The Year in Review
The International Non-Proliferation Environment
Non-proliferation challenges escalated during the 2020–21 reporting period, highlighting further the importance of global non-proliferation efforts and the need for continued engagement in work towards the ultimate goal of eliminating chemical and nuclear weapons.
In December 2020, Iran escalated its stepwise rollbacks of cooperation under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by passing a law called "Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect Iranian Nation's Interests". This led to the cessation of what Iran has called "voluntary transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA" in February 2021, including provisions of the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran also declared it would no longer implement modified code 3.11 of the subsidiary arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. This severely curtailed the IAEA's access to sites, verification tools and information required to assure the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran. Over the period 1 January – 8 March 2021, the IAEA issued no fewer than ten reports on Iranian nuclear activities, including on uranium enrichment up to 20 per cent, research and development on uranium metal, and increased numbers of centrifuge cascades installed and used for nuclear enrichment activities.
On 21 February 2021, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the IAEA reached a temporary bilateral technical understanding, whereby the IAEA would continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities for up to three months, as set out in a technical annex. The technical understanding was later extended to 24 June 2021. On 13 April 2021, Iran informed the IAEA of its intention to start producing 60 per cent enriched uranium and, by 11 May 2021, the IAEA reported its analysis showing enrichment levels up to 63 per cent. Producing uranium at such high enrichments significantly reduces the breakout time to producing 90 per cent weapons-grade uranium.
Aside from reporting on the JCPOA, the IAEA Director General reported on findings2 in relation to four undeclared locations in Iran with respect to Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The report noted that following inspections, Iran had failed to provide necessary, full and technically credible explanations for the presence of nuclear material particles at those sites. The IAEA registered its deep concerns that undeclared nuclear material may have been present at these undeclared locations. The IAEA also reiterated that implementation of modified code 3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under the subsidiary arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement which cannot be modified unilaterally and there is no mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of implementation of provisions agreed to in the subsidiary arrangements.
By the end of June 2021, six rounds of indirect talks on the JCPOA (between the Parties of the JCPOA and the United States) had taken place, the seventh seemingly pending the inauguration of Iran's President elect, Ebrahim Raisi.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continued its WMD-related activities and posed a direct threat through the build-up of its arsenal and proliferation activities. Satellite imagery of the DPRK's Nuclear Scientific Research Centre at Yongbyon provided evidence that the centre's Radiochemical Laboratory may have recommenced spent fuel reprocessing to extract plutonium in February 2021. The 5 MWe nuclear reactor at Yongbyon that provides spent fuel for reprocessing has not operated since December 2018, based on analysis of satellite imagery. The time between the last observed operation of the 5 MWe reactor and the start-up of the Radiochemical Laboratory would provide some time for the spent fuel to cool before reprocessing. In addition, the DPRK continues to test reportedly WMD-capable delivery vehicles including in March 2021, tests of solid-propellant short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), highlighting the DPRK threat to its near neighbours, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan.
Sanctions on the DPRK have not stopped Kim Jong Un's regime from developing WMD and have likely not stopped the regime's attempts to trade in WMD-related goods and technology, but they have certainly made it more difficult. The Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 reported in March 2021, allegations of technical cooperation between the DPRK and Iran on long-range ballistic missile development. The Panel also reported on DPRK efforts to procure key items for its ballistic missile program.
During the 2020–21 reporting year, ASNO assessed that the IAEA continued to effectively fulfil its objective of verifying that States are upholding their respective nuclear non-proliferation commitments, using the tools available under safeguards agreements and under the Additional Protocol (where in place). In its verification activities, the IAEA uses a combination of in-field inspections of nuclear material, facilities, and related activities, as well as analysis of information at its headquarters in Vienna.
The IAEA has continued to draw soundly based safeguards conclusions for States with safeguards agreements. In 2020, Libya regained the broader conclusion3 (lost in 2019) through the implementation of safeguards activities there. Ukraine lost its broader conclusion as circumstances there prevented the IAEA from verifying certain nuclear materials in Crimea. Notwithstanding the loss of the broader conclusion, on the basis of the IAEA's evaluation of all safeguards relevant information available, the IAEA did not find indications that would give rise to proliferation concern.
The IAEA has overcome COVID-related travel disruptions to continue conducting safeguards inspections worldwide, including at the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO). Australia strongly supports the continued application of safeguards, as a cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, while fulfilling local health requirements to prevent the spread of COVID–19.
Plans to develop new nuclear power reactors plummeted globally following the Fukushima Daiichi accident in March 2011, but ten years later interest in nuclear power as a zero-carbon emission energy source has increased. There are approximately 50 nuclear power reactors under construction in 19 countries and many more are planned or proposed. The expansion of interest in nuclear reactors makes clear the ongoing importance of reinforcing key principles of non-proliferation and the need to ensure that sensitive nuclear technologies such as uranium enrichment are managed to minimise proliferation risks. This includes ensuring that nuclear safeguards and monitoring are fully supported, and the IAEA is appropriately resourced for this important work, including the ongoing development of safeguards systems and technologies.
Recent use of chemical weapons continued to be addressed by the international community. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) concluded in April 2021 that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Syrian Arab Air Force, under the control of the Tiger Forces, dropped at least one cylinder of chlorine on eastern Saraqib on 4 February 2018. The OPCW found that the cylinder ruptured and released chlorine over a large area, affecting 12 individuals. Syria is a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and it is imperative that Syria uphold its obligations under the Convention.
At the 25th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC in April 2021, the Conference suspended certain rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Convention. The Decision was co-sponsored by 46 Member States, including Australia, and condemned "in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons by anyone, under any circumstances, emphasising that any use of chemical weapons […] is unacceptable and contravenes international norms and standards".
In August 2020, Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny, was poisoned by a nerve-agent from the Novichok class. The finding was confirmed by an OPCW Technical Assistance Visit in September 2020 and three independent laboratories. Serious questions remain regarding how a person came to be exposed to a dangerous nerve agent on the territory of a State Party to the CWC.
Australia's engagement with the OPCW continues with its two-year term on the OPCW Executive Council extending until May 2022.
Australia's continuing commitment to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and ASNO's contribution to the work of that organisation was underlined with the election of Dr Robert Floyd as Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in May 2021. Dr Floyd achieved the support of two-thirds of CTBTO Member States following an extended campaign. Dr Floyd served as the Director General ASNO for more than ten years (from 29 November 2010) and commenced as CTBTO Executive Secretary on 1 August 2021. We know the CTBTO will be in good hands and we wish Rob all the best in his new role.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Developments
International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards
Australia uses its expertise and resources to make tangible contributions to developing safeguards technology and approaches, delivering safeguards training, and providing technical services. ASNO coordinates the Australian Safeguards Support Program (ASSP), which comprises long-standing partnerships between the IAEA and Australian government agencies, ANSTO, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Australian universities and private companies. Increasingly, the ASSP is also helping the IAEA apply knowledge from technical fields that evolved for applications quite unrelated to safeguards, such as data analytics and robotics. In 2021, ASNO accepted an opportunity to contribute to the IAEA's new COMPASS initiative (see Output 1.4).
IAEA safeguards are fundamentally about maintaining international confidence in the compliance of States with non-proliferation commitments, so there is an important role for States to assist each other in maintaining effective domestic systems and promoting good practice. The IAEA continues to work with States to address specific issues and conduct outreach and awareness-raising activities through workshops and meetings. Australia plays a role in regional capacity building and experience sharing through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN). Dr Floyd also contributed to reviews of approaches to safeguards implementation through his role as chair of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) until June 2021. ASNO's work in these areas is outlined in Output 1.4.
Domestic Developments
In 2021, the IAEA continued to report that it found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia. The IAEA has drawn this 'broader conclusion' that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities for Australia every year since 2000.
During the reporting period, the IAEA conducted various verification activities (i.e. inspections) in Australia under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. As it did in June 2020, ASNO worked with the IAEA and Commonwealth and NSW agencies to overcome challenges posed by COVID–19 restrictions to hold inspections in Australia in August 2020, April 2021 and June 2021. For each visit, the IAEA inspectors spent two weeks in quarantine in Sydney before carrying out the inspections. Additional health and safety measures were applied during the inspections. In total, sixteen separate IAEA inspections were carried out, mostly at ANSTO. The inspectors were able to meet their inspection goals while fulfilling national and state health requirements. The IAEA's findings (where available at the time of publication of this Annual Report) are described in Output 1.1 and Appendix B.
Another focus of ASNO's work was contributing to the Australian Radioactive Waste Agency's (ARWA's) National Radioactive Waste Management Facility (NRWMF) project. ASNO assisted ARWA in their efforts to establish a Common National Inventory for Radioactive Waste which will help ensure the NRWMF can manage the types and quantities of radioactive waste anticipated.
Nuclear Security Developments
Despite ongoing travel and logistical difficulties due to the COVID–19 pandemic, ASNO conducted eight nuclear security inspections and visits including at ANSTO, SILEX, Ranger and Olympic Dam uranium mines and uranium ore concentrate (UOC) transporters. These are described in detail in Output 1.2.
For the fifth time in succession, Australia ranked first globally on the Nuclear Threat Initiative's (NTI) 2020 Nuclear Security Index4, having also improved our performance measures since 2018. Australia was ranked first for measures against the theft of nuclear material among 24 states with more than one kilogram of high enriched uranium or separated plutonium. Australia also ranked first out of 47 states for measures to prevent the sabotage of nuclear facilities.
The preparatory process for the Article 16 Conference of States Parties for the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) continued in 2020 and 2021. Dr Floyd co-chaired the Preparatory Commission meetings with Mr Vilmos Cserveny of Hungary. Despite the delays in holding the Review Conference, it was heartening to see the desire of all States Parties to the A/CPPNM for a thorough and robust review process. The process was positively concluded in early 2021 and the work will be continued by the designated Co-Presidents of the Review Conference.
Bilateral Safeguards Developments
During 2020–21, all Australian Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM) was accounted for in accordance with the procedures and standards prescribed in Australia's network of 25 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCAs) covering 43 countries, plus Taiwan.
All NCAs contain treaty level assurances that AONM will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and be covered by IAEA safeguards. Each NCA also requires that appropriate nuclear security measures are applied to AONM exported overseas, in addition to a number of supplementary conditions.
On 1 January 2021, the new Australia – United Kingdom NCA entered into force, and ASNO has subsequently conducted bilateral transfer reporting with its UK counterpart agency, the Office for Nuclear Regulation. In February 2021, the last export of UOC from ERA's Ranger uranium mine in the Northern Territory was shipped from Australia; and in April 2021, ASNO facilitated the first transfer of AONM, within fuel elements manufactured in Sweden, to Ukraine.
Chemical Weapons Convention Developments
Domestic Developments
During the reporting year ASNO submitted timely annual declarations to the OPCW in accordance with the requirements of the CWC. The declarations included details of Australia's CWC-related chemical trade and other relevant chemical activities within industry and laboratories, as well as national programs for assistance and protection against chemical weapons.
ASNO facilitated routine OPCW inspections at Australia's declared Schedule 1 facility for protective purposes in Victoria and at one 'Other Chemical Production Facility' in Queensland. ASNO worked closely with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to facilitate the requirement for the inspectors to quarantine on arrival in Australia. These inspections bring the total number of inspections in Australia to 62 since CWC entry-into-force in 1997. The OPCW inspection team confirmed the veracity of Australia's declared information, including amendments made to past declarations. The OPCW inspection team also verified the absence of any undeclared CWC-Schedule 1 chemical production.
ASNO's 2019–20 Annual Report noted the commencement of a software development project to create a new database and portal to support Australia's CWC reporting obligations. Work to replace the current system during the reporting period were unsuccessful; the requirement to develop the system on a different platform was recognised. ASNO will continue to work with DFAT's Information Management and Technology Division to develop a new database system with an industry accessible online portal to improve both the end-user stakeholder experience and the efficiency of ASNO's regulatory function.
ASNO continued to help inform Australia's policy positions through the provision of technical advice on CWC and verification-related issues. Efforts to rid the world of chemical weapons, and to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction more broadly, involve many domestic and international stakeholders operating within a complex and contested strategic environment.
International Developments
As of June 2021, the CWC has a membership of 193 States Parties, leaving only four countries yet to join: Israel (signed but not ratified), Egypt, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and South Sudan. Of the member States Parties, 119 (including Australia) have enacted comprehensive implementing legislation required to reduce the threat of the use of chemical weapons including by non-State actors.
The OPCW strives to achieve the goal to eliminate chemical weapons whilst encouraging the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes. To achieve these goals, the OPCW conducts a number of activities with a focus on verification.
The OPCW oversees the destruction of chemical weapons and related sites. The OPCW Inspectorate has conducted over 3000 inspections at chemical weapon related sites including of chemical stockpiles, old chemical weapons, manufacturing facilities and destruction facilities. Since the CWC entered into force in 1997, the OPCW has overseen the destruction of 98.7 per cent of the world's declared chemical weapons stockpiles and ensured that all 97 declared chemical weapons manufacturing facilities have either been destroyed or converted for peaceful purposes.
To facilitate the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes, the OPCW conducts regular inspections of industrial facilities, ensuring that chemicals have not been diverted into the manufacture of chemical weapons. The OPCW inspectorate has conducted 4,134 inspections of industrial chemical facilities in 80 States Parties. These routine inspections ensure that the global chemical industry operates within parameters agreed to by the CWC States Parties. In addition to routine inspections, the OPCW has extended its resources by conducting investigations into allegations of chemical weapons use.
ASNO, as Australia's national authority for the implementation of the CWC, works closely with the OPCW. As the OPCW continues the core work of overseeing the implementation of the CWC worldwide, it has also been challenged by recent uses of chemical weapons: the use of VX in Malaysia in 2017; the use of a Novichok nerve agent in the United Kingdom in 2018; and attributed use of chemical weapons in Syria. Most recently, in August 2020, Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny was poisoned by a nerve-agent of the Novichok group, a finding that was confirmed by an OPCW Technical Assistance Visit and three independent laboratories. Throughout the 2021–22 reporting period, the OPCW has worked to address these issues whilst continuing to support States Parties through essential training, capacity building and technical assistance.
During the reporting period, the Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) Chemical Agents Analysis Facility was accredited by the OPCW as a Designated Laboratory for Environmental Samples, one of 23 within the OPCW's network of laboratories. DSTG's laboratory has been accredited as an OPCW Designated Laboratory for Biomedical Samples since 2016. The DSTG laboratory is one of 13 within the OPCW network with both accreditations, making it eligible to receive biomedical and environmental samples for analysis following routine or challenge inspections, or to verify incidents of alleged use of chemical warfare agents.
Against the backdrop of the COVID–19 pandemic, technical and logistical challenges have been overcome in convening key meetings such as the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) to the CWC. The 25th CSP was split into two parts in November 2020 and April 2021. The OPCW and States Parties have been able to adapt to the challenges of COVID–19 and continue to progress important CWC issues.
During 2020 and 2021, the OPCW's Fact Finding Mission (FFM) issued two reports on its investigation regarding separate incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon on 1 August 2016 and 24 November 2018. The reports indicated that the available information did not allow the FFM to determine if chemicals were used as weapons or not, on either occasion.
On 12 April 2021 the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which has the mandate to determine responsibility for chemical weapons attacks, released its second report which focused on an incident in Saraqib on 4 February 2018. The IIT based its assessment on interviews with witnesses, review of medical reports, analysis of samples collected from the sites of the incidents, examination of imagery including satellite imagery, and consultation with experts. The IIT concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Syrian Arab Air Force, under the control of the Tiger Forces, was responsible for dropping the cylinder.
At the 25th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC, the Conference adopted a Decision to suspend certain rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Convention. The Decision was co-sponsored by 46 Member States. Australia supported this decision to urge Syria to come into compliance with its Convention obligations.
Australia has long advocated for State Party consideration of Central Nervous System Acting Chemicals (CNSACS). In March 2021, the Executive Council adopted the decision entitled "Understanding Regarding the Aerosolised Use of Central Nervous System Acting Chemicals for Law Enforcement Purposes". The decision will be considered at the 26th Conference of the States Parties, due to be held in November 2021. The years of consultation with States Parties has resulted in a strong and balanced Executive Council decision which will contribute to a safer world.
In 2017, it was recognised that the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store required replacement if it was to continue to support OPCW core capabilities in the evolving chemical weapons threat environment. The OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store was designed to support OPCW missions and other verification activities, and to support international cooperation and assistance activities. More recently, there has been an increased demand to respond to the emergence of new chemical threats, which requires the development of new and improved verification tools and expanded capabilities to conduct non-routine missions. A plan to replace the current facility with a purpose-built facility was announced in 2017. The new facility, to be known as the ChemTech Centre5, has an estimated cost of AUD55 million. This cost has already been met by donations from States Parties, including Australia's donation of AUD200,000 in 2020. The main construction contract was signed in April 2021, with construction activities starting in June and operation due to commence at the end of 2022.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Although the CTBT is not yet in force, it is a uniquely valuable element of the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture and has strong support in the great majority of countries. More than 90 per cent of International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities are operating, including all those that Australia has committed to host (see Output 1.6). The IMS and the International Data Centre, which provides IMS data and products to Member States, have continued to function well in the face of disruptions caused by COVID–19.
While international travel remained restricted, new ways were found for Member States and their technical experts to meet to advance the work of the CTBTO. Australian experts have continued to engage with the CTBTO using online tools.
A number of important activities have had to be deferred. Every few years the CTBTO conducts field exercises to help test equipment and procedures for conducting an on-site inspection, thereby increasing preparedness for entry into force of the CTBT. These were scheduled to take place in 2020 but may be delayed by up to several years.
Other Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Activities
International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification
The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) was formed in 2015 to bring together both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states under a cooperative framework to further understand and find solutions to the complex challenges involved in the verification of future nuclear disarmament. IPNDV engages a wide range of states in its work, including three of the five NPT Nuclear Weapons States.
Although physical meetings of IPNDV partners have been disrupted by COVID–19, the commitment and enthusiasm of partner countries to advance this area of work remained strong. During the reporting period, two virtual exercises were conducted to test and refine inspection concepts around a detailed fictional scenario. In that scenario, a state commits to verifiably dismantle a significant proportion of its nuclear warheads. Ongoing work is carried out by two task groups and a 'technology stream'. During the year, ASNO's Malcolm Coxhead replaced Dr Floyd as a co-chair of one of the task groups.
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
A verifiable ban on production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is widely seen as one of the practical steps that could be taken toward nuclear disarmament. However, an impasse in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has prevented negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Australia has actively supported initiatives to advance international discussions on an FMCT, both to promote the commencement of negotiations, and to develop proposals that could assist negotiators. ASNO continues to support efforts by DFAT to advance these objectives.
1 Modified Code 3.1 requires countries to submit design information for new nuclear facilities to the IAEA as soon as the decision is made to construct, or authorize construction, of the facility.
2 Report by the Director General, NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2021/15 and GOV/2021/29 IAEA.
3 The IAEA can draw the "broader conclusion" for a State as a whole that "all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities". This is a more fulsome assessment for a State than "declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities". See also Appendix C.
4 https://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/2020-nti-nuclear-security-index/
5 https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/featured-topics/chemtech-centre, OPCW.
