REPORT ON N.E.I.

The purpose of this report is to sum up the N.E.I. situation as I
see it. I must emphasise 'as I see it', because while I realise
you want facts, and not opinions, hard facts were extremely
difficult to come by in Java, and it is only by adding to these a
generous measure of interpretation and reference that it is
possible to form a coherent picture.

The Basic Issues
There are three main issues in N.E.I.:-

1. The Military Aim. SACSEA has reiterated that its only military
aim is to collect, disarm and remove the Japanese.

2. The Humanitarian Aim. The object here is to rescue, succour,
and rehabilitate the internees and P.O.W.s.

3. The Political Aim. It has often been officially stated that
SACSEA has no political aims; that its activities are exclusively
concerned with (1) and (2). This statement is sometimes qualified
by the statement that SACSEA must attempt to establish the measure
of law and order that is the necessary condition of any
satisfactory political agreement between the Dutch and
Indonesians.

The Indonesian leaders refuse to accept the SACSEA view that the
political issue can be separated from the military and
humanitarian objectives. They do not believe that British policy
is free of political bias between Dutch and Indonesians. There are
two main reasons for this Indonesian resentment against British
conduct.

(1) They claim that the U.K. Government has already prejudged the
issue by its recognition of Dutch sovereignty, and that British
spokesmen have repeatedly displayed strong pro-Dutch sympathies.

At the Conference between Dutch and Indonesians, at which General
Christison presided Mr. Dening frankly expressed his view that Van
Mook's proposals were good and generous. Mr. Sjahrir had already
made it quite clear that these proposals were quite unacceptable
to the Indonesians.

(2) The Indonesians point out that every one of General
Christison's military acts has unavoidable political consequences.

In disarming Indonesians General Christison's only motive may be
to protect internees against mob violence. But it is the
consequences and not the intention that interests the Nationalist
leaders. To disarm all Indonesians and at the same time to
introduce armed Dutch forces is, in the Indonesian view, simply a
way of restoring Dutch domination by British military force under
cover of purely military and humanitarian intentions.

I believe that these Indonesian arguments are unanswerable. No
real division can be made between the military, humanitarian and
political issues.

British Policy
I gained the firm impression that there was a sharp difference
between the viewpoints of General Christison and his political
advisers, Mr. Dening and Mr. Walsh.

General Christison feels that the military forces at his disposal
are inadequate even for the limited task of rescuing and
protecting the internees; and hopelessly inadequate for the larger
task, if it should be assigned to him, of imposing law and order
throughout Java. For such a project Lord Louis has stated that he
would need six divisions with full modern air support. While the
forces in Java are now being increased by one Indian Brigade from
Thailand, this is a small and temporary increase. The U.K.

Government has instructed SACSEA that all Indian troops must be
withdrawn from N.E.I. by the middle of March when the new Congress
is expected to meet. These Indian troops make up the greater part
of Christison's forces, and there is no prospect of replacing them
by British troops.

A number of Dutch troops are available but SACSEA is trying to
postpone their entry to Java for fear that this will provoke fresh
outbreak of Indonesian violence and greatly increase the military
difficulties. Lord Louis asked me directly on Dec. 4-'The Dutch
are pressing me to let their troops into Java now, do you think I
should?' I said I thought it would be a disaster. He replied that
that was precisely his own view.

Moreover the Dutch forces available are so deficient in
organisation, equipment, transport and supply services that from a
purely military viewpoint their usefulness would be limited.

General Christison often repeated two things to me:-

(1) 'The use of military force cannot solve this problem,'
(2) 'The solution can only come by United Nations intervention.'
Christison is acutely aware of the restless impatience of his
British troops who, after six years of grim campaigning, find that
the end of the war instead of taking them home, takes them to
someone else's country where they are exposed to sniper's bullets.

He also recognises that the Indonesians are steadily extending to
the British the hostility they feel against the Dutch. He feels he
has been given a hopeless and thankless task. He takes a very poor
view of the judgment and the efficiency of the Dutch forces under
his command.

My personal belief is that Christison is a very honest, very able
man, liberal-minded, and with a sensitive understanding of the
basic problems in human relationships that he has to deal with. He
is also fully alive to Australia's interests in this area, and
wholly sympathetic with the Australian point of view. I am glad to
be able to report that I feel I gained his full confidence and
that he was eager to help me in every possible way.

I found Mr. Dening and Mr. Walsh taking a different attitude. Mr.

Dening seemed very anxious to impress me with the wisdom of the
Foreign Office, based on so long an experience in handling the
'Eastern Mind' and the great advantages to Australia of the
restoration of Dutch rule in N.E.I.; and the shallow ephemeral
nature of the Nationalist Movement, and with the liberality of Van
Mook's policy.

Mr. Dening was eagerly, if not ably, supported by Mr. Walsh. Mr.

Walsh was much less polished and discreet than Mr. Dening. For
example, I have heard him say that he must persuade Christison to
obliterate the 'dreadful and provocative' slogans scrawled by the
'natives' on the hoardings. These slogans were mainly, if not
wholly, excerpts from Lincoln's speeches. The Indonesians had no
doubt selected them in the belief that American troops would be
coming to Java.

[matter omitted]

Dutch Policy
I believe that before this war the Dutch had achieved a high
standard of administrative efficiency in N.E.I., and that their
colonial policy, by any comparative test, was progressive and
liberal. This made it hard for me to accept the evidence I found
in Batavia of their present incapacity. But the evidence is
overwhelming. The Dutch leaders in N.E.I.-such men as Van Mook,
Van Oyen [1] and Helfrich-appear to be baffled, nervous and over-
wrought. Apparently, the strain and anxiety of these last years
and the shock of finding the situation in Java today so different
from what they had expected, has thrown them off balance. I think
it would be safe to say that most of the leading Dutch officers
and administration in Java display a muddling ineptitude in almost
every enterprise they undertake. This is not only a personal view.

It represents the view of the Supreme Commander and General
Christison. Christison once told me that when he checked the Dutch
military intelligence reports he found that nine out of ten were
misleading or false.

Their Dutch remedy is force, and still more force, to teach the
'natives' a lesson.

[matter omitted]

The Indonesian Policy
Soekarno and Hatta are in eclipse, and I would expect this to be
permanent. Sjarifuddin, the Minister for Information and Internal
Security, is the only member of the Soekarno Cabinet to be given a
place in the Sjahrir Cabinet. All members of the Sjahrir Cabinet
have good records of resistance to the Japanese, whereas most of
the Soekarno Ministers were said to be 'collaborationists'.

At the Indonesian National Convention (the Provisional Parliament)
on November 25th, Sjahrir secured a vote of confidence from a
House of approximately 150 members and only eight dissented. These
dissentents were all former members of the Soekarno Cabinet.

Nevertheless Soekarno later assured me that he and his friends
would give full support to Sjahrir.

This vote does not, of course, give a reliable indication of
Sjahrir's effective power. There is some evidence that the
Convention was partly 'stacked'. Sjahrir himself admits that he
has little influence over many of the local Nationalist leaders.

The Nationalist feeling finds its most fanatical expression in the
Youth Movement, and it is doubtful whether Sjahrir has much
control over these violent young men who are intoxicated by the
possession of arms from the Japanese. These young men provide the
terrorists.

I think it is certain that even if Sjahrir's government were to
win widespread political support, it would still lack the
technical and administrative competence to govern Indonesia
without European assistance and advice. Sjahrir admits this. He
wants advisers and technical assistants, not rulers.

A good deal can be made of the part played by the Japanese in
stimulating Indonesian nationalism and leading the Youth along
fascist lines. In my view, the Japanese influence may explain the
form of Indonesian nationalism; but it does not at all explain its
driving force. Nationalism, in the form of a deep emotional
resentment against the restoration of Dutch rule, is nearly
universal. This means that the real problem is not whether the
Indonesians can govern themselves but whether they will allow the
Dutch to govern them.

Conclusion
It seems to me that events in N.E.I. are likely to take one of two
courses.

(1) During the next few weeks a political agreement may be reached
between 'new men from the Hague' and the Sjahrir Government. While
this would not mean the end of disorders it would very greatly
improve the military and political situation. It would mean that
SEAC's military operations would be directed against isolated
bands of terrorists, and not against a political movement. It
would afford Sjahrir the kind of moral and military support
necessary to enable him to extend his authority.

(2) If there is no political settlement, SEAC will concentrate its
forces within one or two restricted perimeters in Java, probably
to a single area in West Java, that would take in Batavia,
Buitenzorg, and Bandoeng. Within these areas the attempt would be
made gradually to replace British by Dutch forces.

These areas would be made 'model administrations' and foodstuffs
and supplies would be brought from abroad. It is hoped that the
successful re-establishment of Dutch rule within these perimeters
would make them bridgeheads from which Dutch authority could be
extended gradually throughout the island. Since there is likely to
be some famine in the rest of Java, the Dutch would be able to use
the foodstuffs they import as a kind of economic sanction against
rebellious Indonesians.

If I may venture to put my personal view on the part Australia
might play, it is this. For the present, that is for say the next
six weeks we should hold our hand, simply indicating to the U.K.

our view that the introduction of Dutch troops should be delayed
until reasonable hope of a political settlement has passed, and
advising the U.K. of our support of any efforts made by SACSEA to
bring the Dutch and Indonesians together. I think, on the other
hand, that we should make it clear to the U.K. that we dissociate
ourselves from any British 'mediation' which shows bias in favour
of the Dutch attitude as expressed up to November 5th. The British
should try to facilitate, not to enforce a settlement. This policy
would be built on the hope that an agreement between Dutch and
Indonesians is still possible.

If there is no settlement, then the 'perimeter' policy appears to
me to be a hopeless one. I feel certain that the Dutch would not
be able to establish even limited perimeters without continued and
substantial British military support. Meanwhile, the nationalist
resentment would grow in strength and we would be faced with the
prospect of a long civil war in Java. The U.K. would be
inextricably committed to the Dutch, and Java would become a focus
of nationalist revolt, from which the contagion would spread
rapidly to many other areas in South-East Asia. In these
circumstances, I believe that United Nations action would become
inevitable. I therefore believe that if and when the hope of a
Dutch-Indonesian settlement is destroyed immediate steps should be
taken to treat N.E.I. as a problem that belongs to the United
Nations, and not simply to the Netherlands and U.K.

While I recognise our very vital interests in the area, I cannot
see that Australia could hope to succeed in any independent
initiative. First, because Australia cannot mediate unless she is
accepted as mediator by both parties, and we would have little
chance of acceptance by the Dutch. Second, because even if the
Dutch did accept us, for fear that worse might befall them, this
would imply some obligations to back our political intervention
with military force. If the impressions I gained on my flying
visits to Morotai and Borneo are correct, then any Australian
Government which sought to transfer our troops to Java instead of
bringing them home would be faced with a major domestic crisis. I
think it useless for us to give advice to Dutch or Indonesians
unless we are prepared to support our words with deeds. That is
why I feel that if Australia is to participate directly in the
Java crisis we should do so, not as an independent nation, but as
a member of the United Nations, which is specially concerned with
an area of such strategic and political importance for our own
future.

W. MACMAHON BALL