Output 1.2: Nuclear Security

Protection of Australia's nuclear facilities, nuclear material and nuclear items against unauthorised access removal, and sabotage, including Australia's uranium supplied overseas.

Performance Measures

• Security of nuclear material, technology and facilities meets Australia's obligations under the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM), the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, as well as being in accordance with IAEA guidelines.
• Internationally agreed standards for the security of nuclear material are applied to all AONM.
• Proactive and professional contributions are made to the development and effective implementation of nuclear security worldwide.

Performance Assessment

Australian Nuclear Material Categories

Table 13 lists the permit holders for which physical protection or information security is required, categorised according to the materials or items held.

Table 13: Distribution of Permits Holders according to security category

Nuclear Material Category	Type of 'Facility'		Number of Permit Holders
Category II9	Research Reactor, Storage		1
Category III	Storage, Scientific Research		1
Category IV10	Scientific Research		1
Uncategorised11	LOFs, Radiographers		101
Natural Uranium (UOC)	Uranium Mines and Concentration Plants		4
Transport of nuclear material	Transport Companies, Ports, Shipping Lines		24
Associated Items
Associated Equipment and Technology		Enrichment Research, Storage and Archives	4
Associated Technology		Patent Attorneys	5

International and Bilateral Obligations

ASNO's regulation of permit holders established that security arrangements at Australian nuclear facilities were in accordance with Australia's obligations under the A/CPPNM and relevant bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. In 2014, Australia, along with 24 other states, subscribed to the IAEA's fundamental principles of nuclear security and committed to meet the intent of IAEA recommendations on nuclear security.¹² Throughout the reporting period, ASNO continued to ensure that domestic requirements for nuclear security were in accordance with IAEA recommendations. ASNO also met Australia's international shipment notification obligations under the A/CPPNM by notifying relevant parties of the transhipment of uranium ore concentrates (UOC) exported from Australia.

Exports of Australian Uranium

The pandemic has continued to affect the timely international shipment of Australian UOC. Permit Holders have had to adapt schedules or delay deliveries to accommodate vessel delays and congestion in ports and container facilities around the globe. Good communication with relevant government agencies and overseas counterparts has minimised flow-on effects to physical security due to these delays.

Australian uranium exports are subject to security arrangements that include checking the physical condition and integrity of containers, fitted seals and locks at each port of unloading or transhipment. There were no security incidents (malicious acts) involving the transport of UOC in Australia during the reporting period.

Uranium ore concentrate in Australia is protected to the same high standard from production to export.

ASNO received an incident report in October 2020 of a single vehicle accident hauling a UOC container. The vehicle sustained limited damage and as a precaution the unaffected shipment was transferred to a new vehicle.

In November 2020, a Permit Holder reported a shipping container packed with UOC was not locked after loading. Review of security CCTV footage showed that there had been no other access to the container, which was located within a secure compound. ASNO requested the container inventory be verified, procedures be updated and personnel retrained.

In February 2021, a shipment of UOC was loaded onto an ASNO approved vessel, but not on the vessel recorded on the shipment approval. The permit holder notified ASNO of this discrepancy after the shipment had been loaded and resubmitted shipment information. The change in vessel was a result of delayed arrival of vessels to Australian ports and short notice reallocation of cargo to a new vessel. ASNO requested that permit holders maintain accurate records when managing changes to consignments due to delays.

Nuclear Security of UOC at Australian Mines and in Transport

Within the reporting period ASNO received applications for, and granted two new permits for the transport of UOC within Australia. On 18 May 2021, ASNO conducted an inspection of Neil Mansell Transport's proposed secure compound for the purpose of interim storage of UOC incidental to transport. During the inspection, ASNO provided presentation material for regulating the transport of UOC as guidance material.

BHP Olympic Dam also submitted draft copies of a revised UOC Transport Management Plan and Uranium Security Plan. ASNO approved the updated UOC Transport Management Plan in June 2021. At the end of the reporting period, the new Uranium Security Plan remained under review.

On 26 May 2021, ASNO conducted a routine inspection of BHP's security and accountancy arrangements, evaluated security plans and procedures against ASNO's permit requirements and verified that recommendations arising from previous inspections had been addressed. DFAT has committed to recognising and promoting Australia's Indigenous Peoples in its core business, and ASNO actively requests mining companies include a presentation on their outreach, opportunities and inclusion of local Indigenous communities.

ASNO inspects UOC productions facilities in Australia.

Heathgate Resources, operator of the Beverley Uranium mine, also submitted a revised Transport Security Management Plans for ASNO approval in the reporting period. ASNO reviewed the plan against permit requirements and international best practice, approving the updated plan in June 2021. In keeping with ASNO permit requirements and supporting the Government's policies to reduce regulatory burden where appropriate, the contracted transport company adopted the mine's transport security plan and transported UOC consistent with the plan's requirements.

In accordance with relevant Commonwealth and Northern Territory Government legislative and regulatory requirements, Energy Resources of Australia (ERA) ceased uranium mining and processing activities at the Ranger Uranium Mine on 8 January 2021. In the period leading up to cessation of operations, ERA applied to ASNO for a Permit to Decommission a Facility¹³ and prepared a decommissioning plan in support of that permit application. The permit was granted on 8 January 2021. ASNO conducted the first post-shutdown inspection at the Ranger Uranium Mine on 16 June 2021. The purpose of the inspection was to evaluate the status of the mine and security arrangements for key plant during decommissioning. The inspection included verification of a nil nuclear material inventory and review of the decommissioning progress of the processing plant, on-site laboratory, UOC sample inventory and UOC storage yard. ASNO also discussed other decommissioning arrangements at Ranger. In addition, ERA provided ASNO a briefing on the planned rehabilitation works for the mine and on the ongoing Indigenous community engagement activities conducted by ERA.

ASNO has conducted nuclear security and safeguards inspections at Ranger since the start of operations in 1981.

Minor Design Basis Threat Review

ASNO conducted a planned minor review of the design basis threat (DBT). ASNO adopted a periodic cycle of major and minor reviews of the DBT following a recommendation of the 2013 IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) peer-review mission.¹⁴ As a central concept in the internationally recognised guidance document Nuclear Security Series No. 13¹⁵, the DBT is a statement of credible adversary intentions and capabilities and is to be considered a "worst-case credible threat". Physical protection systems at high consequence nuclear facilities are then designed and implemented to provide high assurance of protection against the DBT. ASNO maintains the DBT with the support of several other Australian government agencies. An unclassified version of the DBT is published on ASNO's website.¹⁶

Nuclear Security at Lucas Heights

Throughout the pandemic, ASNO has maintained a strong regulatory relationship and effective communication with ANSTO, including with in-person visits and inspections. Where face-to-face meetings were not possible due to COVID-related restrictions, ASNO conducted virtual meetings with ANSTO to progress critical activities and maintain relationships. Despite the restrictions, key security issues were addressed or progressed, including the conduct of security exercises, enhanced search procedures, approval of new storage facilities and updates to key security documentation.

During the reporting period, ASNO conducted three routine inspections at ANSTO. The inspections reviewed ANSTO implementation of permit requirements and international best practice for nuclear security. ASNO reviewed arrangements at ANSTO facilities located at Lucas Heights for storage of both nuclear material and associated items. During the inspections ASNO reviewed the physical security, information security, personnel security and security governance arrangements for these facilities. ASNO also observed the conduct of a security exercise at ANSTO that demonstrated site capabilities to respond to an advanced threat.

Over the reporting period, ANSTO continued to review a significant number of security documents and procedures that support implementation of its permit conditions to possess nuclear material and associated items. ASNO has reviewed and approved several updated security plans for facilities at ANSTO in 2021. ANSTO continues to work on updating the OPAL security plan and submission of the revised plan is expected in the latter half of 2021.

ANSTO continued to report to ASNO on the progress of its Periodic Safety and Security Review (PSSR) of the OPAL reactor. ANSTO provided ASNO with quarterly updates on the PSSR including review and report drafting activities. The conduct of the PSSR is a requirement that is imposed by both ASNO and ARPANSA jointly. ANSTO is scheduled to provide the PSSR report to ARPANSA's CEO and ASNO's Director General by 30 November 2021.

SILEX Enrichment Technology

Silex Systems Limited (SSL) continued to hold a Permit to Possess Associated Technology with ASNO for research and development of the Silex process towards commercialisation. ASNO continued its regulatory oversight of SSL's activities, including regular meetings and monthly reports.

In January 2021, SSL announced the completion of the restructure of SILEX technology licensee Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE). This followed final approval of the restructure by United States government agencies, including the US Department of the Treasury-led Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. This resulted in SSL acquiring a 51 per cent majority interest in GLE, and Canada's Cameco Corporation increasing its interest from 24 per cent to 49 per cent.

ASNO regulates uranium enrichment research and development to ensure the security of sensitive nuclear technologies.

ASNO conducted an inspection at SSL on 21 May 2021, when it reviewed ongoing development activities, security plans and arrangements, and conducted a partial inventory verification.

SSL progressed its collaboration partnership with UNSW Sydney and Silicon Quantum Computing Pty Ltd (SQC) for the enrichment of Silicon. The project is developing a commercial process for the production of high-purity 'Zero-Spin Silicon' using a variant of the SILEX laser isotope separation technology. ASNO remained satisfied that this program does not involve associated technology as defined by the Safeguards Act.

Ubaryon Enrichment Technology

Ubaryon Pty Ltd holds a Permit to Possess Associated Technology for research and development of an innovative uranium enrichment technique. ASNO continued to work closely in supporting the company to mature its security measures and culture. ASNO collaboratively established a classification guide which provides prudent information security for the technology and supports Ubaryon during commercial partnership, technology development and other related discussions.

Nuclear Security Guidance Committee

The primary role of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) is to manage the production of guidance documents in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS). The NSGC comprises over 50 IAEA Member States, is constituted on rolling three-year terms and meets twice per year at the IAEA in Vienna (i.e. six meetings per term). Australia (ASNO) has been a member since its inception in 2012. The former ASNO Director, Nuclear Security (Dr Stephan Bayer) was Chair of the NSGC's third term from 2018 to December 2020. The 18th meeting of the NSGC, held in November–December 2020, concentrated on the continuing discussion over the revision of the top-tier documents of the Nuclear Security Series and the merits of a Nuclear Security Series publication on safety/security interfaces. Following the meeting, a subgroup was commissioned to provide suggestions and feedback on the process to revise the top-tier documents.

The fourth term of the NSGC commenced in 2021, and following a change of responsibility within ASNO, the new Director, Nuclear Security (Ms Charlotte East) was nominated as Australia's member on the NSGC for the fourth term. The fourth term of the NSGC commenced with the 19th meeting on 7–10 June 2021. The 19th meeting continued to focus on the topics of revision of the top-tier documents in the Nuclear Security Series, the development of a new roadmap for future publications and issues relating to the safety/security interface, including potential publications and the integration of the nuclear safety and nuclear security glossary.

Review Conference of the Amended CPPNM

The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the Conference of Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was held, virtually, from 7–11 December 2020 and again on 1 February 2021. The PrepCom was co-chaired by Dr Robert Floyd (formerly Director General ASNO) for Australia and Mr Vilmos Cserveny for Hungary. The main topics of discussion at the PrepCom were the proposed program and agenda for the Review Conference and the draft rules of procedure for the Conference. The PrepCom concluded at the end of the 1 February 2021 meeting, providing a report on preparations to the designated Co-Presidents of the Review Conference, Nigeria and Switzerland.

Throughout the PrepCom, States Parties expressed a strong desire for a robust and inclusive review conference, clearly indicating a preference for an in-person conference, if possible. With this in mind, participants agreed that a further delay to the conference was desirable. The Review Conference is scheduled for 28 March – 1 April 2022 at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria.

Post Nuclear Security Summit Activities

Australia is a member of the post-Nuclear Security Summit Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG), whose Statement of Principles¹⁷ includes advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture. The NSCG has remained active during the reporting period, despite the pandemic, supporting discussions on the A/CPPNM Review Conference, collective nuclear security commitments, core messaging on nuclear security and work under the GICNT. Dr Floyd was Australia's designated NSCG participant. Australia continued leading a discussion on the preparatory process for the A/CPPNM Review Conference which is expected to take place in March 2022.

In further initiatives to promote nuclear security internationally, Dr Floyd continued to be active in track 1.5 dialogues, in particular the Nuclear Threat Initiative's Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security Priorities, which like the NSCG, has actively promoted the Nuclear Security Summits' goals and commitments and assisted in preparations for the A/CPPNM Review Conference.

9 Nuclear material category is based on IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13.

10 Category IV limits are 15g≥Pu>10g; 15g ≥(²³⁵U≥20%)>10g; 1000g ≥(²³⁵U<20%–10%)>10g; 10 000g ≥(²³⁵U<10%)>10g; 15g ≥²³³U>10g; Unirradiated Source Material ≤5000kg. (%-enrichment).

11 i.e. below Category IV quantities.

12 The 2014 Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security was distributed by the IAEA as INFCIRC/869 and can be found at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/infcirc869.pdf.

13 A Permit to Decommission a Facility, issued pursuant to Section 16B of the Safeguards Act, is required for any nuclear facility or facility where nuclear activities have been conducted before any decommissioning work can commence. These Permits ensure that appropriate security measures are in place and relevant IAEA safeguards activities can be conducted throughout the decommissioning process.

14 A redacted copy of the 2013 IPPAS mission report can be found at:
https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/asno/Pages/iaea-ippas-mission-to-australia.

15 Also referred to as INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.

16 https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/asno/Pages/design-basis-threat

17 https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2016/infcirc899.pdf