NAA: A1838, TS677/3 PART 12

Canberra, March 1968

ANNEX TO 18/1968. Top Secret

Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, 1968

1. The aim of Australian defence policy is to ensure the security of Australia and her Territories. To achieve this aim Australia has adopted a forward defence strategy relying primarily on collective security arrangements with major allies with whom we have participated in measures for the containment of communism and the establishment of stability in South East Asia.

2. This study reviews the strategic basis of Australian defence policy. The study has been projected, as far as practicable, over a period up to 1977 to highlight likely trends in the strategic situation.

[matter omitted]

Outlook for collective security

30. The United States is likely to remain the dominant allied military power in the area. Thus ANZUS will continue to be the key treaty in support of the defence of Australia, but its effectiveness will be conditioned by Australian support for United States policies in areas of common interest and by the demonstration of Australia's willingness and capability to take action both for our own defence and as a contribution to the defence of South East Asia.

[matter omitted]

General strategic concept

36. The development and maintenance of peace and stability in South East Asia and the containment of communist expansion in that area are the best means of ensuring the security of Australia and are therefore the essential aims of Australian defence strategy. For such a forward defence strategy Australia relies primarily upon collective security arrangements and should therefore be prepared, in conjunction with allies, to undertake military measures in South East Asia in support of these arrangements and to safeguard particular Australian defence interests. Australia's contribution to treaty and collective defence arrangements must be, and be seen to be commensurate with Australian national interests and resources.

37. A forward defence strategy would be most readily implemented if Australia and her non-Asian allies retain a credible forward defence posture by the continuing deployment of appropriate forces to South East Asia. Australia's political and defence policies must also be such as to encourage South Eastern Asian countries to:

1. develop policies promoting political stability and economic growth;
2. develop their own defence capabilities in association with Western defence forces located in the area; and
3. develop regional co-operation.

38. The withdrawal of United Kingdom forces from bases in Malaysia and Singapore, whilst not invalidating an Australian forward defence strategy, will make the maintenance of a forward defence posture in Malaysia/Singapore more difficult and costly. However, it is important to Australia that when the United Kingdom withdraws from Malaysia and Singapore alternative arrangements are made to promote stability and security in the region. As long as the United States retains a military presence on the mainland of South East Asia we can expect that she will welcome and facilitate a continuing Australian and New Zealand military presence in the area.

39. Should the United States, for political or other reasons, leave mainland South East Asia, a forward defence strategy could still be effective so long as the United States and her allies remain in or have access to the island chain from Japan to New Guinea, including the Ryukus, Taiwan and the Philippines. This would involve a review of the nature of the Australian strategic contribution.

40. If base facilities in mainland South East Asia (including Malaysia and Singapore) were denied to Western forces, the initial defence of Australia and the security of Australian communications would depend primarily on Australian and allied sea and air power based on Australia and the island chain, and would be conditioned by Indonesian orientation in such circumstances.

41. Irrespective of primary reliance on collective security arrangements, Australia must be prepared to deal with situations which directly threaten our territorial interests and in which we could not reasonably rely on receiving help from our allies, particularly those situations which could arise from a resurgence of Indonesian expansionism.

42. From the foregoing we assess that Australia should continue to:

1. maintain a forward defence strategy in concert with allies aimed at the containment of communist expansion and the establishment of peace and stability in South East Asia;
2. implement that strategy by retaining a forward defence posture of continuing deployment of appropriate forces in that area; and
3. be prepared to deal independently with any situation which directly threatens Australia's territorial interests and in which we could not reasonably rely on receiving help from our allies.

43. Should the communists extend their control in South East Asia, any subsequent direct physical threat to Australia would take some years to develop. These years would have to be used, and may need to be anticipated, for the acquisition of long lead time items if Australian defence preparations are to be adequate when required. The worst situation which Australia might be required to meet on its own would be the development of a threat from Indonesia to Australia and its Territories, particularly along the lines of a Borneo-type confrontation in Papua/New Guinea. This could arise more quickly than a threat from an extension of communist control in South East Asia. Acquisition of long lead time items such as ships and aircraft and the development of the necessary infrastructure in the Papua/New Guinea area for this eventuality require high priority.

Situations short of limited war

44. Situations short of limited war for which Australia should be prepared to provide forces are:

1. bilateral military assistance in mainland South East Asia such as to South Vietnam and Thailand in conjunction with the United States;
2. the support of Malaysia and Singapore against communist insurgency activities;
3. the support of SEATO counter-insurgency plans;
4. internally or externally inspired subversion or insurgency or possibly civil disorder in Papua/New Guinea; and
5. United Nations peace-keeping tasks.

45. Australian forces are already deployed in South Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand. Throughout the period it is likely that there will be continuing demands to contribute forces to allied efforts to meet cold war/insurgency situations on the South East Asian mainland. There is need for capacity not only to be able to contribute in these situations but also to relieve and sustain those contributions which Australia makes.

46. Australia could not rely on assistance from allies to counter an Indonesian threat in the initial stages of any operations, short of overt aggression, confined to the Papua/New Guinea area. This could include confrontation activities similar to those which Indonesia undertook against Malaysia. Australia must therefore have forces capable of meeting at least the initial stages of any situation short of limited war, which is likely to arise in the Papua/New Guinea area.

47. None of the situations short of limited war discussed above are likely to be of short duration, and all could involve commitments extending over several years. Australian capacity to make worthwhile contributions to them all simultaneously would necessarily be limited, and the allocation of available effort will need to be decided in consultation with our allies, particularly the United States.

48. Australia's policy of preserving friendly relations with Indonesia can better be achieved by speaking or negotiating from a position of strength in our own right. It is of particular importance that Australia maintains under demonstrable control at least an element of offensive capacity which Australia considers sufficient to deter Indonesia from actions inimical to Australian interests. By giving suitable publicity to the actions of such forces in appropriate situations the particular purpose of demonstrating their capability would be served. The ANZUS Treaty will remain a deterrent against overt aggression against Australia and its Territories.

Limited war

49. There are two limited war situations in which Australia could be involved. These are:

1. against Chinese communist aggression in mainland South East Asia, and
2. against Indonesia, particularly arising from confrontation-type activities against the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.

50. The risk of limited war against Indonesia during the period will remain slight. Limited war against China in South East Asia is also seen as unlikely. In both cases, under our treaty and defence alliances Australia will not become involved in limited war unless with allies. In either situation the limited war could be of long duration, and there would be a need for Australian forces in Australia to maintain and support those deployed forward.

51. If Australia became involved in a limited war in South East Asia the nature and scale of the Australian contribution would depend on the situation in Indonesia at the time, and would be decided following consultations with allies, particularly the United States. In either limited war situation, sea and air routes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans could be subject to interference and attack. These sea and air routes could be afforded a degree of protection under specific military agreements with our allies made in accordance with SEATO or other plans, but the extent of assistance in the Indian Ocean would largely depend on future United States policy.

52. Australia must be prepared to make a contribution to the defence of sea and air communications commensurate with Australian interests and obligations. However, the area of Australia and her Territories should receive priority over South East Asia in respect of Australian preparations for the defence of sea and air communications in limited war.

Reaction capability

53. As our potential enemies will have the initiative it is essential that Australian forces should have good intelligence and adequate mobility and flexibility for a fast and effective response.

54. Intelligence. Facilities must be available to ensure adequate knowledge of the enemy in order that forces may be prepared, disposed or dispersed to counter any enemy initiative in periods of tension.

55. Mobility and Flexibility. The necessary strategic and tactical mobility to make a fast and effective response is of importance in our defence preparedness. Insofar as strategic sea and air lift is concerned, there is a need to develop a Service capability to enable the carriage of personnel and freight which are beyond the capacity of civilian agencies and to meet situations where the use of civilian agencies is impracticable. The Services must have flexibility to meet the wide range of situations envisaged in this paper.

56. War Reserves. The necessity for a speedy response also emphasises the need for the provision in peace of war reserves from both our own and allied sources to sustain Australian forces in operations.

Nuclear capability

57. Having regard to the present strategic situation and our treaty arrangements in which our most powerful allies have a nuclear capability, there is no current requirement for an Australian nuclear capability. In the longer term, with future advances in technology it might be possible to develop a credible capability, if required, to counter a serious threat of direct attack on Australia. Australian forces should have as far as possible a capability to operate in a nuclear environment in South East Asia and in the face of nuclear opposition. However, at least in the early part of the period under review, the main requirement is to concentrate on improving the strength and effectiveness of Australian forces using conventional weapons.

Conclusions

58. A forward defence strategy based on collective security arrangements with allies will continue to provide the best assurance for the security of Australia and its Territories. Our political and defence policies should be such as to maintain with allies a credible forward defence posture in South East Asia while encouraging the countries of the area to co-operate in promoting security and stability.

59. Our forces must be shaped to provide a capability to act independently to deal with situations, directly threatening our territorial interests, in which we could not reasonably rely on receiving help from our allies. We must also remain capable of making an adequate, prompt and sustained contribution to allied forces in South East Asia in a wide range of situations, including limited war. The size of the Australian military contribution to the forward defence strategy should be determined primarily by the need to ensure that our contribution to treaty and defence arrangements is, and is seen to be, commensurate with out national interests and resources.

60. The development of forces to meet all stated contingencies simultaneously is not feasible and the forces deployed under the forward defence posture should be regarded as part of the independent capability. If two major contingencies for which Australia should be prepared develop concurrently, the allocation of available effort would have to be decided in consultation with allies, particularly the United States. The composition of the Australian independent capability must be kept under review to take account of developments in our immediate area of interest and, in particular, in Papua/New Guinea and Indonesia.