PMM(46)7 LONDON, 20 April 1946 [1]

TOP SECRET

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE POLICY

Statement by the Prime Minister of Australia
Important Note.-This statement was prepared prior to the receipt
of United Kingdom Papers P.M.M.(46) Numbers 1 to 5 [2], and does
not purport to comment on same.

1. The Interim Post- War Strength of the Forces
Like other members of the British Commonwealth, Australia is in a
transition stage from the liquidation of post-war commitments to
the determination of the strength and organisation of the Forces
which should be maintained under the ultimate post-war Defence
Policy to be decided.

The two primary commitments of the Australian Forces in the
interim period are-
(i) The surveillance and control of Japanese disarmed personnel in
Australian territories.

(ii) Participation in the occupation of Japan.

In addition, forces are required on the mainland for
administrative and maintenance purposes.

A governing factor in the strength of the garrisons in the islands
and the strength for the Forces on the mainland for their
administration and maintenance is the shipping available for the
return of Japanese prisoners to their homeland. At the end of
March there were 100,000 Japanese prisoners to be repatriated and,
due to the allocation of additional shipping by General MacArthur,
it was expected that they would all be cleared by the end of June.

The Defence Committee has proposed that the total interim strength
of the Forces at the 30th June shall be 138,000, falling to
111,000 at the 31st December. The amount required in the Estimates
1946/47 for the provision of these forces would be Cio2 millions.

The Government has directed, however, that reductions to the
following strengths are to be aimed at as early as possible in the
interim period:-

Navy.-A maximum of 13,500 (subject to further review when certain
interim commitments have been fulfilled).

Army.-A maximum of 50,000 (including 10,000 in the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force).

Air Force.-15,000 (including 2,280 in the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force).

The main factor governing the ultimate post-war strength of the
Forces is the appropriate percentage of the National income which
should be devoted to Defence.

The percentage of distribution of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force between parts of the Empire is:-

Per cent.

Australia 32
United Kingdom 28
India 27
New Zealand 13

2. Regional Security in the Pacific, including the Use of Bases by
the United States
As indicated in the memorandum on Regional Security in the
Pacific, including the use of bases by the United States [3], the
view of the Australian Government is that the question of Bases
must be related to an overall plan in which the United States
should be associated in the maintenance of security in the South-
West Pacific.

If an arrangement can be reached with the United States, it should
then be possible to prepare a strategical appreciation which would
indicate the nature and strength of the forces to be provided by
each of the parties to the agreement.

Planning relating to any regional arrangement will therefore be
governed by the progress of political negotiations.

In regard to Co-operation in Empire Defence in accordance with the
inherent right of collective self-defence under Article 51, it is
apparent that co-operation between the members of the British
Commonwealth in defence, in accordance with the established
principles of Co-operation in Empire Defence (or such
modifications as may be necessary in the light of the experience
of the war and present circumstances), is consistent with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations (Article 52).

Furthermore, it is only by co-operation on a basis of
standardisation of organisation, arms, equipment and training, and
exchange of technical and scientific information, that the
satisfactory development of Dominion Forces can be provided for.

Article 51 of the Charter provides that nothing in the Charter
impairs the inherent right of individual self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a member. In addition to the forces to be
provided in accordance with Articles 43 and 45 of the Charter,
including regional arrangements under Article 52, it is imperative
that Australia should maintain such additional forces, together
with a war production potential of appropriate dimensions for
expansion, as are requisite until the security system is developed
and firmly established. This precaution is also necessary to
provide against the contingency of the general exercise of the
right of veto by a permanent member of the Council under Article
27 and, in particular, by the vetoing, under Article 53, of
enforcement action under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies.

While planning may proceed on the basis of principles, providing
for such matters as uniformity in the organisation, training and
equipping of Forces, and in the co-ordination of supply, strategic
planning must await the clarification of political arrangements
for security, and the provision of effective Government machinery
for controlling such arrangements.

On the Supply aspect the detailed procedure should be the
examination of specific aspects of the problem as was done in the
case of the proposals relating to:-

Guided Projectiles.

Co-operation in Development, Research, Design, &c., of Munitions.

Channels should also be laid down for the exchange of information.

In particular, the closest co-operation should be maintained on
the impact of scientific development on the types of weapons and
armament for the various Services, their efficacy, and the effects
on future methods of warfare and organisation for it.

3. Machinery for Co-operation in Defence
It was necessary, during the war, for Australia to assert a right,
which should have needed no argument to support it, of being heard
in the formulation and direction of Policy. Provision was made for
this through the nomination of an Accredited Representative to the
United Kingdom War Cabinet and the creation of the Pacific War
Councils in London and Washington. The latter bodies did not
fulfil their expected effectiveness, and the Australian Government
came to rely mainly on the direct contact which existed between
the Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the South-West
Pacific Area. This arrangement worked in a highly satisfactory
manner.

During the Prime Ministers' Conference in 1944, the Australian
Prime Minister put forward certain proposals for improved
machinery for Empire Co-operation [4], and they were referred to
the Governments concerned for consideration.

It is fundamental to future arrangements for co-operation in
Defence that appropriate machinery should be created to provide
for an effective voice by the Governments concerned in Policy and
in the higher control of planning on the official level. Whilst
the set-up of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia has been a
useful experiment, it is not considered to be the ideal machinery.

The Australian Government is of the opinion that the best basis
for providing for the control of a Force such as the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force is along the following lines:-

(a) The control and maintenance of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force should be placed entirely under the Australian
Joint Service machinery assisted by staff representatives from
each contributing country integrated into the staffs of the
Australian Services or Joint Service Machinery.

(b) Each country should provide a national contingent which should
be as self-contained as far as possible, Australia providing the
whole maintenance set up. The Force Headquarters would need to be
integrated on a scale to be decided by Australia.

(c) On a Governmental level, each contributing country should
provide a representative to deal with broad policy affecting their
forces, and they could be co-opted as members of a body such as
the Australian Council of Defence.

Failing agreement with these views, the Australian Government
considers that a scaling down of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Australia is essential. It is considered that one senior
representative from each country is the maximum that should sit on
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia. He should represent the
Army, Navy and Air components supplied from his country.

Consideration might be given to changing over to the form of
direction suggested in (a), (b) and (c) above, and also assigning
to this machinery responsibility for the development of the
defence aspect of matters relating to Regional Security in the
Pacific, in which United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand are
concerned.

Corresponding provision would also be necessary for Dominion
representation on any parallel body on the Governmental level
created in the United Kingdom. On the official level, the
Australian Government contemplates the strengthening of its Joint
Service Staff in London, as a counterpart to the Defence Committee
in Australia, and to provide an agency for advice to the Resident
Minister in London on Defence matters.

Consideration is also being given to the Australian Joint Service
Staff requirements in Washington and at the seat of the United
Nations. Development in this direction would depend on any
arrangement reached with the United States and machinery which may
be created for the purposes of implementing any agreement. A
related aspect is the progress of the work of the Military Staff
Committee of the Security Council, and whether it might create a
regional Sub-Committee for the Pacific.

In more detailed but nevertheless important directions of improved
machinery for Empire Co-operation, the Australian Government is
considering the proposal for the establishment of a Joint
Intelligence Bureau for the Pacific Area, and it despatched to
London some time ago a delegation to participate in a conference
relating to the British Commonwealth Signal Intelligence
Organisation.

4. Approach to the Problem of Future Organisation and Armament of
the Forces
The position in regard to the future organisation and armament of
the Forces was expressed by the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom in his statement to Parliament last February:-

'This is not the time to come to decisions about the eventual
shape of our post-war forces. The great strides made in the realm
of science and technology, including the production of atomic
bombs, cannot fail to affect the make-up of our forces. Time is
wanted for the full effects of these startling developments to be
assessed. But in the meanwhile, and for the year 1946, the
question of fundamental reorganisation does not arise.'

We have established in the Higher Defence Organisation a Defence
Scientific Advisory Committee whose function is to maintain a
general survey of the scientific field and bring before the
Defence Committee, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, or through the
Council of Defence to the notice of the Government, scientific
developments having either direct or indirect bearing upon
national defence. We are also creating a New Weapons and Equipment
Development Committee. Australia is also sending to the Defence
Science Conference in London in June a strong delegation of
service and scientific advisers.

We have been glad to welcome to Australia a Mission from the
Ministry of Supply, and have approved in principle proposals for
Empire Co-operation in the exchange of personnel and information
on matters of research, design and development of munitions and
production and inspection methods.

Before I left Australia I was glad to welcome General Evetts who
is making investigations regarding the location of testing and
research facilities in Australia for the full-scale development
and testing of guided projectiles. Subject to the arrangement of
an agreement mutually satisfactory to both Governments, Australia
is prepared to participate in this important project.

The question of post-war Munitions Policy is related to the
ultimate nature and strength of the post-war Defence Forces, and
must be determined by their requirements and the nucleus
production required for expansion in a future emergency. As the
future nature and strength of the Force cannot yet be resolved,
essential factories are being maintained on current requirements
of the Services and repair work.

In regard to Aircraft Production, the position may be expressed as
follows:-

(i) It is essential for Australia to maintain in peace time a
nucleus production of training and operational aircraft.

(ii) The scale of this nucleus production would have to be
determined by reference to the following considerations:-

(1) The approved post-war strength of the R.A.A.F.

(2) The requirements of the R.A.A.F. for expanded production in
time of war and the capacity of Australia to meet such
requirements.

(3) Any plan that might be agreed upon for the coordinated
production of military aircraft throughout the British
Commonwealth.

(iii) Any more detailed examination of the proposals cannot be
made in advance of a determination of the post-war strength of the
R.A.A.F. as part of the balanced forces for the defence of
Australia.

The Resident Minister in London has been authorised to confer with
the principals of the British Companies concerned, with a view to
their sending representatives to Australia for consultation in the
formulation of a definite plan for an affiliation between
Australia and British sources of aircraft production. This project
has received the blessing of the United Kingdom Government.

In regard to naval shipbuilding, the position is as follows:-

(a) The Australian Naval Shipbuilding Programme is being developed
for the time being by building destroyers.

(b) When provision has been made to satisfy Australian destroyer
requirements, it is proposed that the possibility of building
destroyers for Britain in exchange for larger ships should be
considered by both Governments.

(c) An investigation is being made into the preparation that would
be necessary for efficiently building large ships when the
Australian Shipbuilding industry has been further developed.

Finally, it is the policy of the Government to develop in peace,
resources for the manufacture of munitions as well as the supply
of raw material, in order to make the Commonwealth as self-
supporting as possible in armaments and munitions of war,
including aircraft and shipbuilding. Parallel with the development
of Government factories, the Government is fostering commercial
industries, and thereby seeking to provide the widest possible
base for a supply structure for the needs of the Empire in the
Pacific.

At the Imperial Conference in 1937 important principles were laid
down regarding the decentralised development of productive
capacity throughout the British Commonwealth, and, in 1941, the
Australian Government again urged the importance of the transfer
to Australia of people and production units in industries
associated with war production.

J. B. CHIFLEY