Supplement 1 to Agendum 135/1941 14 May 1941

MOST SECRET

SINGAPORE CONFERENCE-APRIL 1941-WASHINGTON STAFF CONVERSATIONS

Object of Conference
As a result of a recommendation made in the report of the United
States-British Staff Conversations at Washington, dated 27th March
1941, a conference was held at Singapore in April 1941 to prepare
plans for conducting military operations in the Far East on the
basis of Anglo-United States-Dutch co-operation. At the conclusion
of the main conference, the opportunity was taken to clear up
outstanding points arising out of the Anglo-Dutch-Australian
conversations at Singapore in February 1941 (War Cabinet Minute
No. 909 [1]). The arrangements for Australian representation at
the Conference were approved by War Cabinet in Minute No. 972. [2]

Reports of Singapore Conference and Washington Staff Conversations
2. The Leader of the Australian Delegation to the Conference
(Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin [3]) has submitted a memorandum dated
11th May, transmitting the reports of the Singapore Conference and
outlining the main features of the plans for the employment and
disposition of forces in the Far East and their relation to the
conclusions reached at the Washington conversations. The Chiefs of
Staff [4] have considered the reports and they are in agreement
with the plans outlined therein.

3. The following papers are attached [5]:-

(a) Memorandum dated 11th May from Admiral
Sir Ragnar Colvin Annex 'A'
(b) Report of the Chiefs of Staff dated 14th May Annex 'B'
(c) Report of the United States-British
Staff Conversations at Washington, dated
27th March 1941 Annex 'C'
(d) Report of the American-Dutch-British
Conversations at Singapore, dated 27th April 1941 Annex 'D'
(e) Summary of the report of the British-Dutch
Conversations at Singapore, dated 27th April Annex 'E'
Washington Staff Conversations
4. The report of the Washington Staff Conversations sets forth the
general strategic principles which should guide the military
collaboration of the United States and the British Commonwealth,
should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

The principal United States views are summarised in the report of
Sir Ragnar Colvin (Annex 'A') as follows:-

(a) Europe and the North American Atlantic Seaboard were the vital
areas.

(b) Singapore, while very important, was not in the United States
view absolutely vital, and its loss, while undesirable, could be
accepted. This view was not accepted by the British Delegation at
Washington.

(c) The United States intention was, while maintaining a Naval
Force at Hawaii superior to the Japanese, and thus protecting the
West American Seaboard and sea communications in the Pacific, to
use its Navy principally in the Atlantic, and they would, if
necessary, reinforce their Atlantic Fleet from their Pacific
Fleet.

(d) They intended to use the United States Pacific Fleet to
operate offensively against Japanese Mandated Islands, and
Japanese sea communications, and to support British Naval Forces
in the South Pacific.

(e) They did not intend to reinforce their Asiatic Fleet.

(f) They expected that the Philippine Islands would not be able to
hold out very long against determined Japanese attack, and were
anticipating being forced to withdraw from these Islands.

(g) They were prepared to provide sufficient Capital ships for the
Atlantic and for Gibraltar as would permit the release from these
areas of British Capital ships for reinforcement of the Naval
Forces in the Eastern theatre.

5. In a cablegram dated 8th May, No. 340, from the Australian
Naval Attache, Washington [6], the following information is
furnished:-

'United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have informed United States
authorities that they are in provisional agreement with the report
of the recent staff conversations in Washington and that they are
submitting the report to His Majesty's Government for approval.'
American-Dutch-British Conversations
6. The report of the American-Dutch-British conversations at
Singapore is based on the hypothesis of a war between Germany,
Italy and Japan on the one hand and the British Empire with its
present allies and the United States of America on the other.

Plans for the employment of Naval, Land and Air Forces have been
drawn up and are shown in Sections VI (page 12) and VII (page 17)
of Annex 'D'. An important section of the report relates to
unified Command (page 10 of Annex 'D'), the proposals in respect
of which are briefly as follows:-

(a) The British Commander-in-Chief, China, is to exercise unified
strategical direction over all the Naval forces of the Associated
Powers in the Eastern Theatre (including Australia), except those
employed on local defence or operating under the Commander-in-
Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet. Part of the United States
Asiatic Fleet will, however, come under the Commander-in-Chief
China, immediately, and the remainder under his strategic
direction when Manila becomes untenable.

(b) The Commander-in-Chief, Far East, is to exercise similar
strategic direction of such Air Forces as the Associated Powers
may make available. Insofar as Australia is concerned, the Air
Forces available will not exceed 2 Bomber Squadrons for the Ambon-
Timor area.

Note: This has already been approved by War Cabinet in Minute No.

909.

(c) Operational control will continue to be exercised by the
various authorities as at present, except at Ambon where a
Combined Headquarters is to be formed (War Cabinet Minute No. 986
[7]) and at Timor, where, as already agreed, land forces are to be
under the control of an Australian Commander.

(d) The above arrangements are subject to the right of any
Government to withdraw or withhold its forces, provided that prior
information of such intention is passed to the strategic Commander
concerned.

7. The Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Government approve of
the arrangements for unified strategical command as outlined
above.

8. Reference is made in paragraph 42 of Annex 'D' to the support
to be afforded by United States Naval Forces to British Forces
south of the equator. The extent of the support is not defined and
the United States delegation to the conference has undertaken to
make enquiries. The matter has also been taken through the
Australian Naval Attache, Washington. [8] 9. In the list of
initial dispositions and functions of Naval forces, one Australian
6-inch cruiser is shown as operating in North Australian waters to
escort troop convoys to Ambon, Koepang and Singapore, and is then
to be at the disposition of the Commander-in-Chief, China. This is
a new commitment resulting from the stationing of Australian
Military and Air forces in the Netherlands East Indies, thus being
outside the area of Australian Naval Operational control.

British-Dutch Conversations
10. The arrangements set forth in the report of the British-Dutch
conversations are made on the assumption of a war between Germany,
Italy and Japan on the one hand and the British Empire with our
present allies on the other, the United States of America being
neutral. The plans follow, broadly, similar lines to those
contained in the report of the American-Dutch-British
conversations, though, as pointed out in the report of Sir Ragnar
Colvin (Annex 'A'), the strain on our forces protecting sea
communications will be far greater and the submarine and air
forces available for offensive operations will be considerably
less.

Submission to War Cabinet
11. The reports of the American-Dutch-British Conversations, and
British-Dutch Conversations at Singapore, and of the Washington
Staff conversations, together with the memorandum of Admiral Sir
Ragnar Colvin and the report of the Chiefs of Staff, are submitted
for consideration by War Cabinet.

A. W. FADDEN