Annual Report 1999-2000
The functions of the Director General, ASNO,
include:
- ensuring the effective operation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987
and the
Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994, and fulfilment of Australias obligations under
the treaties these Acts implement; - ensuring fulfilment of Australias obligations under nuclear safeguards
agreements, including the agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) for the application of safeguards pursuant to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); - monitoring compliance with the provisions of bilateral nuclear
safeguards agreements by Australias treaty partners; - undertaking, coordinating and facilitating research and development
(R&D) in relation to nuclear safeguards; - ensuring the timely and effective establishment of CTBT
International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities in Australia, and undertaking
preparations to meet the full range of Australias obligations under the CTBT when it enters
into force; and - advising the Minister on nuclear
non-proliferation and safeguards matters, and on issues related to CWC
implementation and CTBT verification.
Overview
of Safeguards Role
In safeguards, ASNO
has four main areas of responsibility:
- the application of safeguards within Australia;
- the physical protection and security of nuclear items in Australia;
- the operation of Australias bilateral safeguards
agreements; and - contributing to the operation and development of international
(IAEA) safeguards and the strengthening of the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime.
IAEA safeguards
are a key element in international action against the spread of nuclear
weapons. Effective IAEA safeguards are of
vital interest to Australia because of their contribution to global and
regional peace and security. They are
also important because they underpin Australias stringent uranium export policies.
Key safeguards functions include:
- ensuring that nuclear material, associated material, equipment and
technology in Australia is properly accounted for and controlled,
and ensuring
that requirements are met under Australias safeguards agreement with the IAEA
and bilateral agreements applying to nuclear material and items in Australia; - pursuant to obligations under the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and following IAEA guidelines, ensuring that appropriate security
measures are applied to nuclear items in Australia; - ensuring Australias bilateral safeguards
agreements are implemented satisfactorily, that is, to guarantee Australias nuclear exports
remain in exclusively peaceful use; ensuring that conditions which Australia
places on the use of Australian Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM), additional to IAEA safeguards, are met (these conditions are
outlined on
page 86); - ensuring that all AONM is subject to IAEA safeguards, and
verification of non-diversion is carried out by the IAEA; - ensuring that any nuclear items other than nuclear material (i.e.
associated material, equipment and technology) which are transferred to other
countries are properly accounted for, and that the relevant records of
Australias
partners are consistent with ASNO records; - contributing to the development and effective implementation of IAEA
safeguards through activities such as participation in expert groups and
international meetings on safeguards, field testing of new safeguards methods
in Australia, and presentation of regional training courses on safeguards
techniques; - managing Australias Support Program for IAEA safeguards, which embraces R&D work
and includes consultancy tasks for the IAEA; - evaluation of the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, and evaluation
of non-proliferation aspects of nuclear fuel cycle developments, as a basis for
advising Government; - contributing to the development of Australias policies in the area
of disarmament and non-proliferation by colleagues in the International
Security Division (ISD) of DFAT; and - working closely on technical issues of
common interest with agencies such as the Australian Nuclear Science and
Technology Organisation (ANSTO), the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency
(ARPANSA), the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), and the Office of
National Assessments (ONA).
Overview
of CWC Role
ASNO is the focal point in Australia for
liaison between stakeholders, such as operators of declared facilities, the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the national authorities of other States Parties on issues
relating to implementation of the Convention.
ASNO's role here is primarily one of liaison and facilitation, to ensure
that Australias international obligations under the CWC are met while at the same
time making certain that the rights of facility operators are protected. ASNO seeks to promote effective
international implementation of the CWC, particularly in Australias immediate
region, by working with the OPCW and other States Parties in the resolution of
outstanding technical implementation issues.
ASNO is also responsible for ensuring that
the requirements of the Chemical Weapons
(Prohibition) Act 1994are met, and may conduct national
compliance inspections of relevant chemical facilities. While the Act makes provision for national
inspectors to obtain mandatory access to sites, it is expected such powers will
be exercised only in exceptional circumstances.
ASNO provides technical support to DFAT in
development of a protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BWC). Once the provisions of this protocol are
settled, and as Australia moves towards protocol ratification, it is envisaged that ASNO will be expanded to embrace BWC responsibilities similar to those it holds under the CWC.
Key CWC functions include:
- identifying and gathering information
on industrial chemical facilities and activities required to be declared to the
OPCW; - working with declarable facilities to prepare
for the possibility of OPCW inspection; - increasing awareness of the CWC and Australias obligations by disseminating
information on the Convention and the Chemical
Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994 to
the chemical industry and other domestic entities likely to be affected; - administering and developing regulatory,
administrative and logistical mechanisms to enable Australia to fulfil its CWC
obligations; - liaising with overseas counterpart
organisations and with the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW in connection with
technical and practical implementation issues; - conducting research directed towards improving
the effectiveness of the CWCs verification regime; - assisting, upon request, other States Parties
to implement the CWC, particularly in Australias immediate region; and - providing
technical advice to support Australias delegation at the negotiations to
strengthen the BWC.
Overview of CTBT Role
Although the CTBT has not yet entered into
force, it is being applied on a provisional basis by those States that have
signed it (States Signatories). The
CTBT expressly provides (Article IV) that its verification system (the
International Monitoring SystemIMS) shall be capable of meeting the
requirements of the Treaty at entry-into-force. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organisation
(CTBTO), with
the CTBTO Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) and States Signatories, are
therefore engaged in a very significant task even before the Treaty has come
into force. This includes the
establishment/upgrading of 337 monitoring facilities around the world, as well
as the development of detailed procedures for the operation of these facilities
and for the conduct of other verification activities such as On Site
Inspections.
ASNO is the main point of contact between
Australia and the Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna. Overall, the role is one of liaison and
facilitation to ensure that the International Monitoring System is established
efficiently and relevant domestic regulations are passed.
Key CTBT functions include:
- being the national point of contact for liaison on CTBT
implementation; - establishing and maintaining legal, administrative and financial
mechanisms to give effect to the CTBT in Australia; - developing arrangements for the operation of Australias National Data Centre
and preparing for possible on-site inspections in Australia; - promoting an understanding in Australia of CTBT verification,
including by acting as an interface between technical and policy specialists;
and - contributing to the work of the CTBTO
Preparatory Commission and its working groups.
Advice
to the Government
The staff of ASNO have substantial experience in international and bilateral
safeguards, nuclear technology, CWC verification issues and CTBT processes and
procedures. Drawing on this expertise
and an international network of contacts in other governments and
organisations, ASNO provides technical and policy advice to the Government and
other bodies.