Canberra, undated

Secret

China

Attached are copies of telegram 5628¹ from Paris and of the Australian draft communique,² and a draft telegram in reply to Mr Renouf.³

2. The draft telegram is based on the judgement that the Chinese, as is only natural, have begun with an extreme position on the Taiwan issue in the hope of taking advantage of our desire for speed. It may be, too, that the Chinese were not expecting us to begin with the Canadian formula, which they perhaps sawemerging eventually as the compromise between the 'tough' Chinese and the 'soft' Australian initial extremes.

3. The draft telegram is also based on the assumption that it is not in Australia's interests to accept without modification the Chinese formulation on the Taiwan issue. In addition to the points made in paragraph 39 of the paper⁴ submitted to you on 3 December, we think it important that in our very first negotiations of any substance with the Chinese they not be given the impression that we can be dragooned into accepting Chinese positions. We think it is important, too, that this impression not be created in the minds of other countries. In particular, our friends and neighbours in South East Asia will be following our moves with interest, not only as an indication of our general stance towards China and in international affairs generally, but also in creating a precedent for their own ultimate moves towards China. Also to be considered is the likely reaction of the USA. (We certainly should not regard that likely reaction as controlling; but it is a factor to be taken into account.) We think the USA would be critical–perhaps even in public–of the Chinese formulation if we accepted it. Indeed, Mr Rogers even objected (in private to Mr Ohira)⁵ to the Japanese 'understands and respects' formula as going too far. Finally, it would in our view be a pity if the beginnings of a new and more sensible relationship with China were to be accompanied by domestic recriminations and controversy within Australia.

4. While we therefore think that we should not depart from the Canadian formula at this stage, paragraph 10 of the draft telegram does give Mr Renouf some flexibility–though stopping short of capitulation.

5. For the rest, the draft telegram seeks to give Mr Renouf as much flexibility as possible on the other differences between the two draft communiques, and to give him reasons in appropriate cases for preferring our own wording.

6. In general, we think that the draft telegram will advance the negotiations in a helpful way, will show the Chinese that we are prepared to be sensibly flexible, but will not give the impression that we are prepared to give away everything in the interests of an early agreement.

[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18/6, i]

1 Document 352.

2 See Document 348.

3 Final is Document 354.

4 See Document 345.

5 Ohira Masayoshi, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.