Following for the Prime Minister [2] from the Prime Minister.

My colleagues and I have given anxious consideration to the Far
Eastern position. [3] We have, as you know, always regarded
Singapore and Malaya as our vital outpost, and have at all times,
as I indicated to the Foreign Office when in London, been prepared
to join in a guarantee to the Netherlands East Indies. [4]

We have also assumed that in the event of war with Japan naval
reinforcements as discussed in London, with a nucleus of five
capital ships, would be sent to the Far East. We now say and
emphasise that an early despatch of capital ships east of Suez
would itself be the most powerful deterrent and first step.

We also once more urge that, having regard to the grave tension at
present existing, air and military reinforcements to Malaya should
be vigorously expedited.

The position of Thailand now comes up for early decision for
events appear to be moving rapidly. Two urgent questions emerge:-

(1) Should we, the British countries, be prepared to make it clear
to Thailand and to Japan that any attack upon Thailand by Japan
will be regarded by us as a casus belli;

(2) Should we announce this to the countries concerned
independently of United States action, or should we make it
conditional upon American concurrence and active participation.

We are of opinion, as the Government of one of the two British
Dominions which are most directly affected, that the first
question should be answered 'yes' and that while every pressure
should be maintained upon the United States, it would be an error
to condition our action upon American action, though actual
objection by the United States of America would of course be
fatal.

Thailand's strategic position and resources are such that Japan's
occupation of them would gravely imperil the safety of Singapore,
the effective control of the waters around the Malay Peninsula,
the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, and the
maintenance of Chinese supplies along the Burma Road.

Having regard to the realities in the Far East, we do not believe
that Japan wants Thailand merely as an end in itself. Its capture
or control would be plainly a first step, and it is the first step
that counts. In this connection we have noted with regret that Mr.

Sumner Welles' warning to Japan seemed to indicate that the
objectionable matter would not be the occupation of Thailand but
only what might happen subsequently. [5]

The attitude of the United States, while constitutionally and
politically understandable, is disappointing. We have throughout
this period felt that a clear and unequivocal statement to Japan
by the United States would have stopped aggression. Up to the time
of the coup in Indo China it had not been made. Later on, Sumner
Welles made a much more vigorous statement to a Japanese
representative, though it is subject to the criticism mentioned
above. But the Japanese have still not been given a firm warning.

Indications of postponed resistance to aggression are a mere
encouragement.

We feel that if we are prepared to fight America will not in fact
desert us. A bold course might change the whole outlook.

Naturally, in all this we are assuming that whatever we do will be
done in the closest consultation and agreement with the
Netherlands East Indies.

Subject to above, our view can be summed up as being that if
Thailand is abandoned and we delay our action we will be one
country nearer to war and that in that war and in particular in
the defence of Singapore, Japan will be relatively stronger and we
relatively weaker than at present.

We express these views frankly and with realisation of their
implications so that you may see the supreme importance which we
attach to them. [6]

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