Nuclear non-proliferation

ASNO ensures compliance with Australia's international treaty obligations under:

• The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – commonly known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
• Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
• the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment
• International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
• Australia's 25 bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCAs).

In particular, ASNO has five primary areas of responsibility in the nuclear field:

• the application of nuclear safeguards in Australia
• the physical protection of nuclear items in Australia
• operation of Australia's network of NCAs, including tracking Australia's uranium exports
• contributing to the development of IAEA safeguards and the strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime
• supporting the implementation of nuclear safeguards and nuclear security across the Indo-Pacific region.

Nuclear Safeguards

Under the NPT, Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) like Australia have committed not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons and are required to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA.

Safeguards, and their related verification techniques, deter the spread of nuclear weapons through the early detection of the misuse of nuclear material or technology. Under a CSA, states are required to submit to the IAEA regular declarations on their nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and to accept inspections by the IAEA to verify these declarations.

Safeguards, therefore, play a critical role in contributing to international peace and security.

The Additional Protocol (AP) is an agreement concluded between a state and the IAEA, complementary to the state's safeguards agreement with the IAEA, broadening the information to be reported to the IAEA and the access to be given to safeguards inspectors.

The AP significantly increases the IAEA's ability to verify that a State's declaration is both correct and complete. It is essential to strengthening the IAEA safeguards system – without the AP the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities is limited.

Australia became the first country to ratify an AP with the IAEA on 10 December 1997. Currently APs are in force with 141 States and Euratom.

ASNO ensure Australia meets its IAEA safeguards commitment through the operation of Australia's national system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material and associated items, and nuclear facilities. This is based on a regulatory permit system for the possession, use and transport of nuclear material, associated equipment and activities, and facilities. Permit holders are required to report quantities of nuclear material and nuclear-related activities to ASNO on a regular basis and are subject to compliance inspections by ASNO inspectors.

The information submitted by permit holders provides the basis for Australia's obligatory CSA/AP declarations to the IAEA. ASNO is also required to facilitate both routine and random IAEA inspections conducted in Australia to verify the correctness of Australia's declarations and compliance with treaty commitments.

In the year 2000, Australia was the first State to receive the IAEA's broader conclusion for a State as a whole, namely that 'all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities'. Australia has received the boarder conclusion every year since.

AUKUS and non-proliferation

On 14 March 2023, Prime Minister Albanese, US President Biden and UK Prime Minister Sunak announced the optimal pathway for Australia's acquisition of a conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine capability. An important element of the joint leaders' statement was the commitment to "set the highest nuclear non-proliferation standard" and to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "on a non-proliferation approach that sets the strongest precedent for the acquisition of a nuclear-powered submarine capability".

Safeguarding this multi-decade national security project is, therefore, a no-fail regulatory endeavour. ASNO is working with the IAEA and AUKUS partners to develop a first-of-a-kind nuclear safeguards approach, within the framework of Australia's CSA and Additional Protocol (AP), for Australia's naval nuclear-powered submarine (NPS) program. This will include developing an arrangement pursuant to Article 14 of Australia's CSA.

Australia commenced negotiations with the IAEA on an Article 14 arrangement in May 2023.

Australia's network of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCAs)

All of Australia's uranium is exported for exclusively peaceful purposes, and only to countries and parties with which Australia has a bilateral nuclear cooperation (safeguards) agreement. These agreements ensure that Australia's nuclear exports are handled in a manner consistent with Australia's uranium export policy.

Australia's network of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements complements and builds upon the IAEA's safeguards regime. They establish treaty-level conditions on the use of all nuclear material exported from Australia.

NCAs serve as a mechanism to apply specific conditions on Australian Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM) which are additional to IAEA safeguards, for instance, with regard to retransfers, high enrichment and reprocessing.

Each of Australia's bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements is supplemented by its own Administrative Arrangement, a confidential document of less than treaty status between Australia and the other country which establishes procedures to ensure the smooth

Australia's safeguards policy also involves the careful selection of countries which are eligible to receive Australian uranium exports. In the case of NPT non-nuclear-weapon states, they must be subject to IAEA safeguards (i.e. IAEA safeguards apply to all existing and future nuclear activities). In the case of NPT nuclear-weapon states, there must be a treaty level assurance that AONM will only be used for peaceful purposes, and that AONM will be covered by IAEA safeguards. In the case of India, a nuclear weapon possessor state not party to the NPT, IAEA safeguards are applied to all of India's civil nuclear facilities, and these are the only Indian facilities that can use Australian uranium.

Australia currently has 25 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements in force covering 43 countries and Taiwan.

ASNO, besides acting as Australia's national safeguards authority - responsible for Australia's NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA - also operates Australia's system of NCAs, and accounts for nuclear material through administering the Safeguards Act.

Australia's bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements

Nuclear Security

Nuclear security is about the protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material (including overseas transport of uranium) against unauthorised access, removal and sabotage.

ASNO is Australia's regulator for nuclear security under the Safeguards Act, which gives effect to Australia's obligations under several international treaties, including:

• the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment
• the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
• treaty-level bilateral NCAs.

ASNO implements its nuclear security obligations within Australia by issuing permits, setting security requirements, reviewing and approving security systems, and conducting inspections.

The main entities with nuclear security obligations are:

• the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, which operates the Open-Pool Australian Light-water (OPAL) reactor at Lucas Heights, Sydney
• uranium mines and their industry suppliers
• uranium transport companies, ports and shipping lines.

Internationally, ASNO ensures international standards and guidelines for nuclear security remain fit for purpose and can respond to emerging threats.

Within the Indo-Pacific region, ASNO works with partners to build regulatory capacity in nuclear security.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The CTBT prohibits all nuclear explosive testing for both civilian and military purposes and establishes a global monitoring network to verify compliance. Australia has made significant contributions to the CTBT.

As Australia's National Authority for CTBT implementation under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Act 1998 (CTBT), ASNO is responsible for ensuring Australia meets its treaty commitments.

ASNO coordinates Australia's practical contributions to preparatory work for the CTBT's entry into force. [4] Central to Australia's contributions is its hosting of 20 monitoring stations and a laboratory as part of the CTBT's International Monitoring System (IMS).

The IMS is a unique global network of facilities using four technologies: seismic to monitor shockwaves through the ground, hydroacoustic to detect sound waves in the oceans, infrasound to listen for ultra-low frequency sound waves inaudible to the human ear, and radionuclide to monitor the atmosphere for radioactive particles and gases from a nuclear explosion. Over 90 percent of the Treaty's 337 IMS facilities are already up and running and the system has proved its effectiveness, detecting all of North Korea's declared nuclear tests.

Australia hosts 20 IMS stations and a radionuclide laboratory - the third largest number of facilities in the IMS network. These stations span the gamut of environmental conditions, from Antarctic cold and shifting ice, to remote desert heat and tropical humidity, requiring innovative solutions to maintain the operational performances required under the CTBT.

Some of Australia's monitoring stations also contribute to the regional warning system for earthquakes and tsunamis – a function of great importance to many countries in the Indo-Pacific.

Australia's International Monitoring System facilities are listed (by category) below. Use the facility's letter and number code to locate the facility on the map provided.

Primary seismic stations:

• PS02 Warramunga, NT
• PS03 Alice Springs, NT
• PS04 Stephens Creek, NSW
• PS05 Mawson, Antarctica

Auxiliary seismic stations:

• AS004 Charters Towers, QLD
• AS005 Fitzroy Crossing, WA
• AS006 Narrogin, WA

Infrasound stations:

• IS07 Warramunga, NT
• IS05 Hobart, TAS
• IS04 Shannon, WA
• IS06 Cocos Islands
• IS03 Davis Station, Antarctica

Radionuclide stations:

• RN04 Melbourne, VIC
• RN10 Perth, WA
• RN06 Townsville, QLD
• RN09 Darwin, NT
• RN08 Cocos Islands
• RN07 Macquarie Island, TAS
• RN05 Mawson, Antarctica

Radionuclide laboratory:

• RL02 Melbourne, VIC

Hydroacoustic station:

• HA01 Cape Leeuwin, WA