UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE PACIFIC

1. During the past few weeks there has been increasing evidence
that Japan intends to make a major move south in the near future.

No single piece of this evidence is strong enough to justify the
conclusion that she has finally and irrevocably made up her mind
to attack the Netherlands Indies or Malaya or both, but the
cumulative effect of small bits of evidence suggests that she will
'spring' as soon as the appropriate moment arrives. This moment
may be a specific date in the near future or an indefinite date
which will be made definite only when Japan feels that German
action in Europe or the Mediterranean or both has brought the most
favourable moment in which to carry out her schemes.

2. Although some think that Japan will move on a fixed date (for
instance, February 18th has been suggested), others, including Sir
John Latham [1] and Dr. Hornbeck [2], are inclined to doubt
whether she has any fixed date in mind. This latter view appears
to be supported by the fact that, so far as one can gather, Japan
is still not quite ready to move. She is still acting as mediator
between Indo-China and Thailand and these negotiations are not yet
complete. Assuming that they end shortly and that Japan, as the
price of her mediation, secures further bases in Indo-China and
other bases in Thailand, possibly as far south as Sangkla [3],
these new bases cannot be made effective overnight. There may,
therefore, be a period of some two to six weeks during which
diplomatic and military steps can be taken to deter Japan from her
southward move and in which to increase the defences of the
threatened areas.

3. One can assume with confidence that Japan will not take any
step (such as an attack on the Philippines) which will inevitably
bring her into a war with the United States. It is very possible,
however, that she may attempt to capture Singapore, either by land
or sea or both. If she succeeded in taking Singapore, it is highly
unlikely that the Dutch East Indies would resist Japanese
pressure.

4. The outstanding question at the moment is to determine what
action, if any, the United States is prepared to take to prevent
Japan capturing Singapore.

5. It is now clear from President Roosevelt's own statement [4]
that if Japan attacks the Philippines America will fight. It is
not clear what America will do in any other set of circumstances
and the next week or two may be the last chance of converting her
to a British Empire point of view before Japan moves.

6. On its face, it seems clear that it is vital to the United
States to prevent Singapore falling into Japanese hands. The naval
defences of the Philippines are not such at present as to make it
possible to base there an American battle fleet. Apart from
Hawaii, Singapore is the only other place where a battle fleet can
at present be based in the Pacific, except perhaps Sydney. So long
as it remains in British hands, action by Japan towards Australia
and the Netherlands Indies can only be precarious. The United
States can continue to draw from the Netherlands Indies supplies
of rubber and tin (she has only 3 1/2 months supply of each) which
she needs. If, on the other hand, Singapore passes into Japanese
hands, then the Philippines themselves will not be safe, Japan
will control the Netherlands Indies and thus put herself in a
position to cut off essential American supplies and will also
vastly increase her own vital resources; and it will be extremely
difficult to throw Japan out of Singapore even after the
conclusion of a successful war against Germany and Italy.

7. These facts seem so obvious that it is hard to believe they are
not accepted by American naval opinion. Yet in the talks which
have recently been proceeding it would appear that the Americans
are not prepared to admit the vital strategic importance of
Singapore or to admit that, while Singapore and the Philippines
are safe in British and American hands, it is unnecessary to the
defence of the United States to station the whole Pacific fleet at
Hawaii.

8. The attitude of the American Naval Committee can be interpreted
along two lines:

(a) That their strategy is essentially unsound, or
(b) That, under political instructions, they are deliberately
arguing a case whose unsoundness they realise.

While the British delegation is, I think, inclined to adopt the
first interpretation, it seems to me a rather dangerously easy one
to adopt. I feel that at least full consideration should be given
to the other possibility, which might be explained as follows:

9. The American Administration has for long tried to induce the
British to send additional warships to Singapore, which suggests,
incidentally, that they are very anxious that Singapore shall not
fall. On the other hand, they have resisted all pressure from
Great Britain to send American warships to Singapore. This may be
because they feel that such action would be taken by Japan as a
casus belli and 'provoke' a Japanese-American war in the Pacific.

Or, the Administration may feel that American public opinion would
not sanction such a move, partly because it would seem provocative
and partly because Americans feel more comfortable with the
Pacific fleet based on Hawaii, even though naval strategists might
agree that it could more effectively be based elsewhere. It is
just conceivable, therefore, that the attitude adopted by the
American naval representatives is to be regarded as a gigantic
bluff, designed to compel Great Britain to reinforce the fleet at
Singapore, even though she must seriously weaken her situation in
the Mediterranean by so doing. It may be that, when pressed,
America would be herself prepared to transfer to the Atlantic
(and, in the event of war between America and Germany-to the
Mediterranean as well) sufficient warships to replace those Great
Britain had been compelled to send to Singapore. The
Administration may feel that war with Germany in the next few
months is highly probable and that American public opinion would
support the use of American warships in the Atlantic and the
Mediterranean. In these circumstances, they may prefer this
roundabout and technically inefficient way of reinforcing
Singapore to the more obvious solution of sending American
warships to Singapore from Hawaii.

10. Two major points now require consideration. The first is what
action the United States can be induced to take with a view to
deterring Japan from starting a war with the British Empire. The
second is, assuming such a war begins, what assistance is the
United States prepared to give.

11. The need for 'deterrent' action has already been made
abundantly dear to the Administration, not only by Lord Halifax
[5] but also by the American Ambassador in Japan. [6] It seems
probable that Mr. Hopkins on his return to America [7] would be
prepared to add his voice in support of the argument. Both the
President and the Secretary of State [8] are considering various
things which the United States can do. Some of these, for instance
a 'strong' reception to the new Japanese Ambassador [9], are
likely to happen. It is doubtful, however, whether the
Administration is prepared to take the only action which would
have a reasonable chance of success, namely:

(a) A flat declaration that a Japanese attack on Malaya or the
Netherlands Indies will mean a war with the United States or
(b) The transfer of American warships to Singapore or
(c) Substantial reinforcement of American warships in the
Philippines or in the Asiatic squadron.

Strong pressure upon the Administration to do one or more of these
three things is desirable. If this pressure fails the only thing
left seems to be to make it as clear as possible that Great
Britain does not intend to let Singapore fall, that, if necessary,
she will send sufficent ships from the Mediterranean fleet to
Singapore, that this will mean a major deterioration in favour of
the Axis powers in the Mediterranean, thus inevitably lengthening
the war and making the danger to America itself across the
Atlantic more real. In these circumstances it may be possible to
induce the United States to agree to make available in the
Atlantic and, if necessary, in the Mediterranean itself,
sufficient ships to replace the British ships sent to Singapore.

12. If war does break out between Japan and Great Britain and on
the assumption that American warships are not already in
Singapore, the greatest pressure should be brought to bear on the
Administration to convince them that Singapore cannot be allowed
to fall into Japanese hands, and to induce them to take whatever
action is possible to preserve in British hands those islands and
naval bases to the East and North of Australia which would assist
any American fleet trying to get to Singapore. If they will not
take this action, the only other thing left is to try to convince
the Administration that, as British ships must leave the
Mediterranean for Singapore, American ships must be made available
in the Atlantic and perhaps even in the Mediterranean to replace
them.

A. S. W[ATT]