COS(41)230 Final (extract) LONDON, 11 April 1941

MOST SECRET

VISIT OF THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

REPLY BY CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MEMORANDUM BY THE PRIME MINISTER or
AUSTRALIA

We have examined the Memorandum prepared by the Prime Minister of
the Commonwealth of Australia [1] and submit our comments below.

LOCAL DEFENCE OF MALAYA

Question:

2. Mr. Menzies has reviewed (paragraphs 1-5 of his Memorandum) the
conclusions of the Singapore Conference Report, 1940, the Chiefs
of Staff comments thereon, and the methods by which the existing
deficiencies are being made up. He makes particular reference to
the views of the Australian Delegation to the Conference that 'in
the absence of a main fleet in the Far East, the forces and
equipment at present available in this area for the defence of
Malaya are totally inadequate to meet a major attack by Japan.'
He has therefore asked for statements of the forces, both land and
air, and the equipment considered necessary for the defence of
Malaya, together with the forces and equipment at present provided
and the dates by which the balance will be met.

Reply:

3. We attach the following statements as Annexes to this paper:-

(a) Annex I: A statement showing the land forces considered
necessary for the defence of Malaya, including the total strength
in personnel, the forces at present provided and the remainder to
be provided, together with the dates by which they will be in
Malaya (so far as can be forecast).

(b) Annex II: The total quantity of equipment in main classes to
be provided for the forces referred to above, the equipment at
present provided, and the remainder to be provided, together with
the dates by which it will be in Malaya (so far as can be
forecast).

(c) Annex III: The distribution of the strength of the 336
aircraft required 'to give a very fair degree of security' to
Malaya indicating the types of squadrons and aircraft, the
immediate equipment and the reserves. In addition, the Annex
states the present strength of aircraft under the same headings,
and states the position regarding re-equipment and reinforcement.

4. An examination of Annex I will show that the land forces in
Malaya, with the exception of certain artillery units, should
reach their full strength by the end of April 1941.

5. We would point out that it is not practicable to give firm
dates regarding the arrival of the various items of army equipment
at present deficient in Malaya. Important items of equipment are
allocated monthly in accordance with the strategical situation,
and the requirements of Malaya are taken fully into account in
common with other theatres. It will be seen that, with the
exception of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, S[mall] A[rms]
A[mmunition] and artillery ammunition, the deficiencies in army
equipment are not serious.

6. With regard to air force strengths, Mr. Menzies has quoted our
opinion that 336 aircraft will give us a very fair degree of
security, even if it embraced part of the reconnaissance forces
for the Indian Ocean. It is unlikely that this programme will be
completed by the end of the year, though that is our present plan.

Nevertheless, in spite of the requirements of the present
situation, particularly in the Middle East, we are making steady
progress with the re-equipment and reinforcement of the Far East.

7. Even the present situation is by no means critical. For the
close defence of Malaya and Burma alone we have at present 118
aircraft, not including the two fighter squadrons (32 aircraft)
now forming. The Netherlands East Indies now possess 162 aircraft
(with reasonable reserves), of types at least equal in performance
to those of the Japanese. Thus the Dutch and ourselves already
possess for defence a total of 280 aircraft, and this figure does
not include any of the 170 fighters which are now arriving in
Malaya from the United States of America, and takes no account of
Dutch orders for 245 aircraft from the United States of America,
deliveries of which were due to begin last month.

8. The majority of the 450 shore-based aircraft which the Japanese
can marshal against us are of obsolete types, and, as we have
said, we have no reason to believe that Japanese standards are
even comparable with those of the Italians. We have already drawn
attention to our experiences, when heavily outnumbered during the
Libyan campaign as well as at Malta and in the air defence of
Great Britain. We fully realise that our air strength in the Far
East is below that necessary for reasonable security in the
absence of a Fleet, but we do not consider that in the present
situation we are running more serious risks there than elsewhere,
though we are making every effort to restore the balance at the
earliest possible moment.

Question:

9. Mr. Menzies has also asked whether it would be possible for
Hurricanes to be made available for Malaya, owing to the
reputation this type has achieved.

Reply:

10. Apart from the necessity for standardisation of types to
simplify maintenance and the supply of spares, the use of
Hurricanes in the Far East is undesirable, as they could only be
provided at the expense of the Middle East, where we are already
extended in our efforts merely to replace wastage. The bottlenecks
are not availability of aircraft, but packing, tropicalising and
shipping capacity. It is therefore of the greatest importance for
us to obtain all the aircraft we can for the Far East from the
United States. The Buffalo appears to be eminently satisfactory
and would probably prove more than a match for any Japanese
aircraft.

NAVAL DEFENCE IN THE FAR EAST

Question:

11. Mr. Menzies has drawn attention in paragraph 7 of his
Memorandum to the Prime Minister's telegram of the 23rd December
1940 [2], in which he stated that: 'if Australia is seriously
threatened by invasion, we should not hesitate to compromise or
sacrifice our Mediterranean position for the sake of our kith and
kin.' Mr. Menzies considers it necessary to resolve a general
declaration of this nature into a plan of the specific measures
that really would be possible in the event of such a contingency
arising. There are large forces in the Middle East, including
three Australian divisions, and they could not be left to their
fate. To withdraw them, however, would take time; shipping would
have to be provided, convoys organised and naval protection
afforded in the meantime. Much could happen in the Far East during
this period.

He further considers that there is need for a definite plan of
naval reinforcement east of Suez to the extent to which it might
be possible, on a progressive basis, according to events in the
Mediterranean.

In our examination below, we assume throughout that the United
States is neutral and that a Japanese threat has developed against
Australia.

CHANGES IN THE SITUATION
Replies:

12. Since December, considerable changes have taken place in the
military situation. The principal changes are as follows:-

(a) Unfavourable Factors:

(i) The increased importance of retaining adequate naval forces in
the Eastern Mediterranean to secure our lines of communication
with Greece, to support our land forces in the new operations now
opening up in Libya and to supply Malta.

(ii) German heavy ships have been operating against our trade,
which has necessitated dispersion of our capital ships for its
protection.

(iii) German attack on trade by submarines and aircraft has
greatly increased.

(iv) The attitude of France has provided Germany with a means of
evading our blockade, and the interception of French convoys is an
additional commitment for our naval forces.

(v) In the Far East our strategic position may have been adversely
affected by the successful Japanese mediation in the dispute
between Indo-China and Thailand, which may give the Japanese an
opportunity to establish their forces in Thailand.

(b) Favourable Factors:

(i) The United States have adopted a policy in which, short of
being at war, they are virtually allied to the British
Commonwealth.

(ii) The situation in Italian East Africa has materially improved,
and Italian naval forces in the Red Sea virtually eliminated.

(iii) The Battle of Matapan has reduced Italian naval strength and
morale.

(iv) Our defence position in the Far East has been improved both
by the strengthening of the garrison and defences of Malaya and
Burma and by the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conversations.

EFFECT OF ABOVE CHANGES ON THREAT TO AUSTRALIA
13. In our view, the general effect of these changes has been to
improve the prospective Far Eastern situation. By far the most
important factor is the attitude of the United States. Though
nominally neutral, they are now so closely identified with our
cause that the potential threat of the United States Fleet at
Hawaii must alone impose a most powerful restraining influence on
Japanese freedom of action to move southwards. It would, we feel,
certainly prevent the use of the whole Japanese fleet in support
of an expedition to the South Seas.

14. In any event, a threat to Australia, other than raids and
attacks on trade, could not arise quickly, since it would first be
necessary for the Japanese to seize an advanced base. Before
undertaking large-scale operations against Australia the Japanese
will also almost certainly consider it necessary to deny Singapore
to us as a base and so remove a potential threat on the flank of
their lines of communication. In the event, however, of Japanese
naval action eventually constituting a real threat to Australia,
we have considered below the possibility of making a capital ship
force available for the Far East, on the assumption that the
United States remains neutral. The question of reinforcement of
the Far East in the event of United States intervention has
already been dealt with. [3]

POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN
15. We have considered the question of progressive withdrawal of
our forces from the Mediterranean and Middle East theatres. The
security of our position in the Middle East remains essential to
our strategy for the defeat of Germany. Loss of that position
would give our enemies such overriding advantages, strategic,
economic and diplomatic, that the course of the war would be
considerably prolonged.

16. Any withdrawal, however small, would involve the movement of
forces by sea, and the necessity for retaining a strong fleet in
the Mediterranean would be increased rather than lessened during
the period of such withdrawal. Even if it were decided to abandon
our Mediterranean interests, the fleet would have to remain until
the end in order to cover the withdrawal of the armies.

HOME WATERS, GIBRALTAR AND CONVOY ESCORT
17. In Home Waters, we must always maintain sufficient force to
cover the vital approaches to the United Kingdom. With enemy heavy
ships in the Atlantic, we have to draw on our heavy ships in the
Home Fleet to assist in escort duty the R Class battleships
already so employed. We have always to guard against being forced
into a dispersion of our heavy ships and then finding a German
heavy ship concentration effected in our Home Waters. There is
thus an irreducible minimum for our heavy ship forces in Home and
Atlantic waters.

18. At Gibraltar we have maintained a small capital ship and
carrier force to prevent the Italian fleet entering the Atlantic,
to carry out offensive operations in the Western Mediterranean,
and to protect trade in the North Atlantic.

ABILITY TO SEND A FLEET TO THE FAR EAST
19. The situation has been fully reviewed in Annex IV, from which
it will be seen that we intend to send a battle cruiser and
carrier to the Indian Ocean at the start of war with Japan.

Certain other heavy ships might be available, but their despatch
to the Far East can only be considered in the light of the
situation at the time. Our ability to send capital ships to the
Far East depends on:-

(a) The strength and location of the German Fleet.

(b) The success that attends our land and sea operations in the
Eastern Mediterranean theatre.

(c) Our own capital ship strength.

(d) The likelihood of invasion of the United Kingdom.

None of these is a factor which can be forecast with accuracy in
advance.

It would be misleading to attempt to lay down possible strengths
for the Far East and proposed movement time-tables. It is vital to
avoid being weak everywhere. All we can say is that we should send
a battle cruiser and a carrier to the Indian Ocean. Our ability to
do more must be judged entirely on the situation at the time.

PROTECTION OF TROOP CONVOYS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
Question:

20. Mr. Menzies has also raised the question of the protection of
troop convoys in the Indian Ocean in the event of war with Japan.

Reply:

21. The Singapore Conference considered capital ship escort would
be necessary for troop convoys in the Indian Ocean. The A.D.A.

Conference in February 1941 [4] recommended that the policy should
be to provide capital ship cover. The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff
and the Australian Government insist that escort, not cover,
should be provided. [5]

22. Initially we shall only have one capital ship in the Indian
Ocean. To provide capital ship escort for troop convoys it will,
at first, be necessary to accept reduced frequency in sailings.

AUSTRALIAN LOCAL DEFENCE

AIR DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA
Question:

23. Mr. Menzies has emphasised the importance which the
Commonwealth Government attaches to the provision of the aircraft
necessary for local security and trade protection, particularly in
view of the situation governing the disposition of capital ships.

He has stated that the present strength of the Australian Air
Force is inadequate for these purposes.

24. The Air Ministry has already discussed this question with the
Prime Minister of Australia and has furnished him with an Air
Staff examination of the Australian paper 'Proposed Organisation
of the Royal Australian Air Force' and a paper relating to
Australian aircraft production by the Minister of Aircraft
Production. [6] The position regarding aircraft supplies from the
United Kingdom production is attached.

25. Mr. Menzies has had a further meeting with the Secretary of
State for Air [7] and the Minister of Aircraft Production on the
10th April, when these questions were discussed.

26. Mr. Shedden [8] has subsequently requested a statement of the
expansion plans of the Royal Air Force, to give the Prime Minister
a complete frame for the picture of Australia's air effort. In
compliance with this request, a copy of Target Programme 'C',
which still forms the basis of the air expansion programme, has
been handed to Mr. Menzies. This copy includes the present Royal
Air Force Order of Battle and, owing to its particularly secret
nature, it is not reproduced as an annex. This expansion programme
is subject to modification; and increase in heavy bombers at home
has already been commenced at the expense of medium bombers, and
the possibility of increasing the heavy bomber force to the
maximum practicable extent is under urgent examination.

MEASURES TO DETER JAPAN AND ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF A
HOSTILE JAPANESE MOVE

Question:

27. Mr. Menzies has asked, in paragraph 9 of his Memorandum, for
the views of His Majesty's Government on the possibility of
obtaining United States of America co-operation in support of a
declaration which might deter Japan from action and on the
possibility of agreement on drawing a line to indicate the point
of aggression by Japan.

Mr. Menzies also draws attention to the Australian Government's
concern regarding the grave potential threat against the security
of Singapore and Australia, by shore-based aircraft, should Japan
attempt to establish herself in the Netherlands East Indies.

Reply:

28. This point will be dealt with separately as a matter of
Government policy.

ACT OF WAR BY JAPAN
29. Paragraph to of Australia Telegram No. 187 dated the 27th
March 1941 [9], expresses agreement with the views held by the
Chiefs of Staff that a decision as to what constitutes an act of
war by Japan should only be made by all the Governments concerned
in the light of the circumstances at the time. We are fully alive
to the serious military disadvantages which consultation between
all the Governments concerned will occasion, but we feel that, in
view of the very grave implications which hostilities with Japan
would bring about, this consultation is essential.

30. It is understood that Mr. Menzies is anxious to convey to His
Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia the present
views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as to
their probable attitude in the event of Japanese aggression in
Thailand, the Netherlands East Indies, Portuguese Timor, New
Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands.

31. If we had a definite assurance of American intervention in the
event of Japanese aggression in any of these areas, there is no
doubt that it would be to our advantage that His Majesty's
Government should immediately declare war on Japan.

If, on the other hand, it appeared likely that the United States
of America would fail to intervene, we could not recommend the
adoption of a definite policy under which Japanese aggression
against these areas should under all circumstances be treated
automatically as a casus belli. Each case would have to be judged
on its merits in the light of the then existing situation.

IMPLICATIONS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF JAPANESE SHORE-BASED AIRCRAFT IN
THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

Question:

32. Mr.Menzies has referred in paragraph 9 of his Memorandum to
the specific point that any attempt by Japan to establish herself
in the Netherlands East Indies would be viewed in Australia as a
grave threat against the security of Singapore and Australia,
which should be resisted. He points out that, if Japan should
establish herself in the Netherlands East Indies, a scale of air
attack which is now limited to seaborne aircraft would become
transformed into a much graver one by land-based aircraft.

Reply:

33. We agree that, if the Japanese succeeded in establishing
themselves in the Netherlands East Indies, they would be a serious
threat to both Australia and Singapore, as Japan would gain
control of all sea routes through the Netherlands East Indies, the
air route to Australia would be cut, and a considerable scale of
air attack could probably be developed against Singapore. The
threat of direct air attack on Australia would, however, not be a
serious one.

The scale of attack is briefly reviewed below.

34. On the assumption that other commitments remain as at present,
the total number of aircraft that the Japanese could make
available for operations based on the Netherlands East Indies
would be about 450 (150 fighters, 150 light bombers and 150 heavy
bombers). This would leave no aircraft for attacks on British
territory from Thailand.

35. The existence of only one aerodrome with facilities for the
operation of heavy bombers within range of Australia (Kendari,
Celebes) would limit the scale of attack on Australia to a maximum
of 40 to 50 aircraft, operating at extreme range over the Timor
Sea-a scale of attack which would probably in practice be
negligible and would be limited to the immediate vicinity of
Darwin.

36. As regards Malaya, however, heavy -bombers could be based on
aerodromes in Western Java, where there is accommodation for 100
to 150, and, if the formidable supply difficulties could be
overcome, light bombers and fighters could be based on Sumatra,
where there is accommodation for some 150 to 200. A total of some
320 aircraft (50 fighters, 150 light bombers and 120 heavy
bombers) could thus be operated against Malaya. [10]

[matter omitted]

DUDLEY POUND [11]

C. F. A. PORTAL [12]

R. H. HAINING [13]