NAA: A1209, 1971/9449 PART 2

Canberra, 17 August 1972

Confidential

Australia House

At the Prime Minister's suggestion, I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

We discussed the Australia House transfer for approximately an hour. The Minister said that he was still turning the Prime Minister's letter over in his mind and wanted to give it more thought before he replied.

The time was taken up in discussion–not in negotiation. Most of the talking was done by the Minister outlining his philosophy of Australia House–what it should do and how it should be controlled.

He wanted me to know that my views were of interest and importance to him–no less than his own Department's.

But at the same time, he made clear some puzzlement and some apprehension about the philosophy behind the Prime Minister's letter.

He was greatly concerned that the formula the Prime Minister produced would turn the budget and accounting side over to Foreign Affairs but leave everything else where it now stood. The Department of Foreign Affairs would have a Foreign Affairs role but little else in the policy area.

The Minister said that the Palace responsibility would certainly stay with the Prime Minister. That was not in question. But the other things mentioned he was unsure about.

He said of the Commonwealth Secretariat that it was really.a Foreign Affairs function. I said I agreed there were Foreign Affairs elements such as sanctions against Rhodesia but surely there were principally Prime Ministerial elements–Prime Ministers' Conferences and certain other meetings.

The Minister held to the view that most of the things the Secretariat does, e.g. Health Conferences, Education Conferences, were Foreign Affairs matters.

I questioned this.

These topics are not eminently Foreign Affairs topics.

But they may well fall to Foreign Affairs. My concern was that matters which are predominantly Prime Minister's matters should come to him in the first instance as of right.

We agreed to put that aside for the moment as perhaps not a highly important matter.

The Minister then spoke of his difficulties with Australia House unless he has authority over it in a full sense. He does not mind the High Commissioner being appointed by Cabinet or the Prime Minister instead of by himself. But once appointed, he, the Minister, must have control.

He must be able to give the High Commissioner directives and terms of reference for his activities and receive reports from him. He has not been receiving reports from Australia House.

I said that did not seem to me to be the point. There could have been reports–there can be directives issued.

I said I saw Australia House with a broad spectrum of Australian representatives. There would be Trade and Treasury and so on. I would say it had worked on this basis. But even if it had not to a full degree, there was nothing to say it could not.

The Minister said that he was not wanting to take an excessive Foreign Affairs line, or even a Foreign Affairs line at all. It was a matter of his own convictions. He had seen other posts in operation. He believed they worked better than Australia House. He believed that with Britain soon to go into the Common Market, it was essential that Foreign Affairs officers under the co-ordinating control of Foreign Affairs in Australia should have access to the relevant British Ministries. It would not happen unless the Foreign Minister was in clear charge.

He said that as things stand, neither his Department nor he as Foreign Minister is getting information from, e.g. Sir Denis Greenhill, Permanent Under-Secretary of the British Foreign Office. He has his association with the Foreign Minister but not in a sufficient way with the Foreign Office.

I agreed that the information had to be got. But there was more than one way of getting it.

What I had been talking about, i.e. the 'Permanent Head' Deputy High Commissioner–was, I suggested, a better way. Barring some particular Foreign Affairs men, any such Deputy High Commissioner would be a more broadly experienced and qualified man .

I also said that even at present, the Foreign Affairs Deputy High Commissioner is able to call on the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office. I assume he does.

The Minister said he could not really accept either of my points. Foreign Affairs officers have, over time, through their own experience become very skilled co-ordinators. As to the right of access to the Permanent Under-Secretary, yes it was there. But because the Deputy High Commissioner did not carry High Commissioner rank, it was awkward.

First, the Permanent Under-Secretary finds it difficult to see anyone not of ambassadorial rank. If he breaks the rule for one he is faced with breaking it for others. Beyond that, there is the Deputy High Commissioner's own embarrassment towards the High Commissioner–who may feel it is he who should be going to the Foreign Office. So it was not working out.

The Minister also said that he was not apt to hear more of British policies from other posts, e.g. Bonn, Paris, or Washington, than he was hearing direct from London.

I said I puzzled over this. Foreign Affairs have had a long succession of very able officers in London–Waller, Mclntyre, Shann, Eastman, to name some. Surely they had reported. I knew from my own cable reading that this was so.

The Minister said yes–up to a point. But their lack of status was a handicap.

He felt deeply about this. He also felt deeply about his own position if he were to run Australia House. He would not want to take it under some ambiguous scheme in control.

He believed it should now become a Foreign Affairs office, but if necessary, he would accept a decision to the contrary. But he would not want it to be in an in-between situation. He did not think that would work. It had not worked in the past.

I said I had a different view about the past, but I respected his views.

My purpose was to find a co-operative basis. The Minister said he would write or speak to the Prime Minister.