UKNA: PREM 13/889

Australian High Commission, London, 8 February 1966

Top Secret

I have been asked by my Prime Minister to transmit the following message to you:&Ndash;

(begins)

My dear Harold,

I greatly appreciated the worth of your congratulations and your welcoming of me into the company of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. It is my hope, and will be my endeavour, to maintain in strength the close ties between our two countries. I know how much Sir Robert Menzies valued his personal relationship with you, and I look forward to our own relationship ripening between us as we discuss together the many matters in which we have a mutual interest.

Thank you for your message of 26th January and the two papers referred to in it. We very much appreciated having Denis Healey with us and I would like to say, as no doubt he has already reported, how cordial and valuable the talks proved to be.¹ Denis made a splendid personal impression both on the Cabinet and through his public statements.

We were pleased to hear from Denis that you are in agreement with the message to you from Sir Robert Menzies on 19th January² and we particularly welcomed the assurance that Britain intends to continue a worldwide defence role in co-operation with her allies, including her role in South East Asia.

I feel we were able to so provide him with an increased appreciation of the full extent of the effort Australia is now making and will continue to make.

In addition to our existing commitment of forces in South East Asia, in particular in Malaysia and South Vietnam, I stressed the heavy calls that are currently being made upon our resources by the rapid expansion of our forces which is now taking place and by the large build-up in population that has been continuous over the last 20 years. This we firmly regard as fundamental to our defensive capacity and to the contribution which we can make to the security of the area.

I am sure Denis will convey to you the strength of our conviction that Britain, Australia and New Zealand should try to retain the Singapore/Malaysian bases because of their great importance to the general stability of the area, to the allied military position in South East Asia, and to the forward defence of Australia and New Zealand.

We, in tum, were glad to have his assurance that it was your own wish to continue to maintain your forces as far north as possible for as long as possible and that any difference between us was not one of intention but of assessment of the risks of a situation arising in which it was no longer practicable or effective to maintain the Singapore/Malaysian bases.

We expressed to Denis our misgivings at the idea that withdrawal of the British bases in Singapore might form part of an agreement to end confrontation with Indonesia. If, as has also been mooted, this was accompanied by a fresh ascertainment of the wishes of the peoples of Northem Borneo, it would give Indonesia everything that it was demanding when it embarked on confrontation. We fear that to give in to Indonesia in this way would merely strengthen those elements inside the country who have embarked on policies of expansion against their neighbours. We remember that the acquisition of West New Guinea by Indonesia, so far from forming the basis for good relations with their neighbours, was followed immediately by the demands against Malaysia. We would not wish to seem dogmatic about the future, and much could depend on who emerges on top in the current domestic struggles in Indonesia, so I shall confine myself at this stage to registering with you the great concern that we in Australia would feel at the future of Singapore being bartered away in the process of terminating confrontation.

During the talks, we made it clear that we did not accept the views on the long term political and strategic aims for South East Asia which were set out in one of the memoranda³ made available to us before the talks began. This memorandum appeared to us to contemplate that the whole region of South East Asia would be neutralised, and that western power would be withdrawn from the mainland and be available in the background. We do not share this strategic concept nor the judgements which lie behind it. What we fear is that neutralisation of the region of South East Asia within the foreseeable future would create a feeling of defencelessness among the peoples and governments of many of the countries, and would open the way for them to be taken over by Communists or other pro-Chinese elements. Furthermore, we in Australia want to avoid situations developing in the region where there is no choice between acquiescing in hostile acts in respect to our neighbours and resort to nuclear warfare. Consequently, we want to see friendly and resolute governments in the region fortified by the knowledge that outside western power is at hand.

In our view, China represents such a threat or source of concern for many countries of the region that they are prepared to accept, tacitly or openly, the presence of outside military strength. Also, in our view, the problems are not posed merely by a Chinese threat of overt military attack, but take many forms involving subversion, insurrection with outside help, guerrilla warfare, and a range of political and propaganda pressures, However, as you said in your message, the memorandum is not comprehensive and, having regard to the realities, I feel that you and your colleagues may not, in fact, espouse the strategic concept and the judgements in the stark form in which they are there presented. In any case, these are matters for continuing discussion between us and, necessarily, with the United States whose power is vital to the security of South East Asia.

While we emphasise the importance of Singapore and Malaysia and look to an indefinite continuance of the bases there, we realise that it makes sense to examine what practical arrangements would be necessary in the event of the bases becoming untenable at some point of time, if only as a form of insurance–to use Denis Healey's word. So we arranged for our military people and yours to have an exchange of information about our facilities here and what might be involved in basing British forces in Australia so that any further examination can be based on a better assessment of practical realities.

During the discussions, we were heartened to learn that you share our view of the importance of quadripartite discussions with the United States. The important objective for us and the New Zealanders–and we believe for Britain and the United States too–is that the expenditure of the resources that can be made available should result in the most effective effort in the common interest. This will only be achieved if we can consider in the context of co-operation between the four allied countries an agreed strategic concept and roles of forces and the base facilities necessary for their support.

Since Denis left, I have not had a chance to consult my colleagues in any detail about the nature and timing of the approach which now needs to be made to the United States to hold quadripartite discussions at the ministerial level. We will keep in touch about this.

You will not usually find me so long-winded in our exchanges, but these matters are of great concern for us both and are relevant to global strategy as well as that of this area.

Yours sincerely

Harold Holt

(message ends)

1 See Document 53.

2 See Document 48.

3 See Document 50, note 1.