Appendix D: IAEA Statements of Conclusions and Other Inspection Findings for Australia in 2021–22
IAEA Inspection Regime in Australia
The IAEA conducts verification activities (under different names, but all essentially inspections) in Australia under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement8 and under the Additional Protocol,9 with the scope and focus differing between these two agreements.
Under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement the IAEA conducts inspections to verify nuclear material inventory and facility design features. There are four types of inspection conducted in Australia each year under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement:
- Physical inventory verification (PIV): a scheduled inspection in a selected material balance area (MBA)10 to verify the stocktake of physical inventory (known as a physical inventory taking) from that MBA. PIVs involve a more complete verification of inventory than short notice random inspections (SNRI,11 see below). The frequency of PIVs depends on the types and quantities of nuclear material held in each MBA. In Australia's case, PIVs are scheduled annually for the OPAL reactor (AS-F), ANSTO's R&D laboratories (AS-C), and ANSTO's storage areas (AS-D). PIVs for each MBA are scheduled together each year so the IAEA can complete all with one visit to Australia. In total these usually take five days to complete in conjunction with DIVs (see below). For MBAs AS-E, ASE1, ASE2 and AS-I, the IAEA schedules a PIV approximately once every four years for AS-E/ASE1/ASE2 combined, selecting one location (usually a university) taken as a representative sample of all such locations; and once every four years for one of CSIRO's locations in MBA AS-I. These PIVs are usually conducted in one day.
- Interim inventory verification (IIV): an inspection in a selected MBA to verify specific types of nuclear material, scheduled at a time other than the PIV. The IAEA conducted an IIV at ANSTO's R&D laboratories (AS-C) in August 2020 to measure the uranium content in solid waste from molybdenum–99 (Mo–99) radiopharmaceutical production using an active well coincidence counter (AWCC). It is anticipated that the IAEA will schedule an IIV approximately once every two years for AS-C.
- Short notice random inspection (SNRI): an inspection called by the IAEA at a random time with limited notice. The IAEA calls an SNRI once or twice each year at the OPAL reactor with three hours' notice to ASNO and ANSTO. These inspections usually last for one or two days.
- Design information verification (DIV): an inspection to verify the correctness and completeness of the design features of a facility relevant to the application of safeguards. The IAEA typically conducts a few DIVs together with annual PIVs.
Under the Additional Protocol the IAEA has the right to conduct verification activities (essentially inspections) known as complementary access. A complementary access may have three purposes:
- assuring the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia (Article 4.a.i);
- resolving any questions or inconsistencies related to the correctness and completeness of Australia's declarations under the Additional Protocol (Article 4.a.ii); or,
- confirming the decommissioned status of a facility (Article 4.a.iii).
The IAEA has conducted a total of 90 complementary accesses in Australia since 1998.
Article 4.a.i complementary accesses are the most common. Since 1998 the IAEA has conducted only two complementary accesses under article 4.a.ii, and one under Article 4.a.iii. Complementary access activities called while IAEA inspectors are already on the Lucas Heights site for other inspections (e.g. at ANSTO) can be conducted at any building on site with two hours' notice. Complementary access activities for locations outside Lucas Heights (e.g. universities, uranium mines) require a minimum of 24 hours' notice, however given the considerable distances in Australia are often issued with several days' notice. The IAEA typically conducts two to three complementary access activities in Australia each year, a few at buildings at Lucas Heights, and one outside of Lucas Heights.
IAEA Conclusions on Australia's Compliance
The IAEA's conclusions for Australia are provided at two levels: the IAEA's overarching summary of findings and conclusions published in the IAEA's Safeguards Statement for 2021 (see Appendix E) for all States with safeguards agreements with the IAEA, including Australia; and the statements of conclusions of inspections in Australia.
The highest level conclusion the IAEA draws, known as the 'broader conclusion', is in paragraph 1(a) of the Safeguards Statement:
'the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.'
Australia is on the list of countries covered by the IAEA's broader conclusion in the Safeguards Statement for 2021. Australia was the first country to receive the 'broader conclusion' in 2000 and has received it every year since.
The IAEA's statements of conclusions related to inspections in Australia are provided in several ways:
- Article 91(a) of Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: the results of inspections at individual material balance areas (MBAs).
- Article 91(b) of Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: the conclusions the IAEA has drawn from all its verification activities (headquarters analysis and inspections) in Australia for each individual MBA.12
- Statement of results of design information verification activities (DIVs).
- Article 10.a of the Additional Protocol: Statement on complementary access activities undertaken.
- Article 10.b of the Additional Protocol: Statement of results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the IAEA has raised with Australia.
- Article 10.c of the Additional Protocol: Statement on the conclusions the IAEA has drawn from all complementary access activities.
IAEA Conclusions and Findings for Each Material Balance Area
Material balance area: AS-C (research and development laboratories)
Material balance period: 4 June 2020–3 June 2021
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interim Inventory Verification | 24–27 August 2020 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 27 October 2020 |
| Design Information Verification | 30 April 2021 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 24 May 2021 |
| Physical Inventory Verification | 4, 8 and 9 June 2021 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 27 July 2021 |
| Design Information Verification | 4, 8 and 9 June 2021 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 27 July 2021 |
|
91(b) Statement of Conclusions (10 September 2021) |
"The IAEA has concluded from its verification activities carried out at AS-C during the material balance period from 4 June 2020 to 3 June 2021, and based on the information available to date in connection with such activities, that all declared nuclear material has been accounted for and that there were no indications of the undeclared presence, production or processing of nuclear material." | |||
Material balance area: AS-C (research and development laboratories)
Material balance period: 4 June 2021–18 May 2022
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Physical Inventory Verification | 19–20 May 2022 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 22 July 2022 |
| Design Information Verification | 19, 20 and 23 May 2022 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 22 July 2022 |
| 91(b) Statement of Conclusions | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | |||
Material balance area: AS-D (vault storage)
Material balance period: 3 June 2020–8 June 2021
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Physical Inventory Verification | 9 June 2021 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 12 August 2021 |
| Design Information Verification | 9 June 2021 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 12 August 2021 |
|
91(b) Statement of Conclusions (3 September 2021) |
The IAEA has concluded from its verification activities carried out at AS-D during the material balance period from 3 June 2020 to 8 June 2021, and based on the information available to date in connection with such activities, that all declared nuclear material has been accounted for and that there were no indications of the undeclared presence, production or processing of nuclear material. | |||
Material balance area: AS-D (vault storage)
Material balance period: 9 June 2021–17 May 2022
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Physical Inventory Verification | 18 May 2022 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 1 July 2022 |
| Design Information Verification | 18 May 2022 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 1 July 2022 |
| 91(b) Statement of Conclusions | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | |||
Material balance area: AS-F (OPAL)
Material balance period: 2 June 2020–6 June 2021
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Short Notice Random Inspection | 28 April 2021 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 28 May 2021 |
| Physical Inventory Verification | 7 June 2021 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 27 July 2021 |
| Design Information Verification | 7 June 2021 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 27 July 2021 |
|
91(b) Statement of Conclusions (24 September 2021) |
"The IAEA has concluded from its verification activities carried out at AS-F during the material balance period from 2 June 2020 to 6 June 2021, and based on the information available to date in connection with such activities, that all declared nuclear material has been accounted for and that there were no indications of the undeclared presence, production or processing of nuclear material." | |||
Material balance area: AS-F (OPAL)
Material balance period: 7 June 2021–16 May 2022
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Short Notice Random Inspection | 8 December 2021 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 7 February 2022 |
| Physical Inventory Verification | 17 May 2022 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 16 August 2022 |
| Design Information Verification | 17 May 2022 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 16 August 2022 |
| 91(b) Statement of Conclusions | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | |||
Material balance area: AS-H (SyMo)
Material balance period: N/A (nil nuclear material present)
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Design Information Verification | 23 May 2022 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 25 July 2022 |
Additional Protocol Assessment Period: 1 January 2021– 31 December 2021
| Date of Complementary Access (CA) | Location | 10(a) Statement of activities | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|
| 28 April 2021 | Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre: Buildings 80, 54 | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 18 June 2021 |
| 29 April 2021 | Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre: Buildings 88, 23A/B, 76 | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 18 June 2021 |
| 11 June 2021 | CSIRO – Lucas Heights, NSW | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 7 July 2021 |
| 15 June 2021 | Honeymoon uranium mine (in care and maintenance, Boss Uranium) | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 7 July 2021 |
| 9 December 2021 | Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre: 64, 64B, 64C, 64D | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 3 February 2022 |
| 9 December 2021 | Silex Systems Ltd – Lucas Heights, NSW | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 3 February 2022 |
|
10(b) Statement of Activities (14 October 2021) |
Thank you for the letter dated 6 September 2021 clarifying the activities at [named hospital]. ASNO's detailed description of the shielded cells at [named hospital] and the accompanying analysis of the cells' characteristics is sincerely appreciated. Based on the provided information, the IAEA could assess that the shielded cells do not meet the definition of hot cells as defined in the Additional Protocol Annex 1 paragraph XV. | ||
|
10(c) Statement of Conclusions (9 March 2022) |
"The IAEA has concluded from its activities carried out during this period, and based on the information available to date in connection with such activities that access pursuant to Article 4.a.(i) did not indicate the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities at:
|
||
Additional Protocol Assessment Period: 1 January 2022– 31 December 2022
| Date of Complementary Access (CA) | Location | 10(a) Statement of activities | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 May 2022 | Department of Defence waste store | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 28 June 2022 |
| 12 May 2022 | Olympic Dam mine | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 23 June 2022 |
| 25 May 2022 | Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre: Building 3 | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 27 July 2022 |
| 10(c) Statement of Conclusions | 10(c) statements of conclusions are provided early in the year following the assessment period | ||
8 See Schedule 3 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987.
9 Published in IAEA document INFCIRC/217/Add.1 based on the model in INFCIRC/540 (corrected).
10 Australia's material balance areas for IAEA safeguards are described in Table 3 in Output 1.1.
11 ASNO uses the term 'short notice random inspections' for these inspections because they are performed on short notice on a date chosen by the IAEA at random. These inspections may also be referred to as 'random interim inspections' because they do not coincide with the ending date of a material balance period.
12 Note: under the standard NPT safeguards agreement printed in IAEA document INFCIRC/153 these provisions are in paragraphs 90(a) and 90(b). Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement has an additional paragraph that is not in INFCIRC/153.
