Your No. 219. [1]

Part I-Introduction
1. It is noted that your cablegram relates to two main proposals:-

(i) The formation of a British Commonwealth Force to participate
in the operations against the Japanese main islands.

(ii) The creation of a British Commonwealth Command in the South
West Pacific Area.

2. We would preface our remarks by referring to our cablegram No.

267 of 8th October, 1943 [2], dealing with the Australian War
Effort, in which the following opinions were expressed:-

'(i) The Government considers it to be a matter of vital
importance to the future of Australia and her status at the peace
table in regard to the settlement in the Pacific, that her
military effort should be concentrated as far as possible in the
Pacific and that it should be on a scale to guarantee her an
effective voice in the peace settlement.

(ii) The interests at stake in this paramount question are not
those of Australia alone. They also include those of the British
Empire in the Pacific. The Commonwealth Government considers it to
be very essential that the Governments of the United Kingdom,
Canada and New Zealand in particular should understand the vital
importance of the extent of the military effort that should be
maintained in the Pacific by Australia alone or in association
with other parts of the Empire. If the defeat of Japan is to await
the end of the war in Europe, the struggle in the Pacific will be
more prolonged, and it is imperative that a certain minimum effort
should be maintained by or on behalf of the British Empire in the
Pacific.'
Part II-Formation of a British Commonwealth Force
3. Your proposal for a British Commonwealth Force with an
Australian component for invading the main islands of Japan is an
appropriate way of giving effect to the views expressed in sub-
paragraph 1 (ii) above if such an arrangement is feasible, and
would be most desirable for the maintenance of the prestige of the
British Commonwealth in the Pacific. However, your cablegram
anticipates the opening of the Malacca Straits by the end of the
year, and the development of a British Commonwealth Force after
that date. It would, therefore, not be possible for this Force to
be organised, trained and deployed before somewhere about April
1946. In the meantime, it is understood that American Forces will
begin the invasion of the main islands at a comparatively early
date. There is also the aspect of Soviet participation which is
the subject of your cablegram No. D.1170 of 5th July. [3] Time is
therefore the essence of the contract and the essential
consideration is actual participation in the main offensive
against Japan. There would appear to be doubts as to the
practicability of the formation of a British Commonwealth Force to
achieve this under existing conditions.

4. In paragraph 18 of cablegram No. 117 of 1st June, 1945 [4], to
the High Commissioner, the following were some of the reasons
given for the desire of Australia to be associated with the
forward movement against Japan:-

'There have been criticisms that the liquidation of by-passed
Japanese Forces is not by itself a worthy effort for our Forces.

With the American progress towards Japan, the operations against
Borneo, the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya have assumed the
nature of localised campaigns which have little immediate or
direct influence on the final defeat of Japan. From the aspect of
prestige and participation in the Pacific peace settlement and
control machinery, it is of great importance to Australia to be
associated with the drive to defeat Japan.'
5. At the San Francisco Conference, Mr. Forde and Dr. Evatt both
stressed that the war effort that Australia has made and intends
to continue until Japan is defeated, entitles us to special
consideration of our views on, and our part in the final Pacific
settlement.

6. In view of the considerations mentioned in paragraphs 2(i), 4
and 5, it is a matter of vital importance that Australia, as a
Pacific Dominion, should not fail to participate in the main
offensive against Japan. It is therefore desired to ensure that an
Australian force, comprising the R.A.N. Squadron, a division of
the A.M.F. and a R.A.A.F. component, as indicated in our proposals
in cablegram No. 117 should participate in these operations.

Public opinion was disappointed that the Australian Forces
allotted for the Philippines campaign were not used, with the
result that our military effort during the latter half of 1944 and
the early part of 1945 was judged solely on the important, but
nevertheless secondary roles allotted to the remainder of our
Forces. This has also been the cause of some dissatisfaction among
the Forces. These considerations are emphasised by the allocation
of a Canadian Division to the American main force, as is at
present understood to be the case. General MacArthur has been
requested to arrange the relief of Australian Forces in Borneo at
the earliest, in order that the organisation of the expeditionary
division and the movement of the necessary R.A.A.F. component may
be proceeded with.

Part III-British Commonwealth Command in the South West Pacific
Area
7. As mentioned in paragraph 4, the operations against Borneo, the
Netherlands East Indies and Malaya, whilst all ultimately
necessary, have assumed the nature of localised campaigns which
will have little immediate or direct influence on the final defeat
of Japan. The soundest strategical course would be for the main
effort to be concentrated against Japan, and, after her defeat,
for the full Allied strength to be directed against the
liquidation of the Japanese in these areas.

8. Apart from the current campaigns mentioned in paragraph 9, it
is emphasised that approximately 70,000 Japanese remain in the
Islands between Celebes and Australian New Guinea. If the strategy
which we favour is adopted, the liquidation of these areas would
be held over until Japan is defeated. Nevertheless, until this is
accomplished, it is essential that the United States of America
should continue to provide portion of the necessary forces and
ancillary services to neutralise the enemy in these areas. If, on
the other hand, the overall plan contemplates subduing these
areas, the following factors should be taken into account and the
forces increased correspondingly. All the areas are undeveloped.

Separate campaigns are necessary to subdue each area. Our
experience teaches us that after the Japanese military
organisations are disrupted, every individual must be
exterminated. In these circumstances, a series of arduous and
unspectacular jungle campaigns is unavoidable. Experience also has
led to the development of campaigns on the following pattern:-

(a) Destruction of enemy organisation by white organised forces;

followed up by
(b) Trained native battalions; and
(c) Destruction of individuals completed by trained natives and
organised partisans.

These developments require time. As the United States of America
assumed original responsibility for the whole of the present South
West Pacific Area, and in view of the present limitations and
difficulties of assumption by the British Commonwealth of further
responsibility in this area, it is considered that the United
States of America should continue to provide portion of the
necessary forces to hold or subdue these Dutch territories.

9. All Australian divisions are employed in active operations, and
no Australian troops are available either for relief or
replacement. The operations of the Australian Forces in New
Guinea, New Britain and the Solomon Islands, in accordance with
the tasks being carried out by them under General MacArthur's
directive seek the realisation of the following objectives:-

(a) The reconquest of New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.

(b) Containing the enemy in New Britain, where the reduction of
Rabaul, which will require consideration when circumstances
permit, would necessitate the use of major forces.

Except as provided in paragraph 6, Australia is therefore unable
to accept any further military commitments from her own resources.

10. It is considered that the area East of the Celebes and West of
the Australian Mandated Territory should not be separated from the
remainder of the East Indies now forming part of the South West
Pacific Area, and created into an independent Command. If it is
desired to set up a British Commonwealth Command whose Eastern
Area would embrace the region East of the Celebes and west of the
Australian Mandated Territory, we will be glad to facilitate the
assembly, training and staging of any troops that can be made
available, provided that they are located in certain island areas
now in use, and not on the Australian mainland. In this
connection, we would refer to the serious limitations of
Australian manpower capacity referred to in cablegram No. 133 of
23rd May, 1945 [5], and 174 of 3rd July, 1945 [6], regarding the
basing of the British Pacific Fleet on Australia. Further, to
stage such troops on the Australian mainland would lead to
inordinate delay, and acclimatisation would be much slower,
whereas island areas are already well developed for the purpose.

It is essential, however, that such forces should be available in
the area before the American Forces are released, if they insist
on withdrawing their Forces as mentioned in paragraph 8 of your
cablegram.

11. If it is decided to set up such a British Commonwealth
Command, our contribution in the region of the present South West
Pacific Area would be the reconquest of New Guinea, the Solomon
Islands and New Britain, less Rabaul, as indicated in our
cablegram No. 117. If sufficient shipping, supplies, and forces
are made available, we would be prepared to discuss what co-
operation may be possible, in view of the wide experience of the
Australian Command and Staff in these operations. As stated
earlier, we are unable to accept any further military commitments
additional to the component of the Force for main operations
against Japan and the operations in New Guinea, New Britain and
the Solomon islands. We have also mentioned the serious
limitations of Australian manpower capacity and material resources
to meet the needs of the British Pacific Fleet.

12. The Australian Naval, Army and Air Forces, are all, at
present, dependent upon a measure of United States' logistical
support, and it will be necessary to maintain such arrangements in
the future, or to make corresponding provision in the event of any
re-assignment.

Part IV-General
13. You will recall that the set-up for the South West Pacific
Area and the directive of the Commander-in-Chief was approved by
the Governments of the United Kingdom, United States, Australia,
New Zealand and the Netherlands, and that a voice in the policy
relating to the use of the Australian Forces was sought through:-

(a) The Accredited Representative to the United Kingdom War
Cabinet.

(b) The Pacific Councils in London and Washington.

(c) The link between the Australian Government and the Commander-
in-Chief, South West Pacific Area.

Circumstances resulted in reliance having to be placed mainly on
(c). This arrangement worked satisfactorily and presumably would
continue for any Forces assigned to General MacArthur.

14. The Government would wish to be assured that any arrangements
made for a change in the command set-up relating to the control of
its Forces provide for this principle before expressing its
agreement and assigning Forces under any new set-up.

15. For example, if, as desired by the Government, the operational
control of the Australian Forces on the mainland of the
Commonwealth and in Papua and Australian Mandated Areas should
revert to the Australian Service Authorities, this principle would
be achieved by the direct responsibility of the Service
Authorities to their Ministers and the Government. If Australian
Forces were to be assigned to a British Commonwealth Command
either in the South West Pacific Area or in the main operations
against Japan, the Government would desire to know how this
principle would be provided for. While the linking of the
Australian Chiefs of Staff with the Combined Chiefs of Staff
through the British Chiefs of Staff might be satisfactory on
purely technical military matters, it is recalled that, in
addition to the direct Governmental link referred to in paragraph
13, the directive for the South West Pacific Area provides for:-

'The right of the Government to refuse the use of its Forces for
any project which it considers inadvisable.

The right of the Commanders of the Australian Forces to
communicate direct with the Australian Government.'
16. Finally, in regard to any set-up to which it is a party, the
Government reserves the right to determine the nature and extent
of the Australian War Effort and the allocation of manpower and
material resources for such purposes, including the extent of the
commitments which can be undertaken. The limitations of our
manpower capacity and material resources have already been
emphasised.

17. This reply expresses the views not only of the Government but
also of the Advisory War Council which comprises both Government
and non-Government members.

CHIFLEY