Uranium Exports and Production
| Item | Data |
|---|---|
| Total Australian UOC exports 2020–21 | 6,166 tonnes |
| Value Australian UOC exports | $606 million |
| Australian exports as percentage of world uranium requirements2 | 7.6% |
| Number of reactors (GWe) these exports could power3 | 30.9 |
| Power generated by these exports | 196 TWh |
| Expressed as percentage of total Australian electricity production4 | 73.5% |
Australia has around one third of the world's uranium resources. Due to COVID–19 related closures in other uranium producing countries, Australia became the world's second ranking producer of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) in the 2020 calendar year, behind only Kazakhstan.5 As at 30 June 2021, there are two operating Australian uranium mines – Olympic Dam and Beverley/Four Mile in South Australia. Mining operations at the Ranger uranium mine in the Northern Territory closed on 7 January 2021.6 The Honeymoon uranium mine has remained in care and maintenance throughout the reporting period.
Like most major global commodities, the uranium industry has been impacted by the COVID–19 pandemic. Global production of uranium decreased in 2020 and this is likely to continue throughout 2021.
Since April 2020, Canada's Cigar Lake uranium mine in Saskatchewan has experienced two extended shutdown periods7 and Kazakhstan's Kazatomprom announced a reduction of 15 per cent on 2019 production figures, as they both prioritised the safety of employees during the pandemic.8
While Australian mines fared better than many of their international counterparts, Australian uranium producers were still impacted. In 2020–21, Australian uranium exports dropped 14 per cent, primarily due to reduced production and delays caused by international shipping and downstream facility closures. The impact of the closure of the Ranger mine will not be fully felt until the 2021–22 reporting period, as ERA compressed its production and export schedule to meet the closure deadline.
Figure 2: Quantity and value of Australian UOC (U3O8) exports from 2010–11 to 2020–21
Australia's Nuclear Safeguards Policy
The Australian Government's uranium policy limits the export of Australian uranium to countries that: are a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);9 have a Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA in force; and are within Australia's network of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. These nuclear cooperation agreements are designed to ensure IAEA safeguards and appropriate nuclear security measures are applied to AONM (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material) exported overseas, in addition to several supplementary conditions. Nuclear material subject to the provisions of an Australian nuclear cooperation agreement is known as AONM. The obligations of Australia's agreements apply to uranium as it moves through the different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, and to nuclear material generated using that uranium.
All Australia's nuclear cooperation agreements contain treaty-level assurances that AONM will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and will be covered by safeguards arrangements under each country's safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, it is a minimum requirement that IAEA safeguards apply to all existing and future nuclear material and activities in that country. In the case of nuclear-weapon states, AONM must be covered by safeguards arrangements under that country's safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and is limited to use for civil (i.e. non-military) purposes.
The principal conditions for the use of AONM set out in Australia's nuclear cooperation agreements are:
- AONM will be used only for peaceful purposes and will not be diverted to military or explosive purposes (here 'military purpose' includes: nuclear weapons; any nuclear explosive device; military nuclear reactors; military propulsion; depleted uranium munitions; and tritium production for nuclear weapons)
- IAEA safeguards will apply
- Australia's prior consent will be sought for transfers of AONM to third parties, enrichment to 20 per cent or more in the isotope 235U, and reprocessing10
- Fall-back safeguards or contingency arrangements will apply if for any reason NPT or IAEA safeguards cease to apply in the country concerned
- internationally agreed standards of physical security will be applied to AONM in the country concerned
- detailed administrative arrangements will apply between ASNO and its counterpart organisation, setting out the procedures to apply in accounting for AONM
- regular consultations on the operation of the agreement will be undertaken and
- provision will be made for the removal of AONM in the event of a breach of the agreement.
Australia currently has 25 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements in force, covering 43 countries plus Taiwan.11
Accounting for Australian Uranium
Australia's bilateral partners holding AONM are required to maintain detailed records of transactions involving AONM. In addition, counterpart organisations in bilateral partner countries are required to submit regular reports, consent requests, and transfer and receipt documentation to ASNO.
ASNO accounts for AONM on the basis of information and knowledge including:
- reports from each bilateral partner
- shipping and transfer documentation
- calculations of process losses, nuclear consumption, and nuclear production
- knowledge of the fuel cycle in each country
- regular liaison with, and reconciliation and bilateral visits to counterpart organisations
- regular liaison with industry and
- IAEA safeguards activities and IAEA conclusions on each country.
Australia's Uranium Transhipment Security Policy
For States with which Australia does not have a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in force, but through which Australian uranium ore concentrates (UOC) are transhipped, there must be arrangements in place with those States to ensure the security of UOC during transhipment. If the State:
- is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
- has a safeguards agreement and adopted the IAEA's Additional Protocol on strengthened safeguards and
- acts in accordance with these agreements;
then arrangements on appropriate security can be set out in an instrument with less than treaty status.12 Any arrangements of this kind are subject to risk assessments of port security. For States that do not meet the above requirements, treaty-level arrangements on appropriate security may be required.
A characteristic of the nuclear fuel cycle is the international interdependence of facility operators and power utilities. It is unusual for a country to be entirely self-contained in the processing of uranium for civil use. Even in nuclear-weapon states, power utilities will often go to other countries seeking the most favourable terms for uranium processing and enrichment. It would not be unusual, for example, for a Japanese utility buying Australian uranium to have the uranium converted to uranium hexafluoride in Canada, enriched in France, fabricated into fuel in Japan and reprocessed in the United Kingdom.
The international flow of nuclear material means that nuclear materials are routinely mixed during processes such as conversion and enrichment, and as such cannot be separated by origin thereafter. Therefore, tracking of individual uranium atoms is impossible. Since nuclear material is fungible—that is, any given atom is the same as any other—a uranium exporter can ensure its exports do not contribute to military applications by applying safeguards obligations to the overall quantity of material it exports.
This practice of tracking quantities rather than atoms has led to the establishment of universal conventions for the industry, known as the principles of equivalence and proportionality. The equivalence principle provides that, where AONM loses its separate identity because of process characteristics (e.g. mixing), an equivalent quantity of that material is designated as AONM. These equivalent quantities may be derived by calculation, measurement or from operating plant parameters. The equivalence principle does not permit substitution by a lower quality material.
The proportionality principle provides that where AONM is mixed with other nuclear material and is then processed or irradiated, a corresponding proportion of the resulting material will be regarded as AONM.
Figure 3: Civil Nuclear Fuel Cycle
2 Based on July 2021 world requirements of 68,269 tonnes U, from the World Nuclear Association's World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements.
3 Based on a comparison of GWe of nuclear electricity capacity and uranium required, for countries eligible to use AONM, from the World Nuclear Association's World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements, July 2021.
4 Based on Australia's electricity generation in calendar year of 2020 of 265.232 TWh from the Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources, 2020 Australian Energy Statistics, September 2020.
5 In 2020, Namibia produced 5,413 tU and Canada less than 2,000 tU (5 million pounds U3O8), where Australia produced 6,202 tU https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/namibia.aspx
6 While Ranger ceased production on 7 January 2021, ERA continued to export UOC already produced until February 2021.
7 https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Cameco-increases-uranium-purchases-to-meet-contrac
8 https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Kazatomprom-put-health-before-profit-during-pandem
9 On October 2012, the Australian Government announced that it would exempt India from its policy allowing supply of Australian uranium only to those States that are Parties to the NPT.
10 Australia has given reprocessing consent on a programmatic basis to EURATOM and Japan. Separated Australian-obligated plutonium is intended for blending with uranium into mixed oxide fuel (MOX) for further use for nuclear power generation.
11 Euratom is the European Atomic Energy Community. The Australia-Euratom NCA covers all 27 Member States of the European Union, and included the United Kingdom until 1 January 2021 when the bilateral Australia-UK agreement entered into force.
12 See page 26 of ASNO's 2008–09 Annual Report for more details on the establishment of this policy.
