In reply to telegram 189 to Dominions Office. [1]

Begins:-

I have read your 189 and previous telegrams. You will, I am sure,
realise that I have not yet had time to make myself fully
conversant with this question [2] but as the matter is urgent I am
sending you the view which I take as at present advised.

You may rest assured that we at this end fully appreciate the
tremendous effort which Australia has made, not only in the field
but in provision of base facilities for British and United States
forces. We are fully conscious of the great strain imposed on your
economy by the continued demands of the Japanese war. We have,
however, hitherto assumed that the simplest way of tackling the
problem of maintenance of the British Pacific Fleet is first to
ask Australia for what is wanted and then to try to make up from
our own depleted resources whatever Australia cannot provide. We
welcome assurance of further assistance to the extent of your
capacity and realise very clearly that your resources are not
inexhaustible. I will reply separately about the question of
pilots for the Naval Air Arm which you particularly mentioned in
your 133. [3] The last two lines of paragraph 7(a) of your
telegram 174 [4] suggest that there is no sound strategical reason
for increasing the striking power of the British Pacific Fleet, we
cannot share this view. Both we and the Americans consider that
its maximum deployment is required if the war against Japan is to
be finished as quickly as possible. Without the works in the
supplementary programme, our plan to have two British fighting
task forces would be frustrated because the second could not be
supported and we could probably not maintain even the intensity of
operations achieved hitherto. This particularly true of works for
the support of air operations, but the camp for dockyard ratings
is also essential to material maintenance of the fleet. Timing of
the supplementary works described in JAPSC/22/45C [5] is important
if reinforcement of the British Pacific Fleet is to become
effective as soon as other considerations allow. Apart from
strategy, you will appreciate the political importance to the
British Commonwealth of Nations of deploying the maximum possible
British strength in the Pacific.

Your suggestion in paragraph 7(c)1 regarding the use of airstrips
in forward area has already been examined. The following factors
have forced us to concentrate our facilities in Australia:

(1) There will be no intermediate base with airstrips developed in
time to meet the planned expansion of the British Pacific Fleet.

(2) The climate in New Guinea is not suitable for rehabilitation,
reforming and training of reserve carrier air groups comprising
aircrews back from prolonged intensive operations which would have
to be accommodated there if they could not go to Australia.

(3) Apart from the climate, shortage of administrative logistic
support necessitates concentration of training facilities.

Dispersal would increase administrative overheads beyond our
resources.

(4) It would be impossible to develop the necessary facilities for
mobile naval air bases on bare landing strips in time.

We have also already done our utmost on the suggestion in your
paragraph 7(d)(ii) that the United States should help with
releases and with facilities in forward areas and are satisfied
that our difficulties would not be met by a further approach to
the United States authorities.

I earnestly beg you to consider the following proposal which seems
to us to offer the only chance of reconciling the needs of the
British Pacific Fleet with your manpower, etc. resources. There
are in Australia, or on the way, 3,000 Royal Marine engineers who
are equipped and trained for constructional work. These are a
mobile force intended for work in forward areas but until the need
arises to send them forward, the Commander-in-Chief has been
authorised, subject to your concurrence, to use them in Australia
for naval works. By using them on this basis would it not be
possible to meet essential Royal Navy requirements without
material detriment to your own needs. Will you authorise your
officers to examine the possibilities in detail with Admiral
Fraser. Some review of priorities might also help in the critical
period up to October.

The Royal Marine engineers would be used as far as possible in
self contained units so as to avoid problems arising from civil
and uniformed labour working side by side.