Appendix B: Australia's Uranium Export Policies
Australia's Nuclear Safeguards Policy
The Australian Government's uranium policy limits the export of Australian uranium to countries that: are a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);4 have a Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA in force; and are within Australia's network of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. These nuclear cooperation agreements are designed to ensure IAEA safeguards and appropriate nuclear security measures are applied to AONM (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material) exported overseas, in addition to several supplementary conditions. Nuclear material subject to the provisions of an Australian nuclear cooperation agreement is known as AONM. The obligations of Australia's agreements apply to uranium as it moves through the different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, and to nuclear material generated using that uranium.
All Australia's nuclear cooperation agreements contain treaty-level assurances that AONM will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and will be covered by safeguards arrangements under each country's safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, it is a minimum requirement that IAEA safeguards apply to all existing and future nuclear material and activities in that country. In the case of nuclear-weapon states, AONM must be covered by safeguards arrangements under that country's safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and is limited to use for civil (i.e. non-military) purposes.
The principal conditions for the use of AONM set out in Australia's nuclear cooperation agreements are:
- AONM will be used only for peaceful purposes and will not be diverted to military or explosive purposes (here 'military purpose' includes: nuclear weapons; any nuclear explosive device; military nuclear reactors; military propulsion; depleted uranium munitions; and tritium production for nuclear weapons)
- IAEA safeguards will apply
- Australia's prior consent will be sought for transfers of AONM to third parties, enrichment to 20 per cent or more in the isotope 235U, and reprocessing5
- fall-back safeguards or contingency arrangements will apply if for any reason NPT or IAEA safeguards cease to apply in the country concerned
- internationally agreed standards of physical security will be applied to AONM in the country concerned
- detailed administrative arrangements will apply between ASNO and its counterpart organisation, setting out the procedures to apply in accounting for AONM
- regular consultations on the operation of the agreement will be undertaken
- provision will be made for the removal of AONM in the event of a breach of the agreement.
Australia currently has 25 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements in force, covering 43 countries plus Taiwan.6
Accounting for Australian Uranium
Australia's bilateral partners holding AONM are required to maintain detailed records of transactions involving AONM. In addition, counterpart organisations in bilateral partner countries are required to submit regular reports, consent requests, and transfer and receipt documentation to ASNO.
ASNO accounts for AONM on the basis of information and knowledge including:
- reports from each bilateral partner
- shipping and transfer documentation
- calculations of process losses, nuclear consumption, and nuclear production
- knowledge of the fuel cycle in each country
- regular liaison with, and reconciliation and bilateral visits to, counterpart organisations
- regular liaison with industry
- IAEA safeguards activities and IAEA conclusions on each country.
Australia's Uranium Transhipment Security Policy
For States with which Australia does not have a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in force, but through which Australian uranium ore concentrates (UOC) are transhipped, there must be arrangements in place with those States to ensure the security of UOC during transhipment. If the State:
- is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
- has a safeguards agreement and adopted the IAEA's Additional Protocol on strengthened safeguards
- acts in accordance with these agreements;
then arrangements on appropriate security can be set out in an instrument with less than treaty status.7 Any arrangements of this kind are subject to risk assessments of port security. For States that do not meet the above requirements, treaty-level arrangements on appropriate security may be required.
4 On October 2012, the Australian Government announced that it would exempt India from its policy allowing supply of Australian uranium only to those States that are Parties to the NPT.
5 Australia has given reprocessing consent on a programmatic basis to EURATOM and Japan. Separated Australian-obligated plutonium is intended for blending with uranium into mixed oxide fuel (MOX) for further use for nuclear power generation.
6 Euratom is the European Atomic Energy Community. The Australia-Euratom NCA covers all 27 Member States of the European Union.
7 See page 26 of ASNO's 2008–09 Annual Report for more details on the establishment of this policy.