Canberra, 6 March 1964

667. Secret Immediate

Indonesia-Malaysia

Your 635.¹

Your message is most disturbing and reflects a point of view which you and your staff must contest at all appropriate levels and with great urgency in the White House and the State Department.

2. Please leave with Harriman and at the White House a note in my name as follows:–

Begins:–

1. Last October I thought there was nothing the Tunku could offer at a tripartite meeting which would not denigrate him in the eyes of his people and jeopardise the position of his Government, and I thought you agreed.² Since then he has agreed to a Ministerial meeting without pre-conditions to discuss the terms of the cease-fire, met Macapagal without insisting on recognition,³ and now agreed to a second Ministerial meeting to discuss the implementation of the cease-fire indicating that, when it can be discussed on terms of equality and without tactical advantage on the part of any party, discussion of a political solution can begin. What has Sukarno done meantime? What movement has there been in his attitudes?

2. The Malaysian Government tried very hard at the first Bangkok meeting to reach an accommodation with the Indonesians. Razak went so far to meet Subandrio's expressed difficulties that he had his own delegation worried, and incurred strong criticism from his own Cabinet colleagues and public opinion.⁴ This with less than two months to go before a general election in which on current advices the Singapore P.A.P. will field some candidates.⁵

3. Kennedy thought that the presence of the guerillas could be handled and disposed of quietly relying no doubt on good faith and not insisting on express arrangements for their withdrawal. Whatever their understanding with Kennedy on this point the Indonesians have violated it. The formula which Subandrio took back from Bangkok to Djakarta on withdrawal was very mild but still Sukarno did not accept it.⁶ On the contrary Subandrio came out with public statements about supplying the guerillas which he knew must be unacceptable to Malaysia and would seriously prejudice the chances or even the possibility of a second Ministerial meeting. What he was doing was still to treat the question of the guerillas as a vehicle of policy.⁷ Sukarno said as much to Macapagal.⁸ Indonesians keep repeating that the withdrawal of the guerillas must be tied in with discussion and settlement of political issues. Apart from the objectionable character of this doctrine, it should be noted that on no occasion have the Indonesians indicated what these political issues are and what sort of settlement would be satisfactory to them. Their only known and declared position is to wreck Malaysia. It is intolerable to ask the Malaysians to offer terms for the withdrawal of guerillas, responsibility for whom Indonesia openly admits.

4. Indonesians have sought to gain sanction and status for the presence of the guerillas in Malaysian territory:–

(a) by asserting publicly that the cease-fire is a 'stand fast';⁹

(b) by claiming publicly the right of supply under the cease-fire (although this point was not discussed at the first Bangkok meeting).

In pursuance of this objective the Indonesians have continued to send supplies and new guerilla units into Malaysian territory. They have not even disputed Malaysian public statement that the number of guerillas inside Sarawak and Sabah has doubled since the cease-fire was proclaimed. In addition to my earlier message I should add that the latest intelligence informs me that not only is the Indonesian build up at the border substantial and purposeful but that if they change their tactics from attempting to put large parties over the border (in the course of which they have so far got the worst of the deal) to one of sending in very small parties with instructions to regroup deeper in Malaysia, there will be a serious increase in the magnitude of the problem for the security forces.¹⁰ Though this will prove manageable it should be avoided. Therefore time, during which Sukarno thinks, as I am inclined to believe he does think, that America will condone his increased effort against Malaysia, is running in Sukarno's favour. It is also worth mentioning that Sukarno took the cease-fire literally and continued his build up in the Riau Islands and instructed continuance of the subversive activities planned in Malaya and Singapore.

5. When it became apparent that Indonesians would not accept Razak's formula on withdrawal, Malaysians considered possibility of early reference to Security Council. We thought and so did the British that the time was not ripe. The cease-fire was still at least theoretically in operation and there was no new overt aggression on Indonesia's part, the Malaysians were not ready for the exercise and altogether its chances of success did not seem good. Malaysians decided instead to try another Ministerial meeting and understandably said publicly that it should be confined exclusively to consideration of ways and means of making the cease-fire fully effective by the immediate withdrawal of all Indonesian forces from Malaysian territory. I think Forrestal misunderstood Razak's position and that his remarks about the Tunku are gratuitous. As I understand it Razak was prepared to accept the idea of a Summit if Indonesia agreed on withdrawal but he intended to insist on more than mere agreement 'in principle'. I do not think there was any evidence of disagreement between the Tunku and Razak and to say that the former 'wrecked' the meeting is absurd.¹¹ Malaysians have not broken faith [with] any undertaking they gave to Kennedy. Indonesians have done so from the time the cease-fire was proclaimed.

6. Subandrio has repeatedly implied that only Sukarno can settle the issues at a Summit and only he can get internal approval. We understand that Macapagal's view is that Sukarno would like to withdraw the guerillas but internal forces against him are too strong.¹² Do the Americans give these views credence? Can they be reconciled with Indonesian build-up in Borneo during the cease-fire?

7. All the evidence suggests that Indonesia is still in the frame of mind to exploit concessions and to treat compromises as signs of inevitable adjustments to Indonesia's policies. The evidence also suggests that Indonesia is itself prepared to fall back when faced with firmness and resolution as for example over proclamation of the Air Defence Identification Zone.¹³ We believe that the dangers of a policy of accommodation and so called 'expedience' are very much greater than the dangers of a policy of quiet but unyielding firmness.

8. Nothing could be more injurious to all our efforts to obtain a state of stability between Indonesia and its neighbours now and for the future than for Indonesia to feel that it could manipulate and twist the Kennedy cease-fire as it is now doing without incurring the gravest American concern. Consequently we are deeply disturbed (apart from its lack of foundation) by any attempt on the part of the United States Administration to blame the Malaysians, the British or Australians for the present lack of progress. Such an attitude will quickly find its way back to Djakarta where recent weeks have shown a disposition on Indonesia's part to take comfort from their own interpretation of American policy. The Indonesian assessment of the Kennedy mission demonstrates this clearly and I have already expressed my belief as to Subandrio's understanding of the ultimate American position.¹⁴

9. The so-called 'practical' policy of getting a 'solution' is highly dangerous as is the view that there is no other way out than condoning the use of force to obtain political concessions.¹⁵ Are we being asked to subscribe to the view that there is no solution but to endorse Indonesia's unwarranted aggression against Malaysia by requiring that terms for its termination be an indispensable condition of our support of Malaysian sovereignty? In our view if the Indonesians are allowed any smell of success in such tactics they will maintain and expand them and we shall all become more and more deeply involved. Inevitably, at some point in time, we shall be forced to resist under much worse circumstances. Jones has been talking of a 'solution' for some months and talking of 'concessions' by Malaysia without saying exactly what they should be.¹⁶ In my view there will never be a solution if we approach the problem on these lines. We shall only be promoting a destructive power struggle. I would be most concerned if I thought that this sort of idea is being even hinted to the Indonesians at the present time.

10. The alternative policy which we think is right is to continue to bring home to the Indonesians that they have put themselves in an indefensible and untenable position which offers no prospects whatever of success. We just cannot go on postponing Sukarno's moment of choice.

Ends.

3. In your discussion but not in writing you should bring home to Harriman very forcefully, Kennedy's assurances on January 15th to Ormsby Gore that there could be no tripartite meeting until confrontation ended. (Your 109 and 103 are relevant.)¹⁷

If it is suggested that our attitude is negative, you should say we have always believed what I have outlined above, that firmness was the best policy. As for practical suggestions you should refer Harriman to my telegram 206 to Bangkok (Washington 63 8).¹⁸

[NAA: A 838, 3006/4/9 part 5]

1 4 March. It reported on a 'full and free' discussion between Beale and a member of the National Security Council Staff, Michael Forrestal, on the 'significant divergence' of views between Australia and the US on the Malaysia issue. Forrestal said Malaysia's opposition to a summit before an Indonesian withdrawal was not 'a practical policy', and that the objective had to be to get a solution. The American view was that Malaysia, more particularly the Tunku, was hindering the process of negotiations set up by Kennedy. Nor could Forrestal see what Malaysia hoped to gain by going to the UN, and while the US would support Malaysia in the Security Council, he 'could not predict' just what that support would be. He claimed that any satisfactory resolution in the UN would be vetoed by the USSR, and even if it were not, recourse to the UN could not produce a settlement.

2 A reference to Barwick's discussions with Harriman and State Department officials in Washington on 14 October 1963 (see footnote 2, Document 129).

3 The Tunku had met with Macapagal in Phnom Penh, 10-12 February. Malaysia had formally broken off diplomatic relations with the Philippines (and Indonesia), on 17 September 1963, in response to their refusal to grant immediate recognition to the new federation.

4 See footnotes 1 and 3, Document 158. Members of the Malaysian delegation were worried that Razak 'may have soft-pedalled in the ministerial meetings'.

5 The decision that the PAP would field a small number of candidates in the upcoming Malaysian election was taken by the party while Lee was away from Singapore with the mission to Africa (see footnote 7, Document 160). The announcement was made by the party's chairman, Dr Toh Chin Chye, on 1 March.

6 See footnote 2, Document 160.

7 On 17 February, Subandrio announced to the press in Jakarta that Indonesia would be sending liaison officers to Bangkok to arrange with the Malaysians for supplies to be air dropped to Indonesian guerillas in Malaysian territory. When the Malaysians rejected this request, he announced that Indonesia would drop supplies with or without permission. Given that the estimated number of these forces was about 200, and that they were scattered in small groups and thus difficult to locate, Indonesia's action in publicly raising the question of resupply was seen as being motivated by political rather than humanitarian concerns.

8 Macapagal met with Sukarno in Jakarta on 28 February.

9 Sukarno's order on the cease-fire, dropped in leaflets over Sabah and Sarawak on 24 January, instructed the forces 'to keep your weapons in your hands and defend your present positions'.

10 Intelligence assessments provided from Singapore.

11 Forrestal had contended to Beale that Razak's 'approach had been that if Subandrio would first agree �in principle� to withdraw the guerillas, he (Razak) would then be prepared to discuss the outlines of a political settlement'. Forrestal went on to say that 'supported by Australia (and presumably the U.K.), the Tunku had interjected himself into the issue and wrecked the meeting'.

12 In discussing his recent visit to Indonesia during a call by Cutts on 3 March, Macapagal said that Sukarno's advisers 'had unanimously opposed the idea' of withdrawing Indonesian forces. Cutts had been instructed to call on the Philippines' President in order to discuss any points Macapagal wished to raise from Menzies' personal message to him of 20 February in which Menzies put forward his views on the problems facing regional security and offered encouragement to Macapagal's policies of regional cooperation.

13 There was no official reaction in Jakarta to Malaysia's action (see Document 162).

14 Shann had earlier advised that the Indonesians were 'flattered' by the Kennedy mission, and that because of the mission, 'they had in part been got off their hook and given some respectability as a power anxious for peace in the area'. Barwick believed Subandrio considered that, politically, the US regarded a friendly, if not aligned, Indonesia as essential to Western interests in the region. A view that was reinforced by the parallel the Indonesian foreign minister saw between the Kennedy mission and US mediatory efforts during the West New Guinea dispute, which had produced a successful outcome for Indonesia rather than for more long-standing allies of the US.

15 In his discussions with Forrestal (see footnote 1), Beale had objected that 'this view represented sheer political expediency', and that in this case it 'would establish a precedent which would not be forgotten' by Indonesia.

16 For example, on 29 January, Jones told Shann in Jakarta, 'that he is refusing to discuss possible solutions', saying that the US had arranged 'the first step of bringing the parties together' and that it was now up to them 'to work it out'. On 22 February, Shann reported Jones as saying the Tunku 'must admit that mistakes were made over the birth of Malaysia and offer to repair them'. In Jones's view, the issue had to be 'taken out of the jungle' and into the conference room. He contended that Malaysians were 'showing every sign of intransigence on this issue', but Sukarno had to 'be given a way out with his own people'.

17 14 and 15 January. They reported Beale's discussions with Ormsby Gore before and after the British Ambassador's talks with Kennedy about his upcoming mission. Ormsby Gore had told Beale that he had 'pressed' that there should be no tripartite talks until confrontation had ceased and that Kennedy had accepted this

18 Document 166.