Canberra, 23 March 1962

Top Secret

Australian Involvement in Malayan External Defence

I had a discussion with Blakers³ and Poyser⁴ to clarify the attitude of the Department of Defence to the question of Australian involvement in Malayan defence. I told them that the Secretary⁵ accepted that there was an agreement between the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand that the Australian components in the Strategic Reserve could be used for the defence of Malaya but wanted to emphasize that we had no commitment to Malaya.⁶ The Defence Department does not contest the correctness of this interpretation of the documents but believes that we should pay less regard to strictly legalistic interpretations and more to the hard solid fact that Australian troops can be used in the external defence of Malaya if this is thought necessary by Malaya and the United Kingdom. What is more, so far as air defence is concerned, for a long time the only fighters in Malaya were the Australian Sabre Squadrons and even now the United Kingdom bases fighters only in Singapore so that any talk about certain aspects of the air defence of Malaya must almost certainly involve the Sabre Squadrons.

2. The Defence Department refer particularly to the following passages in the relevant
documents:�

(a) Directive for British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve⁷

The primary role of the Strategic Reserve is described in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Directive in the following terms. Defence lay particular emphasis on the first sentence in paragraph 10:–

'Roles of the Strategic Reserve

Primary Role

9. The primary role of the Strategic Reserve in accordance with the purposes of the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, is to provide a deterrent to Communist aggression in South East Asia. Within this role it will form part of the forces required for the Defence of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore and of the sea communications in the Malayan area against external aggression.

10. The Strategic Reserve may at the discretion of the BDCC(FE)⁸ be employed in defensive operations in the event of external aggression against the Federation of Malaya and/or Singapore or against the sea communications in the Malayan area. The Strategic Reserve, or units thereof, will not be otherwise committed to the use of force in its primary role by the BDCC(FE) without reference to the ANZAM⁹ Defence Committee, except as specified in paragraph 13 below.'

(b) Malayan Defence Agreement¹⁰

Defence draw attention to Articles I and III which read as follows:–

'Article I

The Government of the United Kingdom undertake to afford to the Government of the Federation of Malaya such assistance as the Government of the Federation of Malaya may require for the external defence of its territory.

Article III

The Government of the Federation of Malaya will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to maintain in the Federation such naval, land and air forces including a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve as are agreed between the two Governments to be necessary for the purposes of Article I of this Agreement and for the fulfilment of Commonwealth and international obligations. It is agreed that the forces referred to in this Article may be accompanied by authorised service organisations, and civilian components (of such size as may be agreed between the two Governments to be necessary) and dependents.'

Defence point out that Article III directly associates the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve with the external defence of Malaya in a public document. They feel that whatever may be the precise legal relationship between Australia and Malaya, the Malayans could properly interpret the Strategic Reserve as being available for the external defence of Malaya and that Australia, under the Directive for the Strategic Reserve, has agreed to this arrangement. Consequently they feel that Australia has a proper place in the discussion of external defence questions between Malaya and the United Kingdom and that participation in such talks could not reasonably be deemed by Malaya to be an implied indication of a willingness to go further.

Nevertheless, I understand that Mr. Hicks¹¹ is prepared to accept the Department of External Affairs' view on the course to be followed, though his opinion in this regard may not be final.

[NAA: A1838, TS696/17/1 part 3]

Cobbold Commission

Following the second approval in principle of the Malaysia proposal by the Malayan Parliament on 23 November 1961, a Commission of Enquiry under Lord Cobbold was appointed to canvass public opinion among the people of Sarawak and North Borneo. The Cobbold Commission sat in the two territories between February and April 1962 and interviewed over 4,000 people. Most were members of delegations, and by and large the bulk of the population had little or no knowledge of the proposed federation. Among those interviewed opinion was somewhat confused on the issue: the Commission found that a third of the population 'definitely favoured Malaysia'; another third accepted the proposal 'subject to specific safeguards'; and that not all of the remainder were 'irrevocably opposed to the plan '. The Commission's report of August 1962 stated that majority opinion favoured the Malaysia proposal. Nonetheless, there were reservations about the second group's concerns and the report recommended a number of constitutional safeguards regarding religion, language, citizenship and immigration. Of the final group, there were those who strongly opposed the proposal, insisting on independence for each territory before consideration be given to becoming part of Malaysia. A small number also were concerned about the inclusion of predominantly Chinese Singapore in the merger.

1 Keith Brennan, Assistant Secretary, Defence Liaison Branch, Department of External Affairs (DBA).

2 Allan Eastman, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Division I, DEA.

3 Gordon Blakers, Assistant Secretary Defence Planning, Department of Defence (DD).

4 Gordon Poyser, Deputy Assistant Secretary and Member of the Joint Administrative Planning Committee, DD.

5 That is, Secretary, DEA, Sir Arthur Tange.

6 In 1959 Australia had become associated with the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) by an exchange of letters with the Malayan Government. This association related only to AMDA stipulations concerning the maintenance of the CSR within the federation.

7 UK document, not published.

8 British Defence Co-ordination Committee (Far East).

9 The ANZAM Agreement (1948-49) was an informal arrangement whereby the British, Australian and New Zealand Governments agreed to consult and co-ordinate defence planning and activities in an area which included Australia, New Zealand and the British territories in Malaya and Borneo, together with the adjacent sea area.

10 AMDA document. Not published.

11 Edwin Hicks, Secretary, DD.