Canberra, 12 August 1958

Secret Guard

Seating of Communist China into the United Nations

PART I

1. The purpose of this paper is not to traverse the arguments in favour and against the seating of Communist China in the United Nations. It has long been accepted that the seating of the Peking regime is a matter of timing rather than of principle and that our interests may be harmed by drift. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that action is urgently called for, and to suggest the lines which that action might follow.

2. Regardless of the time of its occurrence, the seating of the Peking regime in the United Nations will bring certain harmful consequences (e.g. the intrusion of an efficient Asian communist delegation into the United Nations and the Afro–Asian caucus and added communist voting strength in the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, ECOSOC and those U.N. organs, such as the General Committee, to which the Big Five are usually elected. Membership of the Specialized Agencies and bodies such as the I.A.E.A. would presumably follow). These consequences may get worse with the passage of time. They are less likely to become more acceptable. Consequently, our acceptance of Peking's ultimate membership of the U.N. implies that we accept also that we will someday have to live with its inevitable results, and our objective should be to ensure that other and worse consequences do not also follow–and in particular that Peking does not force its way into the U.N. by means of a disastrous U.S. reverse.

3. A U.S. reverse can be avoided only if the U.S. gives the lead. Yet the U.S. will change its policy, if at all, only under extreme pressure which can only be the product either of public defections from the U.S. position (which would undermine Western interests) or of heavy behind–the–scenes diplomatic pressure from America's allies. Clearly the latter is to be preferred to the former and the purpose of this paper is to suggest that all America's allies should begin to discuss frankly with the U.S. the implications of its present policies, its dangers and possible alternatives. These discussions should not be a one–time high level exchange, but a continuing operation–like the one the U.S. mounts to keep its allies in line–conducted at a variety of levels including the top and in a variety of places. The Americans would be resentful, but they would not treat us the way the USSR treats Yugoslavia.

Diplomatic Recognition and Seating in the United Nations

4. Previous consideration of our China policy has linked three things which are capable of being considered separately:–

(i) Seating in the U.N.;

(ii) Diplomatic Recognition;

(iii) Exchange of diplomatic missions.

For reasons which will appear later, this paper is confined to consideration of Western policy in regard to the seating of China in the U.N. (In 1950 the U.N. legal department submitted a memorandum to the Secretary General suggesting that the tests for diplomatic recognition and seating in the U.N. are not necessarily identical. For seating in the U.N., the governing criterion should be the ability of a government to ensure the carrying out of the obligations of membership in the country represented).

Need for Urgent Action

5. Since Cabinet last considered our China policy in 1955, the following developments have occurred which make it necessary to reconsider Western China policy urgently:–

(i) The Chinese are likely to have withdrawn their troops from Korea completely by the end of the year. Many countries will regard this as a de facto vacating of China's aggression in Korea and it will become more difficult to invoke aggression as a reason for exclusion from the U.N.;

(ii) China is a potential nuclear power. At any time China could receive nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union and within a few years will have reached a stage of industrialization which would permit the development of her own weapons if she so chose. An experimental nuclear reactor has been put into operation. The Americans believe that a Chinese Sputnik could be launched within two years. The association of China with disarmament discussions is becoming more pressing;

(iii) China is excluded from the United Nations by a narrow margin of votes. A shift of 10 votes from support to opposition would now put the Americans in a minority. If at any time the Communists were able to play their cards so that Chinese representation in the United Nations became an obvious barrier to early understanding on a major issue (as could still happen in regard to summit talks and the Middle East) it would be extremely difficult for the United States to prevent a drift of that magnitude;

(iv) Cambodia recently recognized Communist China. Other countries may follow in the Afro–Asian group. It is probably fair to say that any country which professes to be 'neutral' must recognize Communist China;

(v) It would be disastrous if the exclusion of China were secured only by the votes of non–Asian countries;

(vi) Economic and social development in China is proceeding at an extraordinary pace. Education and public health programmes are being pushed forward. China plans to catch up with the industrial output of Great Britain in 15 years. If she succeeds, she will become an industrial nation of real consequence in the world. Long before the 15 years have elapsed she will have left Japan and India far behind. If China's development succeeds on a scale comparable with that of the Soviet Union, China will in our lifetime become a great power on a scale to which no European country could aspire. China has her own economic aid programme. Exclusion from the U.N. may hamper but will not prevent China's economic, social and cultural penetration of Asia;

(vii) The recent Mao–Khrushchev talks¹ have demonstrated that no one can push the Chinese around any more–not even the Russians;

(viii) A policy towards representation in the United Nations based predominantly on United States security interests cannot last indefinitely.

6. The present position cannot last indefinitely and I think it is urgently necessary to get working on the Americans because it is going to take such a lot of consistent hard work on the part of many of America's friends to induce the beginnings of a change. The object should not be to try to sell a particular Far East solution to the U.S. but simply to impress on the U.S.:

(i) the dangers of drift; and

(ii) the responsibility of the U.S. to give a lead to the West before it is too late.

PART II

7. The object of this paper is not to suggest a Far East solution, but only to suggest that America's allies or many of them should begin to work towards getting the United States to recognize the need to come up with some new ideas. Naturally, however, anyone who suggests that it is time for a change will be asked what kind of a change he thinks is a possibility, and Part II of this paper discusses one possibility.

8. The course suggested is that, preferably upon the completion of the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Korea, but otherwise at some convenient time (e.g. 14th Session of General Assembly)² the United States should announce:–

(i) that it will no longer oppose the seating of the Peking regime in organs of the U.N. including the Security Council; but

(ii) that pending a solution of the Korea and Formosa and Offshore Island problems the U.S. will continue to recognize the Nationalist government. (It would be no more anomalous for the U.S. to agree to the seating of Peking whilst recognizing Taipei than it is for the U.K. to recognize Peking and support the moratorium).

(iii) The U.S. could privately urge other countries, particularly in Asia, to follow their lead in regard to (ii) above.

9. Separating out the two issues of seating in the U.N. and recognition would have some pretty solid advantages. The United States does not recognize the Peking regime and discourages other countries from extending diplomatic recognition for a variety of reasons of which the following are amongst the more important:–

(a) Recognition of China by the United States would cast doubt on the validity of the mutual defence agreement the United States has with the Republic of China and in that way jeopardize the United States' military position in Formosa.

(b) Widespread recognition of China would multiply China's opportunities for political, economic and cultural penetration of Asia and for subversion and would increase the difficulties of preventing the spread of communism in Asia.

10. The course suggested in paragraph 8 above would:–

(i) Avoid the possibility of the United States suffering a calamitous defeat on Chinese representation in the U.N

(ii) Hold the U.S. position in Formosa (cf. paragraph 9(a) above).

(iii) If the U.S. were to succeed in persuading other countries to follow its lead, mitigate the dangers of paragraph 9(b) above.

Conditions for Seating of Peking

11. Should any conditions attach to the seating of³ U.N.? Some possibilities are discussed below.

Disarmament

12. I do not believe we can make Chinese acceptance of disarmament obligations a pre–condition for seating of Peking regime for the following reasons:–

(i) Peking claims to have a right to be seated in the U.N. unconditionally and would be far too proud and astute to accept conditional admission. The West should not lay itself open to a rebuff by suggesting it;

(ii) Few Afro–Asian countries would be moved to oppose the seating of the Peking regime solely because Peking was not prepared to accept so loaded a proposition. On the other hand, the West's readiness to accept the seating of Peking in principle would probably make it harder to keep the U.S. position intact;

(iii) A disarmament agreement is so far off unfortunately that the Communists and some Afro–Asians would question Western good faith;

(iv) Negotiation of a disarmament agreement will go on for a long time during which presumably the Disarmament Commission⁴ and the U.S. would continually treat the Communists as being in a position to agree or disagree to international inspection in China, to determine the size of Chinese armed forces, to control China's nuclear energy programme, etc. To behave in this way and continue to assert that the Peking regime was not the Great Power China of the Charter would be to try to perpetuate a fiction harmful to the West's reputation;

(v) The Nationalists would either be present during disarmament discussions or absent from them, either one of which would reduce their stature practically to vanishing point;

(vi) It is unlikely that the Americans would be able to maintain their majority in the U.N. on this issue until such time as a disarmament agreement is concluded.

Korea

13. Making the seating of Peking conditional on Chinese acceptance of the U.N. solution in Korea is a possibility, but it too is subject to these difficulties:–

(i) [Peking)⁵ would reject the arrangement;

(ii) Western good faith would be questioned in some influential Afro–Asian quarters;

(iii) American leadership in Asia is threatened seriously, and treating the admission of China to the U.N. as a favour within the bounty of the U.S. to withhold or bestow in the light of American strategic concepts is just the kind of thing which prevents America from re–asserting her leadership. There are positive disadvantages to Asian countries, say, in the exclusion of Communist China from ECAFE or from regional bodies of e.g. W.M.O.

Formosa

14. Two principal issues are involved:–

(i) Strategic significance of Formosa;

(ii) Humanitarian considerations affecting residents of Formosa.

(i) Strategic considerations

15. Under the Democratic regime⁶ Formosa was not regarded as an essential link in the strategic chain of United States defensive bases in the Pacific. MacArthur probably did not concur in this view and when the Republicans came to power, Formosa came to be treated as essential.

16. I am not sure whether there has been any recent re–appraisal of American strategic assumptions. Development of new weapons and new methods of war may have diminished the significance of Formosa. The U.S. could fairly be asked for its present assessment.

17. Nevertheless, there is always a danger that, even if the United States does regard Formosa as essential, it may be attempting to maintain for military reasons a position which it is politically impossible to sustain indefinitely. In Asian eyes, Formosa could be needed by the United States only for operations against the mainland of Asia, possibly involving the use of nuclear weapons. Many Asians may well fear that the maintenance of a United States base in Formosa for use if there should be war against Communist China may well precipitate a nuclear war in Asia which would not otherwise occur.

18. Moreover, we must not lose sight of the possibility that the United States' policy of containment of communism in Asia, which in Asian eyes is based primarily on military dispositions and alliances, may not prove sufficient to withstand energetic and imaginative, political, economic, social and cultural communist offensives in the Far East.

19. The United States will have to abandon Formosa some time. The best we can hope for is that the United States can maintain its position there until such time as changed concepts of strategy or the development of new weapons render its maintenance no longer necessary.

20. For this reason I think that the U.S. should link the problem of Formosa to the question of recognition on which majority votes cannot overbear the U.S. rather than to the question of seating Peking in the U.N. on which majority views can prevail.

(ii) Humanitarian considerations

21. Sovereignty over Formosa has been yielded up by Japan. A final legal disposition of Formosa can only be made by the 'Allied Powers' to which Japan surrendered. These are the United States, the United Kingdom,. Soviet Union and China. Japan did not surrender to the other belligerents which signed the peace treaty. Of the four 'Allied Powers', two recognize the Peking regime as the legitimate government of 'China', one recognizes the Taipei regime as the legal government of 'China': the fourth, of course, is China.

22. One way to handle Formosa would be to summon a meeting of the 'Allied Powers'–the U.S., the U.K., the USSR and both Chinese regimes (Chiang and Mao of course consistently proclaim their mutual aversion to a meeting) to consider:

(i) a Saar type solution⁷ for Formosa under which voting would be for (a) independence or (b) reunion with the mainland;

(ii) Satisfactory assurances that there would be no victimization in Formosa if the Communists were to take over. (Many top Kuomintang men could be given political asylum overseas).

23. Such a proposal would not commend itself to the Communist side immediately, if at all, or to the Nationalists either for that matter. But, provided that the U.S. had first waived its objection to the seating of Communist China in the U.N., it would probably be possible to get enough political support to hold the position for some time, and [the U.S.]⁸ would have nothing to lose if its proposals were accepted, because Formosa would probably choose independence.

24. Our solicitude for the inhabitants of Formosa is more soundly justified, I think, on grounds analogous to those which promoted the U.N. side to decline to repatriate communist prisoners forcibly rather than on 'self–determination' grounds. I know of no principle of self–determination which we recognize as having universal validity which could be applied to Formosa.

[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, ii]

1 The Soviet Prime Minister, Nikita Khrushchev, visited Peking from 31 July to 3 August 1958 for discussions with Mao Tse–tung. The communique issued at the conclusion of the talks called for the immediate holding of a summit conference, the withdrawal of US and UK forces from Lebanon and Jordan, the ending of nuclear tests, and the abolition of military blocs and military bases on foreign soil.

2 The 14th Session was scheduled to open in 1959.

3 The words 'China in the' have presumably been omitted here.

4 The Disarmament Commission was created by a resolution of the General Assembly in January 1952. It existed under the jurisdiction of the Security Council with a general mandate on disarmament questions. It met only occasionally after 1959.

5 Text in parenthesis was a handwritten correction on the original.

6 That is, the Truman Administration in the United States.

7 On 13 January 1935, the people of the Saar region of Western Europe voted in a plebiscite on whether to remain under League of Nations control, become a part of France, or return to Germany.

8 Bracketed text was a handwritten addition on the original.