The accompanying material was brought around to me this afternoon
by Dr. Soedarsono, the Indonesian Representative in Delhi. You
will notice that it is addressed to Dr. Usman who is asked to
submit it to the Australian Government 'after approval and
substitution'. We do not quite understand what is meant by
'substitution'.

2. Dr. Soedarsono, made no attempt to withhold the contents of the
document from us and it came to us in open form. It might be as
well, however, if it were sealed down before being passed to Dr.

Usman. Dr. Soedarsono is handing another copy of it to the
External Affairs Ministry here.

3. You will have had our cablegrams [1] on this subject giving an
outline of the
Indian attitude and that of other quarters towards the progress of
the Security Council reference. There is a good deal of
uncertainty in all quarters as to what the next step can and ought
to be. Mr. K.P.S. Menon when I saw him earlier this week asked me
what I thought of the idea of an Asian conference in support of
Indonesia to which, in the absence of instructions I could only
remark that Asian opinion seemed already to have expressed itself
in fairly definite terms. Menon himself seemed to query whether a
conference of this kind would achieve any real purpose. He then
said that he would be seeing the Prime Minister and asked whether
I could propose anything to him for discussion during their
interview. Sir Girja Bajpai, when I saw him this morning, was
equally at a loss although, as reported to you today by cablegram,
he is suggesting a common approach in the form of a message by
Asian countries and Australia to the Security Council. The
Indonesians themselves, including Dr. Soedarsono, appear likewise
to want a lead. Soedarsono, said today, for example, that he was
seeing the Prime Minister this evening and enquired whether I
could suggest any method of approach to the problem which he might
discuss with Mr. Nehru. Here again, as in the case of Mr. K.P.S.

Menon, there was nothing that I was in a position to contribute.

4. Soedarsono has heard from the Indonesian Representative in
Washington that future action by the United States and Britain
will be conditioned by the action which Asian countries, including
Australia, may take in support of Indonesia. The report is really
very vague, however, and I am not sure that Soedarsono attaches
great importance to it. Both in his case and in the case of the
Indian Ministry of External Affairs there is a disposition to
blame Britain for her somewhat indeterminate attitude towards the
whole affair. The attitude of America too has come in for some
comment. When Mr. K.P.S. Menon called the American Ambassador (Mr.

Henderson) to the Ministry the other day and raised the question
of Marshall aid for Holland, Mr. Henderson replied that this could
not be cut off since an embargo by America of this kind would
amount to using the plan for political purposes. When speaking to
me later Menon wrote Henderson's explanation off as 'inane'.

5. There has been no repetition of earlier reports that an
Indonesian Government in exile will be formed in India. On Monday
last when we met Soedarsono, and Indonesian Representatives from
adjoining areas, they said that the emergency government under Dr.

Sjafrudin would, for the time being, carry on from Sumatra.

Enclosure

COPY

New Delhi,
December 30, 1948.

Republic of Indonesia
Office of the Representative in India.

No. 1545/11/48.

From: Dr. Soedarsono,
Representative of the Republic
of Indonesia in India

To: Dr. Usman,
Representative of the Republic
of Indonesia in Australia

Begins. To be submitted to the Government of the Commonwealth of
Australia after approval and substitution.

Quote. The Security Council passed on December 24, 1948, a
resolution calling upon the two parties to cease fire and to
release the Indonesian leaders. The clause demanding for the
withdrawal of the Dutch troops to the lines prior to the outbreak
of the colonial war, was rejected on the 24th, and again on the
27th.

In connection with the above, we feel very strongly in drawing
your attention to the following facts:

1. A similar demand, viz. that for the withdrawal of troops to the
lines prior to the outbreak of the colonial war, was also made
last year, and with the result known to all of us, viz.

sanctioning the occupation of Republican areas by the Dutch by
means of force.

2. Negotiation through the intermediary of the Committee of Good
Offices has and will yield no result on account of the limited
power given to it.

3. In a political overall solution and not a mere military one,
lies the whole solution for the Indonesian question.

4. Since this cannot be done through good offices of the
Commission formed by the United Nations, we are of the opinion
that arbitration can only be the alternative in solving the issue.

As all this cannot, in our opinion, be materialized immediately by
the Security Council, we are of the opinion that a satisfactory
solution of the Indonesian issue is impossible through the United
Nations Organisation only. A speedy solution can only be reached
through a third party, which, acting as an intermediary in
addition to the Security Council, would be strong enough to force
the Dutch to come to an immediate agreement or to submit
themselves to arbitration.

We are further of the opinion that this third party is to consist
of neighbouring countries, and those which have a lively interest
in Indonesia, as for instance India, Pakistan, Burma, Australia,
Ceylon and New Zealand. It goes without saying that it is left to
the discretion of the individual countries concerned to suggest
what joint action can be undertaken.

As, according to our representative to the Security Council, the
attitude of and the actions to be taken by the Governments of the
United States of America and the United Kingdom, will depend upon
steps which will be taken into consideration and executed by Asian
countries, especially by India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and also
Australia, and developments both in the Security Council and in
Indonesia have reached a critical stage, we on our part would like
to suggest the following:

A. As the first steps to be taken and already being considered by
your Government:

- severance of diplomatic relations
- imposing of economic sanctions
- rendering of material help.

B. For further joint action we would like to suggest that the
above-mentioned countries are by agreement to invite any other
country interested in the question, with the view to take the
following steps:

(a) to order the Dutch to come to an immediate and direct solution
by means of arbitration through countries in Asia, the Far East
and the Pacific, which are directly interested in the issue.

(b) to order the Dutch to withdraw their troops under supervision
of a joint police force which is to maintain law and order to
prevent any 'possible retaliation'.

The individual friendly countries will adopt such measures or
sanctions-economic or diplomatic-as may commend to themselves.

In the meantime we can assure that our people and armed forces
will continue the fight till the last bitter end. Although we do
not get any news directly from Java as a result of the
disappearance of our radio stations which were bombed out by the
Dutch, we still receive reports from Sumatra to the effect that
our side have recently secured many gains at several fronts. We
are convinced that guerilla fighting on a large scale is and will
continue throughout the Republican territories. Unquote. Ends.