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361 Cabinet Submission by Evatt

Agendum 1384 CANBERRA, 31 August 1947

SECRET

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE-CANBERRA
AUGUST, 1947
REPORT TO CABINET

The following report is submitted for the information of Cabinet:-

1. The British Commonwealth Conference in Canberra on the Japanese
Peace Settlement began in the Chamber of the House of
Representatives on 26th August, and concluded on 2nd September,
1947. Dr. Evatt was unanimously elected Chairman. The other
countries represented were Burma, Canada, India, New Zealand,
Pakistan, South Africa and the United Kingdom.

2. Some preliminary notes on the agenda by Dr. Evatt were
circulated to all members of the Conference two days before it
began. These notes were substantially the same as the submission
to Cabinet which was dealt with on the 16th August, with a few
minor changes to make it suitable for distribution to other
countries. These notes were taken by the Conference as a basis of
most of the discussions and as a result a great deal of the
initiative throughout the Conference rested with Australia.

3. The Conference took no formal decisions on any matters of
policy, but substantial agreement clearly existed on all the main
points of the Australian submission. The main points are
summarised below.

4. Procedural questions. There was general agreement with
Australia's view that the peace Conference should be called as
soon as possible; that it should contain all the countries now
represented on the Far Eastern Commission with the addition, if
possible, of Pakistan; that it should be at a Governmental level;

that the method of reaching decisions should be by simple majority
for procedural and drafting questions and by a two-thirds majority
for matters of substance.

5. Basic Objectives. Representatives were in agreement with the
policies enunciated in the Potsdam Declaration and the basic
policy of the Far Eastern Commission.

6. Territorial Provisions. Representatives agreed that there was
no option but to confirm the territorial changes suggested in the
Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam Declarations. There was considerable
dissatisfaction at the secrecy in which the Yalta Agreement had
been shrouded and in its one-sided nature, but Delegates took the
realistic view that the Russians were in occupation of those
territories, that the United Kingdom was bound by its signature to
support Russian claims, and that therefore little purpose would be
served by opposing the territorial changes made.

7. Disarmament and Demilitarisation. There was general agreement
that Japan
should remain completely disarmed; that all manufacture of
armaments and aircraft should be forbidden. Some differences
existed over permitting Japan to operate and maintain aircraft for
internal services, and in the end the consensus of opinion was
that Japan should be allowed to operate some aircraft, but only
under strict customs control and for restricted specific purposes.

8. Constitutional Reform and Democratization. The principles
included in the Australian paper received general support and the
only question that attracted much attention was the amount of
detail which it would be practicable to insert in the Treaty.

9. Treaties. The Australian proposals for Japanese ratification
and recognition of treaties were generally accepted. With regard
to admission of Japan to international bodies, the Australian
views were again acceptable, but it was felt that the admission
should be left to the bodies themselves and not require prior
assent by the proposed Supervisory Commission for Japan.

10. Economic and Financial Provisions. Here again the principles
of the Australian paper were generally acceptable. Some discussion
took place as to the amount of detail which should be inserted in
the Treaty, but little difficulty was found in reaching agreement
on most of these points. The programme contains three central
elements: Allied security; economic democracy; and retention by
Japan of economy which would enable her to sustain herself. Some
discussion took place on the nature of controls and the
limitations that should be placed on Japan's strategic industries,
but the Conference did not attempt to go beyond principles or to
discuss technical details.

11. Reparations, Restitution, Costs of Occupation. The Conference
discussed the
various categories that might be considered for reparations and
the total amount of reparations which might be accepted from
Japan. The general feeling appeared to be that total reparations
would not be very great. The Conference did not discuss the
allocation of reparations among the various members of the
Commonwealth or among other Allied countries. Australian views on
restitution and costs of occupation found general acceptance.

12.Supervisory Machinery. The Conference agreed that there should
be supervisory machinery established to operate after the treaty,
that all nations which had made a direct contribution towards
winning the war should be represented on it, and that its
decisions should be by simple majority.

13. The Conference can be regarded as a complete success from
Australia's point of view despite some differences of opinion on
detail which are unavoidable in an international gathering. Those
points which Australia regarded as vital to her interests were
acknowledged by the other members of the Conference. The views of
Australia and the rest of the British Commonwealth correspond on
important matters with the views of the United States Government
and it can confidently be stated that the British Commonwealth
Conference has already played a valuable part in speeding and
assisting the final Peace Settlement. [1]

1 Cabinet discussed this report on 2 September. It noted its
contents and 'defined the authority and procedure of the Prime
Minister and of Cabinet in connection with problems which will
arise in association with the conference dealing with the Peace
Treaty with Japan'.


[AA : A2700, VOL. 35]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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