INDONESIA

High Commissioners' meeting this morning attended by Noel-Baker
and Mayhew, dealt exclusively with Indonesia and was extremely
lively but friendly. We are meeting again tomorrow morning to
discuss Indonesia and, if necessary, on Monday morning. If you
have any special instructions for me and send them most immediate
tomorrow, I will have them before tomorrow's meeting. I have not
repeated this telegram to New York or to Evatt and assume you will
take any necessary action in that direction.

2. As a result of talk he and I had yesterday, the Indian High
Commissioner [1], with my support, asked that Indonesia be the
first subject considered and Mayhew outlined recent action by the
United Kingdom claiming that its attitude on Indonesia had been
misrepresented and misunderstood. He claimed:-

(I) That Bevin had constantly urged the Dutch both by direct
approach and at meetings of the consultative council of powers at
Brussels, to avoid force and to settle their differences with
Indonesians peaceably.

(II) That the United Kingdom had supported the United States
resolution [2] in the Security Council and the Australian
amendments. [3]

(III) That the statement of the Dutch Prime Minister on departure
from Holland [4] offered some hope that the Dutch were responding
to United Kingdom pressure, particularly that of 1st January
summarised in para 1 of Heydon's telegram 48. [5]

(IV) That it would be unwise for the Security Council to pass
resolutions in particular for imposition of sanctions which could
not be carried out and thus reduce Council's already 'weakened
authority'.

3. Menon made a very strong statement. His main points were as
follows:-

(I) It was not a question so much of whether or not the United
Kingdom had supported resolutions in the Security Council, or had
exerted pressure on the Dutch as the degree and intensity of their
action.

(II) The vigilance of India, Australia, Pakistan and Ceylon re
Indonesian question in recent months had been played down by the
United Kingdom authorities as 'alarmist'. United Kingdom's wrong
assumptions had produced an attitude of insufficient firmness and
while it had said 'sharp things to the Dutch in private' it had
consistently said smooth things of them in. [6] Only one policy
'that of perfidy'. The Dutch plainly wanted to 'see their empire
re-established in the Indies'. Everyone realises that this quite
impossible now and the United Kingdom which had taken a bold step
of abdication from its imperial position in India and other
countries, was in better position than any other power to say so.

(V) The United Kingdom with its moral prestige and with its
position in Western Union could have made a downright condemnation
but had failed to do so.

(VI) The Indian Government was not satisfied that arms which
United Kingdom supplied to the Dutch in Europe did not in fact
replace those which were sent to the Indies.

(VII) The Dutch had flouted the Security Council resolutions and
the United Kingdom ought to say no.

(VIII) The United Kingdom attitude which treated the Dutch and
Indonesians as being on the 'same political and moral level' was
fundamentally wrong as were statements by both Dening and Falla in
the Security Council. [7] The idea of the Dutch setting up genuine
Government to which powers will be transferred was quite false for
it was based on the same misconception. The result was that the
United Kingdom did not impress the Dutch and did not impress
members of the British Commonwealth.

4. Menon repeated several times that in all he said it must be
clearly understood that the Indian Government was not presuming to
dictate the policy of the United Kingdom Government which was an
'entirely sovereign state' and 'completely entitled to make up its
own mind regardless of the views of the other members of the
British Commonwealth.'
5. I spoke firmly along the lines of telegram 3 of 5th January [8]
using some of the points made in Hodgson's telegram 302 December
31st [9] regarding proceedings in Security Council. Among other
points I mentioned these:-

(I) The matter was so important that some High Commissioners felt
they ought to see Attlee if necessary as soon as possible.

(II) Mayhew had referred to the weakening authority of the
Security Council. United Kingdom, both by its relatively junior
representation at Paris and by the statements it made, could
itself be charged with weakening the authority. The United Nations
is our one great hope and its influence must be strengthened at
every opportunity.

(III) United Kingdom had a position of considerable influence as
great power. In this matter it apparently chose not to use fully
that influence in the Security Council with the result that the
Dutch almost certainly did not treat pressure by Bevin and others
seriously. In the Security Council, the retreat of the United
Kingdom and the United States from their reasonably firm attitude
at the start was perhaps the most important factor encouraging the
Dutch to ignore the resolutions.

(IV) The Dutch action has driven the bitter republicans who had
defeated the Communists in Java into the hands of the Communists'
party. Other High Commissioners might agree but I felt that action
to give nationalism and communism a common front would only
strengthen the communist attack in South East Asia.

(V) The Dutch were not independent of their neighbours. Surely the
United Kingdom in many ways had the power to influence Dutch
action. If the United Kingdom lost this opportunity of using its
position as leader of Western Union it would open up the whole
question of the attitude of some Commonwealth countries towards
Western Union.

6. Goonetilleke (Ceylon) said that the representation of the
United Kingdom by a young civil servant [10] at the Security
Council when it was discussing the fate of 70 million people could
only be interpreted as indifference. The attitude of the press in
the United Kingdom must be significant. It contained no outright
criticism of the Dutch and frequently cast doubts on the attitude
of India, Australia, Pakistan and Ceylon to the Indonesian
question. In the absence of an 'open full statement' by the United
Kingdom Government this was interpreted by the people certainly of
Ceylon and India as reflecting the Government's views. Jordan, for
New Zealand said his Government may be sending an observer to the
conference at New Delhi and that he saw some hope in Queen
Juliana's speech. [11] Egeland who said he had no instructions
shares this view.

7. Robertson for Canada said that his Government had separated
[12] the United States, United Kingdom and Australian position in
the Security Council except on the question of withdrawal of
forces. He felt that in a difficult and dangerous situation strong
language should be reserved for private conversations and without
specifying speakers criticised some of the 'wild language' used in
Paris. Menon commented on this that he was concerned with the
content of speeches and not with language and taunted Robertson
with an analysis of Canada's votes and abstentions in Paris on the
basis of an 'ideological line up'. He said that any criticism he
made of the United Kingdom's attitude applied with even more force
to Canada.

8. In conclusion Menon asked that all Commonwealth Governments be
given the full text of the instruction to the United Kingdom
Ambassador at The Hague on 1st January. (See para 2 (IV) ).