Canberra, 5 December 1963

Top Secret

Australian Assistance to the Defence of Eastern Malaysia¹

I attach a letter which I have received from the British High Commission, forecasting requests for assistance by Australian forces in Eastern Malaysia.²

The subject is about to be taken up by the Defence Committee,³ after which it will come forward to the Government. In the meantime, you may be interested to see the following summary of the additional requirements from Australia and New Zealand which the British Chiefs of Staff suggest:–

'We list in the following paragraphs additional requirements for further forces, etc., in the provision of which Australian and New Zealand contributions would be most useful if a request for help was made by the Government of Malaysia.

(a)The following support is required NOW, under conditions of a covert threat on the present scale.

(i) For Air Defence, two complete LAA batteries⁴ or the personnel to man 24 L70 guns,⁵ which are being stockpiled in Malaysia.

(ii) One SAS Squadron, to augment the present United Kingdom squadron in Eastern Malaysia.

(iii) An airfield construction unit or personnel/plant for the improvement of airfields.

(iv) Permission for the use of Cocos⁶ by 'V' Bombers⁷ and LRT⁸ aircraft.

(b) Additional support as below would be of great assistance to meet the present covert threat, and would assume added importance if this threat were to increase.

(i) The use of units of 28th Commonwealth Brigade Group for service in Eastern Malaysia, including the use of the Australian and New Zealand battalions on the understanding that they would not have to be replaced from UK.

(ii) Royal Australian Air Force and Royal New Zealand Air Force medium and short range transport aircraft (C.130s⁹ and Bristol Freighters).

(iii) One Royal Australian Air Force Iroquois squadron to augment the helicopter force in Eastern Malaysia.

(iv) The use of Royal Australian Naval and Royal New Zealand Naval ships of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve for transporting troops.

(v) Logistic personnel and contributions to the requirements shown at Appendix.

(vi) Administrative and technical personnel to support Royal Australian and Royal New Zealand aircraft.

(c) The following would become essential under conditions of overt aggression.

(i) The unrestricted use of the whole of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade Group.

(ii) Additional logistic units.

(iii) Royal Australian Air Force and Royal New Zealand Air Force Canberra squadrons and Royal Australian Air Force Sabre squadrons for attacks on military targets in Indonesia.

(iv) Royal Australian Air Force maritime reconnaissance aircraft.

(v) Advance agreement to the use of Australian airfields¹⁰ for strike aircraft.

(vi) Unrestricted use of the Royal Australian Naval and Royal New Zealand Naval ships of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve and the provision of the naval units and facilities in paragraph 35 above.'

[NAA: A1209, 1964/6040 part 1]

1 Sabah and Sarawak.

2 A British Chiefs of Staff Committee Paper, dated 27 November, was attached with the High Commission's letter. The paper set out the UK's view of the additional forces that would be required in various situations, and indicated the contributions that Australia could 'most usefully' make if requested by Malaysia.

3 The Defence Committee considered the British paper in Meeting No. 84/1963, on 18 December. See Document 139.

4 Light anti-aircraft guns.

5 40mm anti-aircraft gun.

6 Cocos (Keeling) Islands. Australian territory in the Indian Ocean, southwest of Indonesia–2,950 km northwest of Perth and 3,700 km west of Darwin.

7 RAF aircraft–Valiants, Victors and Vulcans–that comprised Britain's strategic nuclear strike force in the 1950s and 1960s.

8 Long range transport.

9 Cl30 Hercules cargo aircraft.

10 Principally Darwin and Cocos (Keeling) Islands