Canberra, September 1953²

I find distinguished support for my thesis on the significance of Formosa in this article by Dr. Steiner,³ who is certainly in world class as a China expert.

You will notice that he does not put much faith on [sic] a half–way position i.e. one that recognises both regimes as having legitimate interests. This, I believe, is one E.A. is playing with. I must say I am distrustful of it on grounds other than Steiner's, although he states substantial objections. His discussion of the obstacles to the negotiations of such a settlement are also relevant. Nevertheless, my views aside, you should ask yourself if it is practicable to work for a modus vivendi on the Taiwan question. My basic objection is that the negotiations would assume that the Chinese Communists are ethically disposed to respect contractual relationships. My second objection is that America will seem in the eyes of anti–Communist movements in the Far East to temporise. I don't think she can afford this.⁴ Thirdly, the fact that America does not want it, may be sufficient justification for us to take the view that it is unpracticable [sic], on the ground that it is on [sic] our interest not to be quixotic, but to pursue policies which seem likely of success.

Steiner discusses the question of recognition, and alternative policies. Note his assessment on page 61 that Taiwan is of vast strategic significance. The second column page 61 is doubly significant.

I regret, I did not have time to read through that draft article I wrote on the admission issue:⁵

A number of typing mistakes arose from my bad writing. One was the use of 'dormant' for 'dominant', which in the context could give an entirely opposite meaning.

Further I did not go on to discuss the recognition question. Basically my view is that diplomacy these days is necessarily unconventional, as Steiner says. As the Communist propaganda machine and propagandists here are interested to interpret recognition as approval, we should withhold it. Further, it would be inconsistent to recognise China, while refusing her admission to the U.N. Also by recognising China, we would complicate the Americans' stand vis–a–vis Britain. Recognition like admission is a political issue.

I have not discussed the procedural aspects of admission, but I assume E.A. will have that down to a fine art. Procedurally, the question turns not on the admission of a new nation, but on credentials. It seems as if the major struggle would take place in the Assembly.

[NAA: A1209, 1957/4832, i]

1 A.T. Griffith, Prime Minister's Department.

2 Griffith did not specify the day on which he wrote the minute.

3 H. Arthur Steiner, a political scientist at the University of California. In his article ('The United States and the Two Chinas', Far Eastern Survey, vol. xxii, No. 6 (May� 1953), pp. 57–61.), Steiner argued that Peking's 'expansionist tendencies' had to be curbed and the strategic position of Taiwan secured if the current US policy of 'two Chinas' was to be palatable. The alternatives, he believed were flawed: first because the unleashing of ROC forces on the PRC would require full US support, which would over–extend US forces and might result in the disintegration of Chiang's forces; and secondly, (this point and following is contained in Steiner's second column, p. 61, referred to by Griffith below) because the abandonment of Taiwan by the United States in exchange for a settlement was untenable. It was untenable, Steiner argued, because the communists would not abandon world revolution, because Taiwan had acquired a symbolic meaning for those who sought to offset the 'catastrophe' on the mainland, because Taiwan occupied a central geographic position among the progressing nations of the Far East, and because Taiwan was of great strategic value to the United States and Asian countries. In conclusion, Steiner claimed that, 'We all suspect we are yet to pass through an Armageddon', and that with no clear solution to China in sight, the 'best we can hope is that our "holding" solutions will not needlessly disadvantage us when Armageddon comes'.

4 In an associated minute to Brown, Griffith wrote that: 'In assessing the trend of American opinion, one does better to look to the mood which will give rise to governmental policies. There is no discernable trend away from the feeling that the United States Government must not take risks to bring the Chinese Communists to a point where they will desist in a policy of aggression. This is the test the Americans will apply. At this point it is worth noting that the American intellectual is steeped in the pragmatic philosophy of Dewey. The utopianism of the British schools which lies behind the 'soft' policy mind is not as dominant in America today as it was a few years ago. I do not believe that American policy today is the fruit of Middle–West passions, although it may be coloured to some extent'.

5 Not found.