Output 1.1: National Safeguards System
Operation of Australia's national system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material, items and facilities.
Performance Measures
- Australia continues to receive the broader conclusion that 'all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities' from the IAEA.
- Australia's obligations are met under Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
- Australia's system of safeguards permits and authorities is administered in a timely and effective manner.
- The quantities, categories, locations and intended end-uses of nuclear material and associated items within Australia are accounted for.
Performance Assessment
International Obligations
Reporting Obligations under the Australia – IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
During the reporting period, ASNO submitted all reports, declarations and notifications to the IAEA on nuclear materials, facilities and activities, ensuring that Australia met its obligations under its safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
For each material balance area (summarised in Table 3), ASNO provided reports to the IAEA as required by the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
Table 4 is a summary of total quantities of nuclear material by category in Australia. A small quantity (2.7 kg) of 235U in high enriched uranium is retained in Australia and used for a variety of purposes primarily due to the utility of the particular chemical, physical and isotopic characteristics. Typical uses of this material include: research and development related to nuclear non-proliferation activities; validating the commercial application of ANSTO's Synroc waste immobilisation technology; nuclear forensics for identifying illicit nuclear materials; development of detection technologies and chemistry work. The quantity comprises several items in various locations around Australia such as ANSTO and some universities.
As well as requiring reporting on nuclear material inventory and transactions, the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement also requires reporting on design and operational attributes (relevant to safeguards) of nuclear facilities. This information is provided to the IAEA in Design Information Questionnaires (DIQs) for each facility material balance area (MBA), and in the case of MBAs for locations outside facilities (LOFs), in LOF information questionnaires. No DIQs were updated during the reporting period.
The Safeguards Act requires permits for possession of nuclear material, as well as associated material, associated equipment and associated technology (collectively termed associated items). Permits for associated items ensure Australia can maintain regulatory controls on technology, equipment and material with potential proliferation risks, can report on design attributes for DIQs, and meet other reporting obligations under various nuclear cooperation agreements. Table 5 lists the inventory of associated items in Australia.
| Location | Material balance area (MBA) | Name of facility or location outside facility (as designated in Australia's subsidiary arrangements with the IAEA) |
|---|---|---|
| Lucas Heights | AS-A | HIFAR (Note: de-fuelled in 2007) |
| Lucas Heights | AS-C | Research and development laboratories |
| Lucas Heights | AS-D | Vault storage |
| Elsewhere |
AS-E, ASE1& ASE2 |
Other locations in Australia (e.g. universities, industrial radiography companies, hospitals) |
| Lucas Heights | AS-F | OPAL reactor |
| Lucas Heights | AS-H | Synroc waste immobilisation (SyMo) plant |
| CSIRO (various sites) | AS-I | CSIRO |
| Category | Quantity | Intended end-use |
|---|---|---|
| Source Material | ||
| Uranium ore concentrates (UOC) | 785 tonnes | Export for energy use pursuant to bilateral agreements |
| 3.5 tonnes | Storage | |
| Natural uranium (other than UOC) | 4,487 kg | Research, storage |
| Depleted uranium | 28,477 kg | Research, shielding |
| Thorium ore residues | 59 tonnes | Storage/disposal |
| Thorium (other than thorium ore residues) | 1,936 kg | Research, industry |
| Special Fissionable Material | ||
| 235U – low enriched | 204,311 grams1 | Research, radioisotope production, storage |
| 235U – high enriched | 2,747 grams | Research, storage |
| 233U | 3.8 grams | Research |
| Plutonium (other than 238Pu) | 1,201 grams | Research, neutron source |
| Category | Quantity | Intended end-use |
|---|---|---|
| Associated Material | ||
| Deuterium and heavy water | 20.9 tonnes | Research, reactors |
| Nuclear grade graphite | 83.3 tonnes | Research and storage |
| Associated Equipment | ||
| HIFAR3 | 1 | Reactor |
| HIFAR coarse control arms (unused) | 5 | Reactor components |
| HIFAR coarse control arms (used) | 14 | Reactor components |
| HIFAR safety rods | 3 | Reactor components |
| HIFAR fuel charging and discharging machines | 2 | Reactor components |
| OPAL reactor4 | 1 | Reactor |
| OPAL control rods | 14 | Reactor components |
| OPAL control rod drives | 6 | Reactor components |
| Nuclear-grade zirconium tubes | <50 kgs | R&D and storage |
| Self-powered neutron detectors | 46 | Reactor components |
Reporting Obligations under the Australia – IAEA Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol gives the IAEA greater access to information and locations related to nuclear fuel cycle activities, thereby allowing the IAEA to provide greater assurances not only that all declared nuclear material is accounted for, but also that states do not have any undeclared nuclear material or activities. Australia was the first country to sign and ratify an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, which came into force for Australia on 12 December 1997.
ASNO prepares and provides annual declarations under a range of Additional Protocol categories, as well as quarterly declarations on relevant exports. An important aspect of the Additional Protocol is reporting to the IAEA on nuclear fuel cycle related research and development activities and plans relevant to the development of the fuel cycle. ASNO ensured that all IAEA requirements were met during the reporting period, including with respect to Australia's intention to acquire conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
Safeguards Developments in Australia
The IAEA implements safeguards in Australia in accordance with the provisions in a range of legal instruments: the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; Additional Protocol; Subsidiary Arrangements; facility attachments and LOF attachments for each material balance area (MBA).
Australia's MBAs are described in Table 3. The overarching framework the IAEA uses to prioritise and optimise various in-field verification and headquarters (i.e. at the IAEA) analysis activities under these instruments is the State-level approach (SLA) for Australia. The IAEA recently completed a minor update to Australia's SLA under its SLA Improvement Project.
ANSTO continues to construct its SyMo facility (Synroc Waste Immobilisation Facility) and, the IAEA conducted design information verification at the facility in May 2022. The IAEA is likely to conduct baseline environmental sampling in 2023.
All entities holding a permit to possess nuclear material are required to conduct an annual physical inventory taking (a stocktake of nuclear material held). The 2022 physical inventory taking was completed successfully with subsequent reporting to the IAEA submitted on time.
ASNO continued to engage with the Australian Radioactive Waste Agency (ARWA) in its mandate to establish a facility for Australia's radioactive waste.
Permits and Authorities System
ASNO continued to operate Australia's state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) in accordance with Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and national legislation. Australia's SSAC is implemented through permits issued under the Safeguards Act. Notices of all permit changes were published in the Australia Government Gazette as required by subsection 20(1) of the Safeguards Act. A summary of all permits granted, varied, revoked and expired in the reporting period is in Table 6. During the reporting period, all permits related to the transport of nuclear material were varied and extended as part of ASNO's rolling plan of permit updates.
Essential for the operation of the permit system is a fit-for-purpose database for managing permits and preparing routine reports on nuclear material inventory and transactions to the IAEA. ASNO continued to work with the database development team (under DFAT's Information Management Division) on the continuing development of ASNO's NUMBAT database.
| Permit or authority | Current total | Granted | Varied | Revoked | Expired |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Possess nuclear material | 115 | 6 | 14 | 1 | 0 |
| Possess associated items | 10 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Transport nuclear material | 16 | 0 | 17 | 0 | 5 |
| Transport associated items | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Establish a facility | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Decommission a facility | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Communicate information contained in associated technology | 7 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 151 | 6 | 38 | 1 | 5 |
IAEA Inspections
The IAEA conducted inspections in accordance with standard arrangements under Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. ASNO officers facilitated access for the IAEA inspectors in accordance with conditions under respective permits issued under the Safeguards Act and accompanied the inspectors during all of their activities.
In the reporting period, the IAEA made two separate visits to Australia. The IAEA conducted a short notice random inspection in December 2021 and its annual, scheduled Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) inspections in May 2022. The IAEA also conducted Complementary Access at Silex Systems Limited in December 2021, and at Olympic Dam and a Defence waste store in May 2022. Details on all inspections are provided in Table 7. The IAEA's findings from these inspections (where available at the time of publishing this Annual Report) are listed in Appendix D.
Overall, the IAEA has maintained the 'broader conclusion' for Australia that 'all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities'. (See Appendix D.)
| Date | Facility | Material balance area5 | Type6 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8–9 December 2021 | ANSTO | AS-F | Short Notice Random Inspection |
| 9 December 2021 |
ANSTO Silex |
AS-C | Complementary Access (4.a.i) |
| 10 May 2022 | Defence | AS-E | Complementary Access (4.a.i) |
| 12 May 2022 | Olympic Dam Mine | AS-E | Complementary Access (4.a.i) |
| 16–24 May 2022 | ANSTO | AS-C | Design Information Verification & Physical Inventory Verification |
| AS-D | Design Information Verification & Physical Inventory Verification | ||
| AS-F | Design Information Verification & Physical Inventory Verification | ||
| AS-H | Design Information Verification | ||
| 25 May 2022 | ANSTO | AS-C | Complementary Access (4.a.i) |
IAEA and ASNO inspectors at Olympic Dam Uranium Mine during the Complementary Access, May 2022. (Image courtesy of BHP Olympic Dam)
ASNO Safeguards Inspections
ASNO accompanied the IAEA on all the inspections listed above to ensure Australia's obligations were met in a timely and efficient manner and to ensure the inspections were conducted effectively. ASNO inspectors are able also to use these opportunities to observe the inspected organisation's performance against their domestic permit conditions. ASNO also conducted domestic inspections and separately visited some permit holders to discuss their arrangements for implementing permit conditions. (See Output 1.2.)
Inventory balances
ASNO performed the annual material balance evaluation of the nuclear inventory accounts for each MBA with minor differences between book and physical inventory. These inventory differences were reported to the IAEA in conjunction with inventory change reports and physical inventory listings. Details are provided in Table 8. Differences were due to re-measurement of small batches of nuclear material at universities and research institutes and correction to mis-assigned weights of shielding in radiography devices.
The mislocated item of depleted uranium reported in last year's report was found and the apparently mislocated item of thorium was resolved as a case of double counting. The permit holder involved is updating their procedures to improve their accounting and control of nuclear material.
| Material Balance Area | Difference between book and physical inventory | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Other locations (MBA AS-E & ASE1) | –45.67 kg depleted uranium | Re-measurement and re-assignment of batch weights, including industrial radiography cameras, dismantled aircraft counterweights and chemical reagents. |
| +0.19 kg natural uranium | ||
| –0.02 kg thorium | ||
| CSIRO (MBA AS-I) | –0.00 kg depleted uranium | Re-measurement of batch weights as part of CSIRO's campaign to characterise legacy inventory in storage, including one correction of an error in assignment of a decimal place |
| –0.04 kg natural uranium | ||
| +0.61 g plutonium | ||
| –0.03 kg thorium |
1 The quantity of 235U in low enriched uranium in Australia increased between 30 June 2021 and 30 June 2022 primarily due to the import of fresh fuel assemblies for the OPAL reactor.
2 Not including items categorised as associated technology.
3 The ANSTO Board decided to cease operation of HIFAR in January 2007. The reactor was de-fuelled in May 2007. It is awaiting decommissioning.
4 Includes, inter alia, the reactor reflector vessel and core grid.
5 See explanation of each material balance are in Table 3.
6 Details on different types of inspections are outlined in Appendix D.
