Taipei, 13 November 1970

Confidential Personal

I should like to sketch out hastily a few thoughts consequent on our talks here, and in particular on the paper on 'Means of retaining international support for the R.O.C.' which you took with you, and which I should like to discuss with Oscar Armstrong here on a personal basis, if you see no objection.

One question is, of course, how much would we achieve even if the R.O.C. accepted a number of the suggestions? (I am, of course, under no illusions about the likelihood of persuading the R.O.C. to do anything. It would be very hard going.)

[matter omitted]

Attachment

MEANS OF RETAINING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE ROC

The R.O.C. next year might be made sufficiently aware of the precariousness of much of the international support it now receives to be receptive to face-saving ideas from countries whose friendship has been steady and whose continuing good will is essential. The U.S. fills the bill most neatly, and Japan to some degree. (Other countries could have minor roles to play.)

2. The following rudimentary and tentative ideas would need to be put to very critical study (by the U.S. in particular which has most resources to do the necessary research to develop supporting arguments). They are based on the premises that high policy decisions are taken by President Chiang alone, that he will in no circumstances abandon the R.O.C.'s 'national policy' of recovery of the mainland and that any suggestions should be ostensibly reconcilable with present policies.

[matter omitted]²

4. Against this background, arguments might be developed which could justify the R.O.C. taking the following steps in celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Republic and of President Chiang's impending retirement, as a demonstration of its confidence in competing with Peking, and for the sake of the Chinese people. (Some of these steps may be within the bounds of the practicable and some beyond it.)

(a) Change the formula in 3(d) to 100% political (or 90% political).

(b) Cease shelling of the mainland from Quemoy–on condition that the other side does not increase its fire from the present desultory level. Right of retaliation to be preserved.

(c) Have an elected Governor of Taiwan and Mayor of Taipei (part of the development of the 'model province') who would work in partnership with the Central Government which is for the present in this province.

(d) By Presidential decree, have greater administrative powers devolve on the Provincial Assembly, thus lightening the load on the legislative Yuan (again the partnership concept).

(e) Give a Taiwanese Deputy Secretary-General of the K.M.T. (there is one now) responsibility for the Party's relations with its branch in Taiwan province.

(f) Offer numerous unconditional invitations to Taiwanese students–from the U.S. and Japan in particular–to return on visits to see the extensive changes and economic development that have taken place here over recent years.

(g) Intensify publicity (with which the information agencies of friendly governments might help) about the extent and reality of Taiwanese achievements. (Taiwan is a 'reality' as much as is mainland China.)

(h) Against the background of the above, make a statement directed to Peking to say in effect that, if the regime there shows itself, in concrete ways, to be as devoted to the Chinese people's welfare as is the R.O.C., a new situation would be created which could open up the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the China/Taiwan problem by the Chinese people themselves. (Some rhetoric about the nature of communism and of the present leaders in Peking would presumably be unavoidable.)

(i) Propose postal exchanges with the mainland between members of separated families.

[matter omitted]

[NAA: A1838, 3107/38118, ii]

1 R.H. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, North Asia Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs.

2 Matter omitted relates to considerations that Dunn thought 'might conceivably lead [Chiang] to adopt a seemingly more flexible line'. These included, inter alia: the upcoming 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Republic, which could be a time for 'a grand gesture'; the fact that 1971 could be Chiang's last year as President, which he might see as an opportunity to 'go down in history as a great statesman'; the existence of the idea that Taiwan was a 'model province' for all of China; the accepted notion that there could be 'an accommodating "partnership" between various levels of government'; and the established policy that recovery of the mainland would occur by means which are '70% political and 30% military'.