Output 1.1: National Safeguards System

Operation of Australia's national system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material, items and facilities.

Performance Measures

• Australia continues to receive the broader conclusion that 'all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities' from the IAEA.
• Australia's obligations are met under Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
• Australia's system of safeguards permits and authorities is administered in a timely and effective manner.
• The quantities, categories, locations and intended end-uses of nuclear material and associated items within Australia are accounted for.

Performance Assessment

International Obligations

Reporting Obligations under the Australia – IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

During the reporting period, ASNO submitted all reports, declarations and notifications to the IAEA on nuclear materials, facilities and activities, ensuring that Australia met its obligations under its safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

Table 3: Material Balance Areas (MBAs) in Australia for IAEA safeguards purposes

Location	Material balance area (MBA)	Name of facility or location outside facility (as designated in Australia's subsidiary arrangements with the IAEA)
Lucas Heights	AS-A	HIFAR (Note: de-fuelled in 2007)
Lucas Heights	AS-C	Research and development laboratories
Lucas Heights	AS-D	Vault storage
Elsewhere	AS-E	Other locations in Australia (e.g. universities, industrial radiography companies, hospitals)
Elsewhere	ASE1	Other locations in Australia (e.g. universities, industrial radiography companies, hospitals)
Lucas Heights	AS-F	OPAL reactor
Lucas Heights	AS-H	Synroc waste immobilisation (SyMo) plant
CSIRO (various sites)	AS-I	CSIRO

Table 4: Number of line entries in inventory and inventory change reports submitted by ASNO to the IAEA for each MBA

Location/facility	MBA	2018–19	2019–20	2020–21
HIFAR (de-fuelled 2007)	AS-A	0	0	0
ANSTO research laboratories	AS-C	997	494	681
ANSTO vault storage	AS-D	336	280	297
Other locations	AS-E ASE1 AS-I	2,405	2,315	2,359
OPAL reactor	AS-F	343	122	179
Total		4,081	3,211	3,516

Table 5: Number of line entries (by report type) submitted by ASNO to the IAEA across all MBAs

Type of data	2018–19	2019–20	2020–21
Inventory Change Report (monthly)	1,449	605	862
Physical Inventory Listing (annual)	2,422	2,447	2,470
Material Balance Report (annual)	210	159	184

For each material balance area (summarised in Table 3), ASNO provided reports to the IAEA as required by the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Report statistics are summarised in Tables 4 and 5. The high number of reports in Table 4 attributed to 'other locations' primarily relates to small holdings of uranium and thorium compounds at universities and research institutions.

Table 6 is a summary of total quantities of nuclear material by category in Australia. A small quantity (2.7 kg) of ²³⁵U in high enriched uranium is retained in Australia and used for a variety of purposes primarily due to the utility of the particular chemical, physical and isotopic characteristics. Typical uses of this material include: research and development related to nuclear non-proliferation activities; validating the commercial application of ANSTO's Synroc waste immobilisation technology; nuclear forensics for identifying illicit nuclear materials; development of detection technologies and chemistry work. The quantity comprises several items in various locations around Australia such as ANSTO and some universities.

Table 6: Nuclear Material in Australia at 30 June 2021

Category	Quantity	Intended end-use
Source Material
Uranium Ore Concentrates (UOC)	1,165 tonnes	Export for energy use pursuant to bilateral agreements
	3.5 tonnes	Storage
Natural Uranium (other than UOC)	4,485 kg	Research, storage
Depleted Uranium	28,276 kg	Research, shielding
Thorium Ore Residues	59 tonnes	Storage/disposal
Thorium (other than Thorium Ore Residues)	1,935 kg	Research, industry
Special Fissionable Material
235U – low enriched	194,666 grams1	Research, radioisotope production, storage
235U – high enriched	2,747 grams	Research, storage
233U	3.8 grams	Research
Plutonium (other than 238Pu)	1,203 grams	Research, neutron sources

As well as requiring reporting on nuclear material inventory and transactions, the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement also requires reporting on design and operational attributes (relevant to safeguards) of nuclear facilities. This information is provided to the IAEA in Design Information Questionnaires (DIQs) for each facility MBA, and in the case of MBAs for locations outside facilities (LOFs), in LOF information questionnaires. No DIQs were updated during the reporting period.

The Safeguards Act requires permits for possession of nuclear material, as well as associated material, associated equipment and associated technology (collectively termed associated items). Permits for associated items ensure Australia can maintain regulatory controls on technology, equipment and material with potential proliferation risks, can report on design attributes for DIQs, and meet other reporting obligations under various nuclear cooperation agreements. Table 7 lists the inventory of associated items in Australia.

Table 7: Associated Items² in Australia at 30 June 2021

Category	Quantity	Intended end-use
Associated Material
Deuterium and heavy water	20.9 tonnes	Research, reactors
Nuclear grade graphite	83.4 tonnes	Research and storage
Associated Equipment
HIFAR3	1	Reactor
HIFAR coarse control arms (unused)	5	Reactor components
HIFAR coarse control arms (used)	14	Reactor components
HIFAR safety rods	3	Reactor components
HIFAR fuel charging and discharging machines	2	Reactor components
OPAL reactor4	1	Reactor
OPAL control rods	14	Reactor components
OPAL control rod drives	6	Reactor components
Nuclear-grade zirconium tubes	<50 kgs	R&D and storage

Reporting Obligations under the Australia– IAEA Additional Protocol

The Additional Protocol gives the IAEA greater access to information and locations related to nuclear fuel cycle activities, thereby allowing the IAEA to provide greater assurances not only that all declared nuclear material is accounted for, but also that states do not have any undeclared nuclear material or activities. Australia was the first country to sign and ratify an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, which came into force for Australia on 12 December 1997.

ASNO prepares and provides annual declarations under a range of Additional Protocol categories, as well as quarterly declarations on relevant exports. Table 8 lists the number of entries made under each category. An important aspect of the Additional Protocol is reporting to the IAEA on nuclear fuel cycle related research and development activities. ASNO ensured that all IAEA requirements were met during the reporting period with respect to nuclear research and development.

Table 8: Number of entries made under the Additional Protocol

Type of Declaration under Article 2.a and 2.b of the Additional Protocol	2016 –17	2017 –18	2018 –19	2019 –20	2020 –21
2.a.i Government funded, authorised or controlled nuclear fuel cycle- related research and development activities not involving nuclear material	8	10	13	16	15
2.a.ii OPAL operational schedules	2	1	1	1	1
2.a.iii General description of each building on each site, e.g. ANSTO, universities	289	274	273	267	259
2.a.iv Manufacturing or construction of specified nuclear related equipment	2	2	0	1	1
2.a.v Location, operational status and production capacity of uranium or thorium mines or concentration plants	4	65	6	6	6
2.a.vi Information on source material that is not of a composition or purity that requires full IAEA safeguards requirements	7	7	7	7	7
2.a.vii Information on nuclear material exempted from Safeguards	4	4	4	4	4
2.a.viii Information related to the further processing of intermediate or high- level waste containing plutonium	2	2	2	2	2
2.a.ix Exports or imports of nuclear- related equipment listed in Annex II of the Additional Protocol	-	-	-	-	-
2.a.x General 10-year plans related to nuclear fuel cycle activities	4	4	56	5	5
2.b.i Nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear material and not funded, authorised or controlled by the Government	-	-	-	-	-

Safeguards Developments in Australia

The IAEA implements safeguards in Australia in accordance with the provisions in a range of legal instruments: the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; Additional Protocol; Subsidiary Arrangements; facility attachments and LOF attachments for each material balance area (MBA). Australia's MBAs are described in Table 3. The overarching framework the IAEA uses to prioritise and optimise various in-field verification and headquarters (i.e. at the IAEA) analysis activities under these instruments is the State-level approach (SLA) for Australia, which the IAEA updated in 2016 and is currently reviewing under the IAEA's SLA Improvement Project.

In Australia, the IAEA and ASNO apply most of their respective safeguards efforts to the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), particularly safeguards aspects of the ANSTO Nuclear Medicine (ANM) project. At full operation, ANM has the capacity to supply a significant proportion (up to 25 per cent) of the world's requirements for molybdenum–99 (Mo–99), the parent product of the world's most widely used nuclear medicine, technetium–99m. ANSTO's permit issued under the Safeguards Act to establish its SyMo facility (Synroc Waste Immobilisation Facility) was extended by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Marise Payne, to cover construction delays.

All entities holding a permit to possess nuclear material are required to conduct an annual physical inventory taking (a stocktake of nuclear material held). As first done in 2020, ASNO adjusted procedures for the physical inventory taking at small permit holders (primarily comprising radiographers, universities, laboratories and state regulators) in 2021 to allow flexibility for COVID-impacted industries that could not readily conduct inventory-taking during June/July 2021. However, the multiple COVID-related lockdowns, especially in Sydney and Melbourne, resulted in two permit holders being unable to complete their physical inventory taking and associated reporting in time for ASNO to meet its reporting deadline to the IAEA (30 July). ASNO worked with these permit holders to obtain a "book inventory" based on the best information available to them. Formal physical inventory taking will be pursued once the lockdown periods end.

ASNO continues to engage with the Australian Radioactive Waste Agency (ARWA) in its mandate to establish a facility for Australia's radioactive waste. During the reporting period, ASNO assisted ARWA in its project of establishing a Common National Inventory for Radioactive Waste.

Permits and Authorities System

ASNO continued to operate Australia's state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) in accordance with Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and national legislation. Australia's SSAC is implemented through permits issued under the Safeguards Act. Notices of all permit changes were published in the Australia Government Gazette as required by subsection 20(1) of the Safeguards Act. A summary of all permits granted, varied, revoked and expired in the reporting period is in Table 9.

Table 9: Status of Permits and Authorities under the Safeguards Act at 30 June 2021 and Changes in the Reporting Period

Permit or authority	Current total	Granted	Varied	Revoked	Expired
Possess nuclear material	110	6	92	3	4
Possess associated items	10	0	2	0	0
Transport nuclear material	21	2	0	0	0
Transport associated items	0	0	0	0	0
Establish a facility	1	0	1	0	0
Decommission a facility	2	1	0	0	0
Communicate information contained in associated technology	7	0	1	0	0
Total	151	9	96	3	4

The conditions and restrictions set in ASNO's permits and authorities are customised to the activities relevant to the possession and transport of nuclear material and associated items and also to the relevant industry involved (e.g. research, radiography, mining, patent services). A summary of these permit classes is listed in Table 10. A high-level plan for the revision of all permits and authorities was established in August 2020. In 2020–21, 96 permits and authorities (including nearly all Class L, R and U6 permits) were revised under this plan. In 2021–22 all Class U2, U3, T1 & T2 permits and ANSTO's S1 permit are scheduled for revision.

Essential for the operation of the permit system is a fit-for-purpose database for managing permits and preparing routine reports on nuclear material inventory and transactions to the IAEA. ASNO continued to work with the database development team (under DFAT's Information Management Division) on the continuing development of ASNO's NUMBAT database.

Table 10: Main classes of Permits and Authorities

Class Code	Class Description	Number of Instruments Issued
R1	Radiographers holding less than 500 kg of depleted uranium shielding	37
R2	Radiographers holding between 500–5000 kg of depleted uranium shielding	7
L1	Using and storing less than 10 kg source material and less than 1 g special fissionable material	32
L2	Using and storing less than 500 kg source material and less than 5 g special fissionable material	17
L3	Using and storing less than 5000 kg source material and less than 10 g special fissionable material	3
U1	Production of UOC at concentration plants	4
U2	Transport UOC from mine to Australian port	10
U3	Transport UOC from Australian port to overseas destination	7
U4	Handling of UOC at ports and by stevedores	3
U5	Transport and export of UOC from mine gate to overseas destination	0
U6	Analysis of UOC samples	4
U7	Establish a UOC concentration plant	0
U8	Decommission a UOC concentration plant	1
T1	Transport of nuclear material by road, sea or air	3
T2	Transport of nuclear material by air	1
P1	Patent attorney services for patents potentially containing associated technology	5
P2	Storage and archiving of associated technology	1
S	Special series covering larger holders of nuclear material and associated items	4

IAEA Inspections

During the reporting period, the IAEA conducted inspections in accordance with standard arrangements under Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. In the reporting period, the IAEA made three separate visits to Australia. On each occasion, the IAEA inspectors spent two weeks in quarantine before conducting their inspections. Details on all inspections are provided in Table 11, and the IAEA's findings from these inspections (where available at the time of publishing this Annual Report) are listed in Appendix B.

ASNO officers facilitated access for the IAEA inspectors in accordance with conditions under respective permits issued under the Safeguards Act and accompanied the inspectors during all of their activities.

In August 2020, the IAEA conducted verification of the uranium content in solid waste from molybdenum–99 (Mo–99) radiopharmaceutical production using an active well coincidence counter (AWCC). This first formal use of the AWCC in Australia followed successful hot commissioning of the detector in 2019. This inspection addressed the issue previously identified by the IAEA of the build-up of otherwise unverified nuclear material (see findings of material balance area AS-C page 96 of the 2019–20 ASNO Annual Report). Following verification with the AWCC, the IAEA applied dual containment seals to verified waste in storage.

The IAEA conducted a short notice random inspection in April 2021 and its annual, scheduled Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) inspections in June 2021. The IAEA also conducted a Complementary Access at the Honeymoon uranium mine (currently under care and maintenance) in June 2021.

Overall, the IAEA has maintained the "broader conclusion" for Australia that "all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities" (see Appendix B).

Table 11: IAEA Safeguards Inspections 2020–21

Date	Facility	Material balance area7	Type8
24–27 August 2020	ANSTO	AS-C	Interim Inventory Verification
28 August 2020	CSIRO	AS-I	Complementary Access (4.a.i)
28 April 2021	ANSTO	AS-F	Short Notice Random Inspection
	ANSTO	AS-C and AS-F	Complementary Access (4.a.i)
29 April 2021	ANSTO	AS-C	Complementary Access (4.a.i)
30 April 2021	ANSTO	AS-A	Design Information Verification
30 April 2021	ANSTO	AS-C	Design Information Verification
3–10 June 2021	ANSTO	AS-C	Design Information Verification & Physical Inventory Verification
		AS-F	Design Information Verification & Physical Inventory Verification
		AS-D	Design Information Verification & Physical Inventory Verification
		AS-C	Technical visit
11 June 2021	CSIRO	AS-I	Complementary Access (4.a.i)
15 June 2021	Honeymoon uranium mine	AS-E	Complementary Access (4.a.i)

ASNO Inspections

During 2020–21, ASNO accompanied the IAEA on all the inspections listed above to ensure Australia's obligations were met in a timely and efficient manner and to ensure the inspections were conducted effectively.

The IAEA holds inspections to help it draw its conclusions on the correctness and completeness of Australia's nuclear accounting reports and safeguards declarations. ASNO inspectors are able also to use these opportunities to observe the inspected organisation's performance against their domestic permit conditions. This proves an efficient mechanism for ASNO's stakeholder outreach on regulatory requirements.

In addition to the IAEA inspections, ASNO continued to assist CSIRO and other permit holders with characterising legacy items of nuclear material and adding them to the inventory records. ASNO visited the NSW Environment Protection Authority (NSW EPA) radioactive store for which re-characterisation of its inventory had been partially completed. ASNO provided advice and recommendations on required actions for NSW EPA to satisfactorily establish and maintain the nuclear material inventory for the store.

Inventory balances

ASNO performed the annual material balance evaluation of the nuclear inventory accounts for each MBA with minor differences between book and physical inventory. These inventory differences were reported to the IAEA in conjunction with inventory change reports and physical inventory listings. Details are provided in Table 12. Differences were due to re-measurement of small batches of nuclear material at universities and research institutes and approximately 0.2 kilograms of mis-located items of depleted uranium and thorium for which investigations were pending the cessation of COVID-related lockdowns.

Table 12: Inventory Differences Recorded during 2020–21

Material Balance Area	Difference between book and physical inventory	Comment
ANSTO research and development laboratories (AS-C)	–0.04 kg depleted uranium	Re-measurement of batch weights
	–0.28 kg natural uranium
Other locations (MBA AS-E & ASE1)	+1.75 kg depleted uranium	Re-measurement of batch weights and three small items that were not located during physical inventory taking in 2021 but are expected to be located following the cessation of COVID-related lockdowns.
	+0.04 kg natural uranium
	+0.79 kg thorium
CSIRO (MBA AS-I)	342.00 g element weight (2.82 g 235U) enriched uranium	As part of CSIRO's campaign to characterise legacy inventory in storage, two items previously identified as being low enriched uranium were re-measured and found to in fact be natural uranium.
	–0.34 kg natural uranium

1 The quantity of ²³⁵U in low enriched uranium in Australia increased between 30 June 2020 and 30 June 2021 primarily due to the import of fresh fuel assemblies for the OPAL reactor.

2 Not including items categorised as associated technology.

3 The ANSTO Board decided to cease operation of HIFAR in January 2007. The reactor was de-fuelled in May 2007. It is awaiting decommissioning.

4 Includes, inter alia, the reactor reflector vessel and core grid.

5 This value includes one entry for each of Australia's four uranium mines, one entry for the production of all mines, and one entry with the total production of all concentration plants at all mines.

6 The additional entry for 10-year plans relates to the Australian Government project to site, design and build a national radioactive waste management facility.

7 See explanation of each material balance area in Table 3.

8 Details on different types of inspections are outlined in Appendix B.