Canberra, 24 January 1964

Top Secret

Defence of Malaysia

Mr Hasluck will wish to tell Cabinet on Tuesday¹ that our Defence authorities have received the following message from the British Commander in Chief Far East²:–

'I have received a request from the Federation of Malaysia for the Australian and New Zealand battalions of 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade Group to be made available at the earliest opportunity for operations on the Malayan-Thai border.³ Request your consent to deployment of 3 RAR. Timings and detailed arrangements are being examined.'

2. A week or two ago we were in receipt of murmurings from the British to the effect that we may be asked by Malaysia to make 3 RAR available for service in Borneo in rotation with the British and New Zealand regiments.⁴ We gave no direct response on this point. Rather, we took shelter under the proposition that there was at this stage no military need.

3. Now comes the request quoted above�that our regiment should go north to the Thai border and not to Borneo.

4. This request was discussed at the Defence Committee meeting on 23rd January.⁵ It was the view of each of the Chiefs of Staff, including Air Marshal Scherger, and of the Secretary of the Defence Department, that we should agree. They said, in the first place, that assignment of our regiment to Thai border operations is perfectly normal–it is within the Directive,⁶ and it is well established practice. Normally, they said, the request would be agreed to at Minister for Defence level.

5. They also said, wryly, that it looked as if by this request Britain and Malaysia were getting from us by indirect means what we had not so far agreed to provide directly. In other words, if we and New Zealand take over from Malaysian forces on the Thai border, the relieved Malaysian forces become assignable to Borneo in due course.

6. I said to the Defence Committee that I had no technical view to put as to whether our force should or should not go to the Thai border. However, I did express an interest in the interpretation which would be put in Australia, in Britain and in Indonesia, upon a deployment at this stage to the Thai border. It must have some appearance of Australia finding it convenient to make this deployment so as to avoid being called upon in Borneo.

7. However, the Defence people made two comments in reply to me. First, the request, even though coming from the Malaysian Government, must be taken as having the sanction of the British Government. We are therefore not side stepping, but agreeing to assist with forces in the manner requested. Secondly, and I think more important, General Wilton and Air Marshal Scherger both specifically stated that the regiment could, on very short notice, be re-deployed from the Thai border to Borneo.

8. All in all therefore, I went quietly. It appears to me:–

(a) that by assisting on the Thai border we are assisting Malaysia;

(b) that as you said in your statement recently, Malaysia is the whole geographic unit and not merely Borneo;⁷

(c) that if it develops that our regiment is needed or could be better used in Borneo, it will still be possible to re-deploy it on short notice.⁸

[NAA: A1209, 1964/6040 part 1]

1 Cabinet was due to consider Hasluck's and Barwick's joint submission on Malaysia's request for defence assistance on 28 January (see Document 149). Hasluck also planned to raise verbally the matter of the deployment of the Australian battalion in Malaysia.

2 That is, Admiral Begg.

3 On 14 January, Critchley had forewarned Canberra of this request advising that, at a meeting on Malaysia's defence in Kuala Lumpur on 13 January, the Malaysians had said they would like the Australian battalion 'to be committed to Thai border operations in rotation on a permanent basis...[to] strengthen a weak position on the border and enable a Malay battalion to increase its readiness for movement if required'. Although the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) terrorist force in the rugged border area had dwindled since the end of the Emergency, it remained cohesive and continued to provide a strong nucleus for terrorist activities in Malaysia.

4 Possibly a reference to a discussion between Air Vice-Marshal G.C. Hartnell, Head of the Australian Joint Services Staff in London, and Peter Thomeycroft, UK Minister of Defence, on 21 January, in which Thomeycroft spoke of the need for Australian forces in Borneo. Hartnell reported that 'Thomeycroft led me to believe that a further approach might be made to Australia'.

5 Defence Committee Meeting No. 3/1964, 'Defence of Malaysia'.

6 That is, the Directive covering the use of Australian forces with the CSR.

7 In a statement on 16 January (for context see footnote 1, Document 149), Menzies pointed out that Australian forces had already been in Malaysia 'for some considerable time', and that they had been deployed there for 'the defence of that country, which comprises not only Sarawak and Sabah but (it should be remembered) Malaya and Singapore'. CNIA, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 61–62.

8 At its meeting on 28 January, Cabinet noted these points and indicated approval for the deployment of 3 RAR on the Thai border (Decision No. 42).