Current
Projects

Analytical Services for Environmental
Sampling Environmental sampling is an
important safeguards strengthening measure that will enhance the IAEAs capability
to detect undeclared nuclear activities. ANSTOhas demonstrated
that mass spectrometry using a tandem accelerator can be used to analyse
environmental samples with very high sensitivity. In November 2000, ANSTO applied to join the IAEA Safeguards
Network of Analytical Labs (NWAL)ASSP is supporting ANSTO in obtaining IAEA
certification.

ANSTO has demonstrated
unequivocally that AMS (Accelerator Mass Spectroscopy) is the only technique
capable of measuring U-236 at the low levels expected in environmental
materials. Consequently, the IAEA asked
ANSTO to measure U-236 in soil samples from Kosovo, as part of the UN
Environment Programs study of the environmental and health consequences of the
use of depleted uranium (DU) in ammunition.

Application of the State-level Integration
Concept on Fuel Cycles Under Safeguards Eleven Member States
(Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan,
Sweden, United Kingdom and United States) contribute to this joint task by developing
integrated safeguardsapproaches for
their nuclear fuel cycles and/or by helping the IAEA to derive generic guidance
for the design of integrated safeguards approaches on the level of the
state-as-a-whole.

ASNO is an active participant in
this joint task. In early 2001, ASNO
finalised its proposal for an integrated safeguards approach for Australia,
thus contributing to Australia becoming the first state for the introduction of
integrated safeguards. The IAEA commended
ASNOs contribution to the joint task by the following conclusion: Under this
task the Australian Support Program demonstrated a strong sense of leadership
in the implementation of strengthened safeguardsby providing a
state-level safeguards approach for the Australian fuel cycle. This approach was part of the background
information for the Agency during the development of the in-house state-level
safeguards approach for Australia. The
task also contained some elements that were used by other support programs;
specifically the Integrated Safeguards Evaluation Methodology developed by the
U.S. Support Programme.

This task is expected to be
completed by the end of 2001.

Re-Examination of Basic Safeguards
Implementation Parameters During the 1990s the IAEA acknowledged the need, in
parallel with the development of strengthened and integrated safeguards
concepts, to re-examine basic safeguards implementation parameters, such as
timeliness goals, significant quantities, and the categorisation of nuclear
material for safeguards purposes.

Under this task ASNO has prepared
papers for the IAEA on timeliness verification goals and the categorisation of nuclear material, which have
been extensively used by the IAEA for the conceptual development of integrated
safeguards. ASNO has also prepared
several papers related to the development of integrated safeguards approaches
to specific facilitytypes (research reactors
and light water reactorswith and without
MOX fuel) for SAGSIduring the
reporting period.

Expansion of the Physical Model The Physical Model was developed for the IAEA by a panel of
international experts (including ASNO staff) in support of the enhanced
information analysis in the context of strengthened and integrated safeguards.
The Model
identifies, describes and characterises all known fuel cycle technologies and
processes, especially those required for the acquisition of weapons-useable
fissile material, as a guide for IAEA analysts and inspectors.

As developed, the Physical Model
is a living document subject to periodic review and update. During the reporting period
ASNO, with
support from ANSTO, contributed to the revision of the Physical Model to
encompass hot cell operations.

The expansion of the Physical
Model is still under way with the last part Intermediate and High Active Waste
Management now being under review at ASNO. In addition, a general revision process has been set in train, initially
looking particularly at the volumes on reprocessing and enrichment, and
consideration is being given to the further development of an electronic
version of the Model.

Support for Information Review and Evaluation Since 1997, ASNO has undertaken for the IAEA a number of
consultancy subtasks in this area which support the implementation of
strengthened safeguards. Activities during
the reporting period were as follows.

To evaluate information on miningand milling of uranium for safeguards
purposes This task seeks
to: determine the circumstances under which the IAEA might undertake
complementary accessto a uranium
mining/milling site; what verification activities might be undertaken; and how
declared information about mining/milling activities would be taken into
account in an assessment on possible undeclared activities.

An interim report was submitted by
ASNO in June 1998. The IAEA found the
report very useful in helping it to develop new verification procedures under
the Additional Protocol. Using an
approach proposed by ASNO, the IAEA achieved highly conclusive results on the
dating of uranium samples taken during the Agencys (first ever) complementary
access to a uranium mine, the Ranger mine, in
June 1999.