Canberra, 19 December 1963

Top Secret

Malaysia

What you said in Parliament in September was this:–

'... if in the circumstances that now exist and which will continue for a long time, there occurs, in relation to Malaysia or any of its constituent states, armed invasion or subversive activity–supported or directed or inspired from outside Malaysia–we shall to the best of our powers and by such means as shall be agreed upon with the Government of Malaysia, add our military assistance to the efforts of Malaysia and the United Kingdom in the defence of Malaysia's territorial integrity and political independence.'¹

2. Britain, at the instance of her Chiefs of Staff, now wishes to cash the cheque. They have given us a list in three parts–

(a) support required now under conditions of covert threat on the present scale;

(b) supplementary support still against covert threat but on increased scale; and

(c) support which would be essential under overt aggression.

3. The British Chiefs of Staff request has been reinforced in the last few days by a letter from the Prime Minister to you.² There is as yet no formal request from the Malaysian Government.

4. The Defence Committee and also the Department of External Affairs, in its separate capacity, have looked at the British request.

5. The Defence Committee's report³ will be tabled this morning. It will say–

(a) that there is no military need at present for additional assistance;

(b) that if any commitment is made in due course by Australia to Eastern Malaysia, it should be from our elements of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve already in Malaysia–the naval and air elements are already available but our next contribution would be our battalion of 28th Commonwealth Brigade, which would be made available on rotation with the British and New Zealand battalions.

6. The Defence Committee view seems to me to be the key to the situation–that there is no military need at present. I do not read your statement to Parliament as requiring the Government to come to British assistance short of a military need.

7. However, to give a flat 'no' to the British request will have some appearance of failing to live up to a commitment. We ought not to rush in with help, but equally we ought not to wait until some state of extremity exists. (I suspect that External Affairs would wait for extremity, and even then think twice.)

8. I suggest an answer along the lines–

(a) We feel there are good reasons of a political kind, vis-a-vis Indonesia, not to put our forces into the Borneo Territories at this stage;

(b) therefore we would hope that we will not be in receipt of a formal request from Malaysia for forces;

(c) but this does not mean retraction;

(d) it will give us the opportunity to press Indonesia diplomatically to halt its activities;

(e) we will make it clear in the course of the diplomatic exchanges that we will have no option other than to put forces in if the situation does not improve;

(f) that we would be willing to keep in consultation with Britain and to consider making our battalion from the Strategic Reserve available in Borneo if a military need arises.⁴

[NAA: A1209, 1964/6040 part 1]

1 Ellipsis in original document.

2 Douglas-Home wrote to Menzies, 17 December, advising him of 'the importance we attach to assistance from Australia, which would supplement the forces we and the Malaysians have committed. I hope you will be able to agree to provide it'. Sir Alexander Douglas-Home, formerly Lord Home and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had resigned from the House of Lords and become Prime Minister following Macmillan's resignation on 18 October.

3 Document 139.

4 Following Cabinet's acceptance of the Defence Committee's view (see footnote 15, Document 139), DBA prepared the draft reply to Douglas-Home on the basis of Bunting's suggestions. Waller advised Barwick that it was 'deliberately discursive', on the grounds that the 'best justification for our policy is to explain it, and by doing so we may take the edge off British resentment–whether or not they can accept the validity of our approach'. Menzies accepted the draft and the message was delivered to the British High Commission in Canberra on 24 December for transmission to London.