Please give the following message which is of the highest degree
of secrecy to the Prime Minister [1] for his most secret and
personal information.

Begins:

1. I am sure you are anxious to know how we view the present
situation in the Middle East and the following will supplement my
remarks to the House of Commons on Wednesday.

2. Of the two main attacks, that in Cyrenaica appears to be
secondary to that in the Balkans, but the former has achieved
unexpected success and the reports indicate that the Germans are
moving more land forces to exploit it, but are unable at present
to spare additional air force. Should they be able to do so, we
may be faced later with threat of development of a large scale
attack on Egypt. The deciding factors here are our power to hamper
or cut his [sic) communications from Italy and Sicily to Tripoli,
the speed with which we can reinforce tanks, anti-tank guns and
aircraft, and the enemy's power to maintain his forces. This will
be no easy task for him as Benghazi will be unusable for some time
and his road line of communications will be a long one. The
Germans are also making trouble for us in Iraq and are attempting
to do so in Syria. They do not appear to intend to attack Turkey
at present.

3. As ever, our vital strategic requirements in the Middle East
remain the security of our main base of operations in Egypt, and
so we are faced with the problem as to how far we can maintain our
forces in Greece and at the same time safeguard the security of
Egypt.

4. However the present situation may have developed we still
consider decision we made in sending our forces to Greece
strategically correct. The situation in the Balkans is so fluid
that it is not possible at present to give a considered
appreciation, but even with German advance into Yugoslavia, the
picture is better than that which seemed probable before the
Yugoslavian coup d'etat. [2] There can, therefore, be no question
of removing these forces now, and apart from what we have said and
undertaken to help Greece and Yugoslavia, as long as our forces
continue to operate in Greece they compel the enemy to fight,
maintain his forces and prevent him re-establishing normal
economic conditions in the Balkans.

5. At the same time, as all other available forces are required in
the defence of the Egyptian frontier, we have decided that we must
hold up for the present the despatch of the second Australian
division to Greece and Emit our commitment in Greece to
maintaining the forces which have already arrived there.

6. We have taken various steps which will accelerate considerably
the arrival in the Middle East of additional aircraft, tanks,
anti-tank guns and other reinforcements. These measures include
reinforcements of our air force in Egypt by squadrons withdrawn
from Aden and East Africa, and of our fleet in the Eastern
Mediterranean by destroyers from the Red Sea. Our aim will be to
re-establish ourselves in Cyrenaica at the first opportunity. In
the meantime, we propose to go strongly against the enemy's lines-
of communications in Tripoli and from Tripoli forward. Ends.