Canberra, 29 April 1953

Top Secret

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Basic Assumptions

2. The present paper carries the discussion further and attempts to examine matters which may arise at the 'political conference' not so much as problems on each of which we would be prepared to negotiate with the Communists on its merits, but in the context of, and through the likely procedure and machinery of, the 'political conference' itself and the conditions under which discussion on Korea and other Far Eastern problems seems likely to take place. In other words, this paper is based on the assumption that we have no concessions which we will consider making gratis to the Communists, either regarding Korea or which might weaken our position in any way elsewhere in the Far East or South East Asia; any changes in status, influence or control which we might consider would have to be weighed to our advantage in their context and in the balance of our position in the whole area.

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14. It appears fruitless to discuss 'other Far Eastern problems' in the context of the 'political conference' without knowing what sort of agreement will, or will not, emerge from the 'conference' on Korea itself. If basically Western policy in the Far East and South East Asia is to contain Communism, to resist Communist expansion wherever possible and to wipe out Communist power wherever possible outside present Soviet and Chinese Communist territories, there can be no question of considering in the abstract any moves which might weaken the Western position at any point. Consideration of concessions to the Communists can only arise–if it arises at all– as calculated risks for the purpose of gaining agreements. Even in such circumstances, it might be found that the Western manoeuvres were strictly limited by strategic considerations. However, there are a number of minor moves which might be considered at the appropriate stage by the West, for the purpose of improving the atmosphere of negotiations or, more profitably, as bargaining counters:–

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(b) Chinese Representation in the United Nations

If we are to make any concession, this subject offers perhaps the best prospects, apart from the formality of having the U.N. selective embargo lifted while continuing restrictions by private means. A move on 'U.N. representation' however, needs to be approached cautiously since it could tum into a 'snowball' of wider recognition for Peking and consequent 'de–recognition' of Chiang–perhaps a desirable end, provided loss of military power by the Chinese Nationalist Government did not render it incapable of defending Formosa (see below). If prospects at the 'political conference' were that the Communists might accept a more satisfactory Korean 'settlement' in exchange for recognition of Peking in the United Nations, the United Nations side might perhaps not have to go further than agreeing to recommend (with United States support) that the General Assembly re–consider the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations–a question which has been postponed in the Assembly and other U.N. bodies while Chinese aggression continues in Korea. Such a recommendation might result in an Assembly decision in favour of Peking which could lead, in due–course, to a wider diplomatic recognition of Peking and a more realistic acknowledgement of Chiang's political position. Possible disadvantages from a military point–of–view, however, are discussed in the sub–paragraph which follows.

(c) Formosa

The United Nations has not taken up a position on the question of Formosa. The Fifth General Assembly had a United States item on its agenda calling for study of 'the general situation with respect to Formosa', but following Chinese Communist intervention in Korea early in November, 1950, no discussion on Formosa took place. Just before Chinese intervention in Korea occurred, our Delegation reported Mr. Dulles' views on Formosa as 'very much the same as our own' (i.e. as those of the then Minister for External Affairs), that 'it should not be taken for granted that Formosa is to go back to China and that the Formosans should be given an opportunity of expressing their views. Further, as far as possible, nothing should be said or agreed on which would tend to make our relations with China any worse. He (Dulles) fully understands our position regarding the Cairo declaration and seems personally to take the view that this declaration is now overridden by the United Nations Charter and may have to be set aside'. At that time, the U.S./U.K. intention was to get the General Assembly to send a Commission to Formosa to study the problem and submit a report 'containing recommendations for the future of Formosa'.

Recently, Mr. Dulles denied that the State Department had discussed any proposals with the United Kingdom to establish some form of 'trusteeship' for Formosa.

Even if a move on 'Chinese representation' (see (b) above) led to 'de–recognition' of the Chinese Nationalist Government, it is difficult to see how the United States could dispense with the services of the Chinese Nationalist Forces in Formosa in holding this strategic island. Possibly, the Chinese Nationalists would have to accept some change in their international status and would still be prepared to garrison and defend Formosa against Communist attack; but any change in their authority within Formosa–such as the imposition of a 'trusteeship' leading to self–determination and presumably self–government for the Formosans themselves–would almost certainly be resisted by force by the Chinese Nationalists or, if Chiang were finally forced by United States pressure to accept it, would mean the end of the Chinese Nationalists as an organised force (if of doubtful value) against Communism. And if the Chinese Nationalists cease to be the force on which we rely for the defence of Formosa (if for nothing more), who is to fill the vacuum? The United States? the Japanese? Would Australia be called on for a contribution?

There appear to be very clear advantages in maintaining Chiang in Formosa in a capacity which will ensure the continuance of the Chinese Nationalist Forces as defenders of the island. Their value as potential invaders of the mainland (which forces acting under U.N. auspices in Formosa would not be) may also be important, even if they do no more than immobilise Chinese Communist forces on the mainland to meet the possible threat.

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[NAA: A1838, TS852/20/4/2, v]

1 Mention was made here to a previous paper by the UN Section, which in September 1952 had commented on the machinery contemplated by the United States for a political conference on Korea.