should have done so last week, except that Miss Cock,
the Delegation's Secretary, was away on sick leave and the
pressure of meetings allowed me no time to draw up a chair and sit
down with my pen.

2. In the talks Dow had with Lovink and Van Vreeden they stressed
to him that the situation was as grave as could be: it was
deteriorating hourly and there was definitely an immediate danger
of fighting flaring up. Throughout the week members of the
Netherlands Delegation and Central Joint Board representation have
continued to emphasise their acute anxiety and to stress that the
situation is highly inflammable.

3. Since Saturday, August 13, the Dutch have written three letters
to us. The first, dated the 13th, alleged infringements of the
Cease-Hostilities Agreement in Sourabaya, Solo, Modjokerto,
Sidohardjo and 'different places throughout East Java'. The Dutch
claimed that: in Sourabaya at about 0100 hours on August 11th,
some units of a TNI battalion moved in from about 15 kilometres
west of Sourabaya; 65 of them then seized a BPM motor bus and
drove into the eastern quarter of the town. Here they dispersed,
but at the same time about 200 men of the same battalion appeared
in groups in the centre and western sectors of the town. In Solo
at daybreak on August 7, TNI forces began armed disturbances which
developed 'into a co-ordinated action on a large scale amounting
to an attempt to disturb order in the town, possibly to occupy the
town before the Cease-Fire entered into force'. Fighting continued
until midnight August 10/11 and then died down, but the TNI
continued to commit hostilities in the sense of Article 3 [1] of
the Manual by mine laying and putting up barricades which, in the
course of the next day, August 11, were gradually pushed forward
up to the centre of the town.' In Modjokerto on August 11, TNI
forces infiltrated into the town 'thus improving positions in
relation to the Netherlands troops in contraversion of the Cease-
Fire Agreement'. In Sidohardjo the night of 10/11 August, TNI
units kidnapped 33 Indonesian officials and during the following
night 5 more. They also claimed that written orders and several
other documents were found on members of the Republican armed
forces concerned in these incidents which proved the Dutch
allegations. They concluded that the events did 'not constitute
isolated incidents but (formed) part of a wider scheme to be
applied at other places in East and Central Java'.

4. In their second and third letters of 15th and 18th August, they
repeated their complaints about infringements and forwarded
further supporting documents.

5. As reported in my K.339 [2], we met the Dutch members of the
Central Joint Board informally on Tuesday night to hear their
story in detail. De Beus led off with a brief recapitulation of
the incidents already reported and then their military man, Van
der Wijk, expounded from intelligence maps. These showed mass
movements of TNI troops throughout East and Central Java from
their status quo positions towards Dutch-held towns and lines of
supply. Van der Wijk argued that such widespread movements could
only be a co-ordinated operation and quoted from various captured
documents and orders to substantiate this conclusion. He pointed
out that the movements were only possible because of the Dutch
troops' strict observance of the Cease-Hostilities Agreement, but
stressed that the pressure on Dutch positions was extremely
provoking and that the military situation had become most acute.

He feared that fighting might flare up in some area and rapidly
spread. At the end of the meeting he took Dow and me aside and
said he feared TNI attacks on the towns next day, Republican
Independence Day. In particular, the Dutch military expected a
major attack on Semarang the following morning.

6. It is worth nothing that in their letter of August 13 the Dutch
themselves indicated the situation in both Sourabaya and Solo to
be no longer dangerous. They said that in Sourabaya they had
captured nearly all the penetrating troops and in Solo they had
established contact with the local TNI commander and persuaded him
to withdraw his troops from the town.

7. It is not yet possible to give a full account of what has
actually been taking place in the places mentioned by the Dutch.

On information so far received it would appear that there was a
definite infringement of the Agreement in Sourabaya, insofar as
the TNI Commander knew of the Cease-Hostilities agreement, even if
he did not understand it. Apparently he, a TNI major, imagined
that if he succeeded in getting some troops into town before the
Cease-Hostilities became effective he could then reveal their
presence the next day and claim portions of the town as a zone of
control. He was disabused of this notion by military observers and
on August 11th they arranged a conference between him and the
local Dutch Chief-of-Staff. The parties agreed at this conference
that the TNI troops should either be transported back into the
countryside by the Dutch, retaining their arms, or should be taken
into custody until their fate could be settled by the Local Joint
Committee. Major Djarot, the TNI Commander, chose the second
alternative, but when the military observers visited the Kampongs
with him the following day to round up the TNI troops they were
told they had mostly surrendered to the Dutch. The observers asked
Djarot did he wish them to drive him into the countryside or did
he wish to surrender. He chose to surrender to the Dutch. Contact
has since been established between the Dutch and the TNI
Divisional Commander in the area and the Local Joint Committee is
functioning.

8. Unfortunately our military observers usually spend one week in
Solo and one week in Salitiga and had left for Salitiga the day
before the fighting broke out. Dutch and Republican reports as to
how it started differ. The Dutch claim that TNI infiltrants began
an armed uprising supported by TNI forces from outside who
developed an attack on three sides of the town. The Republicans
claim that the Dutch began a round-up of TNI in the town and when
these resisted, forces from outside the town came to their
assistance. In any case, the fighting apparently developed into a
serious battle in which the Dutch used artillery and bombers
(though they did not mention this in their letter). The Dutch
Commander-in-Chief, Van Vreeden, himself flew to Solo on August
11th, and succeeded in contacting Colonel Slamat Riadi, the local
TNI Commander. Riadi declared that he had only heard about a
'Cease-Fire' and was not instructed in the Cease-Hostilities
Agreement. The latest reports indicate that the contact then
established has been maintained and a local agreement reached.

However, we still have no report from the Chairman of the Local
Joint Committee.

9. In Modjokerto our observers reported that TNI troops took up
positions in the vicinity of the town (not inside the town as the
Dutch reported) on August 11th. They attempted to contact the TNI
Commander but no responsible officer could be found. They
therefore left stencilled copies of an instruction announcing the
Republic's proclamation of the Cease-Hostilities and requesting
the Commander to withdraw his troops. When they visited the area
the next day the Dutch had made a sweep and captured some troops
but most of the posts had withdrawn.

10. We have no information from Sidohardjo.

11. As reported in my K.339 the major attack on Semarang did not
develop and Milex reported that the Dutch General in charge was
unperturbed by the military situation. Since then the Chairman of
the Local Joint Committee has established contact with the TNI
Brigade Commander in the area and arranged a satisfactory
conference with the Dutch.

12. When the Cease-Hostilities Agreement was reached, nobody
expected a full and immediate implementation and it was generally
anticipated that there would be widespread infringements for some
time. It is certain that in some areas there is still ignorance of
the Agreement, and in many more no definite news about it.

Republican communications are extremely poor and on top of this,
it must be remembered that it is not sufficient merely to tell of
or to order a Cease-Hostilities; trusted officers must fully
explain the Agreement.

13. With the cessation of Dutch resistance some movement of the
TNI from its 'status quo positions'-mainly mountainous and deficit
areas-towards the towns, is not very surprising. The position has
been complicated by two factors: the inaccuracy of local Dutch
military intelligence and the exaggeration of reports in transit
to Batavia; and the existence of TNI orders in certain areas,
perhaps only Sourabaya and Sedmarang, for attacks upon the towns.

However, these orders date back to April, June and July and only
one, Major Djarot's, is dated August. (The captured order
instructing that all orders will be pre-dated is a fantastic
document and the Dutch have not pressed it as a serious piece of
evidence. It is mainly concerned, incidentally, with a sinister
plot between the TNI, an Australian Milob and 'Brigadier-Colonel'
Prior for, if I remember, the seizure of Sourabaya. I shall
forward a copy next week.)
14. It is obvious that the Dutch greatly exaggerated the situation
in Semarang and there seems no reason for their fears in
Sourabaya, Modjokerto and Solo. In other areas, though, the
situation has been 'deteriorating hourly' since last Friday,
August 12th, they have reported nothing to us which might bear out
their anxiety.

15. When we met the Dutch on Saturday, August 13, to discuss their
refusal to go to Djokjakarta, they had jumped to the most unlikely
explanation of the reported infringements in East and Central
Java. s'Jacob obviously suspected the central Republican
Government to be responsible and I gathered that the Dutch thought
the Republic hoped to improve its strategic position to strengthen
its bargaining power at The Hague. It was in this light that they
refused the Sultan of Djokjakarta clearance for his trip to
Bandoeng, fearing that he would not instruct his authorities in
Pasundan in the implementation of the Cease-Hostilities Agreement,
but would arrange for movements in West Java similar to those to
the East. Dutch tactics to meet this alarming situation were
reminiscent of the days before December 19th. s'Jacob refused even
to consider going to Djokjakarta and demanded that the Republicans
should come to Batavia. Furthermore, he considered that the matter
was far too serious to be dealt with by the Central Joint Board,
though this provided the agreed machinery for dealing with
infringements, and wanted the matter to be discussed between the
main Delegations. It was clear that he considered even this would
be useless and that the only measure which was likely to have any
worthwhile effect was for the Sultan to come to Batavia at once
and speak with Lovink. (A symptom of the lack of balance among the
Dutch that morning was their later notion that UNCI should proceed
to Djokjakarta and bring the Sultan back.)
16. To draw the curve, before Saturday ended the Dutch dropped
their charge against the central Republican Government and were
content with accusing high TNI circles. On Sunday they moved a
point further and blamed the local divisional Commander in East
Java. At our interview this morning with De Beus and De Ranitz,
they admitted that they had no proof of a co-ordinated plan and
treated this question as a 'secondary issue'.

17. Since Saturday Dutch policy has been twofold: to demand
meetings of the Central Joint Board to press the Republicans to
issue a high-level command from Djokjakarta to all troops that
they should withdraw to their status quo positions; and to have
the Sultan come to Batavia to discuss the situation with Lovink.

18. My impression is that the driving force behind the Dutch
during this week has been the alarmism of their military circles
in Batavia. These succeeded in stampeding the civilians from
Lovink down. And once this jitteriness was communicated to The
Hague, Lovink no doubt, was catching it from both directions. (On
a side note: I don't think Lovink and other 'men of goodwill' have
been receiving much comfort from old hands such as Van Hoogstraten
and Koets. These two appeared thoroughly to be enjoying themselves
at the Republican Reception on Wednesday evening, telling how
terrible the situation was...)
19. The Deputies' position during the week has been very
uncomfortable and since Saturday, when we succeeded in bringing
the Dutch back to some sort of balance (and by the way, having
them re-draft their letter to tone down its ultimative character)
we have had to spend most of our time avoiding position A, where
we would find ourselves pressing the Dutch case with the
Republicans and position B, where the Dutch could say at some time
that UNCI took no note of their warnings and offered no assistance
at all. After Sunday's Board meeting, when we went as far as we
felt we could properly go to meet the Dutch requirements, we have
therefore spent most of our time listening to the Dutch tell us
how inflammable the situation is, and stalling on a further Board
meeting until either the Republicans or we had some information.

Actually, we believed that Sunday's decision gave the Dutch all
they could ask from the Board at that stage, and the question was
not one of further measures by the Board but of implementing the
decision. This could best be effected at the local level, and is
in fact being so effected. However, as I explained in my K.339,
there has been unavoidable delay because of the Military Observers
not being able immediately to take up their new posts as Chairmen
of the local Committees. (The shortage of military observers has
considerably handicapped our work on the implementation of the
Cease-Hostilities and for this reason also we have had to reduce
the number of local Joint Committees from 17, which both parties
agreed would be necessary, to 13, there not being enough Milob
Chairmen to go round.)
20. During the week it has not been possible to get the Dutch to
talk about anything but the 'crisis' and we have made no progress
with other important business such as the delineation of zones of
patrol, supply, political prisoners, etc. However, at this
morning's talks De Beus emphasised the importance of the
delineation of zones and pressed (sic) for us to go to Djokjakarta
this afternoon to discuss it. We have been urging this for two
weeks, ever since the first informal meeting of the Board, so
gladly agreed to go to Djokjakarta tomorrow morning, when we would
have had time to give the Republicans some notice. The second item
on the agenda will be 'the observance of the Cease- Hostilities in
East and Central Java'. De Beus explained that he was instructed
by his Government to raise this formally. However, his tone was
much more reasonable today and though I anticipate they will still
try to have the Republic issue an order from their Central
Command, as requested of the Sultan by Lovink on Thursday, they
might be content merely to register their complaints formally.

They are unlikely to receive much change from the Republicans,
since the Sultan returned from his trip to Sourabaya satisfied
with the progress of the implementation and unable to understand
what all the fuss was about.

21. The situation has eased since a week ago, but there is still
an air of tension. Though the Dutch reports have undeniably been
exaggerated, one cannot dismiss them altogether and the lack of
independent information from our military observers keeps one in
suspense. However, the highly inflammable situation has lasted a
week without any flames and with most of the main centres under
control and the Local Joint Committee Chairmen established in
their posts, we are now in a fair position to deal with any
incidents which might occur.

22. We have to date no news from Sumatra or West Java to indicate
that the implementation of the Cease-Hostilities Agreement is not
progressing smoothly there.