Appendix B: IAEA Statements of Conclusions and Other Inspection Findings for Australia in 2019–20
IAEA Inspection Regime in Australia
The IAEA conducts verification activities (under different names, but all essentially inspections) in Australia under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement3 and under the Additional Protocol,4 with the scope and focus differing between these two agreements.
Under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement the IAEA conducts inspections to verify nuclear material inventory and facility design features. There are four types of inspection conducted in Australia each year under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement:
- Physical inventory verification (PIV): a scheduled inspection in a selected material balance area (MBA)5 to verify the stocktake of physical inventory (known as a physical inventory taking) from that MBA. PIVs involve a more complete verification of inventory than short notice random inspections (SNRI,6 see below). The frequency of PIVs depends on the types and quantities of nuclear material held in each MBA. In Australia's case, PIVs are scheduled annually for ANSTO's OPAL reactor (AS-F), R&D laboratories (AS-C), and storage areas (AS-D). PIVs for each MBA are scheduled together each year so the IAEA can complete them all in one visit to Australia. In total these usually take five days to complete in conjunction with DIVs (see below). For MBAs AS-E, ASE1 and AS-I, the IAEA schedules a PIV approximately once every four years for AS-E/ASE1 combined, selecting one location (usually a university) taken as a representative sample of all such locations; and once every four years for one of CSIRO's locations in MBA AS-I. These PIVs are usually conducted in one day.
- Interim inventory verification (IIV): an inspection in a selected MBA to verify specific types of nuclear material, scheduled at a time other than during the PIV. The IAEA conducted an IIV at ANSTO's R&D laboratories (AS-C) in August 2020 to measure the uranium content in solid waste from molybdenum–99 (Mo–99) radiopharmaceutical production using an active well coincidence counter (AWCC). It is anticipated that the IAEA will schedule an IIV approximately once every two years for AS-C.
- Short notice random inspection (SNRI): an inspection called by the IAEA at a random time with limited notice. The IAEA calls an SNRI once or twice each year at the OPAL reactor with three hours' notice to ASNO and ANSTO. These inspections usually last for one or two days.
- Design information verification (DIV): an inspection to verify the correctness and completeness of the design features of a facility relevant to the application of safeguards. The IAEA typically conducts DIVs together with the annual PIVs.
Under the Additional Protocol the IAEA has the right to conduct verification activities (essentially inspections) known as complementary access. A complementary access may have three purposes:
- assuring the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia (Article 4.a.i);
- resolving any questions or inconsistencies related to the correctness and completeness of Australia's declarations under the Additional Protocol (Article 4.a.ii); and/or
- confirming the decommissioned status of a facility (Article 4.a.iii).
The IAEA has conducted a total of 85 complementary accesses in Australia since 1998.
Article 4.a.i complementary accesses are the most common. Since 1998 the IAEA has conducted only two complementary accesses under Article 4.a.ii, and one under Article 4.a.iii. Complementary access activities called while IAEA inspectors are already on the ANSTO site for other inspections can be conducted at any building on-site with two hours' notice. Complementary access activities for locations outside ANSTO (e.g. universities, uranium mines) require a minimum of 24 hours' notice, however given the considerable distances in Australia are often issued with at least several days' notice. The IAEA typically conducts two to three complementary access activities in Australia each year, a few at ANSTO buildings, and one outside of ANSTO.
IAEA Conclusions on Australia's Compliance
The IAEA's conclusions for Australia are provided at two levels: the IAEA's overarching summary of findings and conclusions published in the IAEA's Safeguards Statement for 2020 (see Appendix C) for all States with safeguards agreements with the IAEA; and the statements of conclusions of inspections in Australia.
The highest-level conclusion the IAEA draws, known as the 'broader conclusion', is in paragraph 1(a) of the Safeguards Statement:
'the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.'
Australia is on the list of countries covered by the IAEA's broader conclusion in the Safeguards Statement for 2020. Australia was the first country to receive the 'broader conclusion' in 2000 and has received it every subsequent year.
The IAEA's statements of conclusions related to inspections in Australia are provided in several ways:
- Article 91(a) of Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: the results of inspections at individual material balance areas (MBAs),
- Article 91(b) of Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: the conclusions the IAEA has drawn from all its verification activities (headquarters analysis and inspections) in Australia for each individual MBA7,
- Statement of results of design information verification activities (DIVs),
- Article 10.a of the Additional Protocol: Statement on complementary access activities undertaken,
- Article 10.b of the Additional Protocol: Statement of results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the IAEA has raised with Australia, and
- Article 10.c of the Additional Protocol: Statement on the conclusions the IAEA has drawn from complementary access activities.
IAEA Conclusions and Findings for Each Material Balance Area
Material balance area: AS-A (HIFAR)
Material balance period: N/A (safeguards status: closed down)
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Design Information Verification | 30 April 2021 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 21 May 2021 |
Material balance area: AS-C (research and development laboratories)
Material balance period: 8 May 2019–3 June 2020
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Physical Inventory Verification | 4–10 June 2020 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 27 July 2020 |
| Design Information Verification | 4–10 June 2020 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 27 July 2020 |
| 91(b) Statement of Conclusions (19 October 2020) | "The IAEA has concluded from its verification activities carried out at AS-C during the material balance period from 8 May 2019 to 3 June 2020, and based on the information available to date in connection with such activities, that all declared nuclear material has been accounted for and that there were no indications of the undeclared presence, production or processing of nuclear material. The Agency continues to monitor the amount of nuclear material left unverified and notes the work being carried out jointly between the State, the Facility Operator and the Agency to deploy dedicated nondestructive analysis equipment that will allow the verification of the irradiated nuclear material left unverified at AS-C." | |||
The IAEA's statement noted "the work being carried out jointly…to deploy dedicated non-destructive analysis equipment" relates to the IAEA's active well coincidence counter (AWCC) for quantifying the uranium in solid waste from ANSTO's molybdenum–99 radiopharmaceutical production process. The AWCC was successfully deployed in the interim inventory verification inspection on 24–27 August 2020, as shown in the table below. See Output 1.1 for further details.
Material balance area: AS-C (research and development laboratories)
Material balance period: 4 June 2020–3 June 2021
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interim Inventory Verification | 24–27 August 2020 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 27 October 2020 |
| Design Information Verification | 30 April 2021 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 24 May 2021 |
| Physical Inventory Verification | 4, 8 and 9 June 2021 | ANSTO | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | N/A |
| Design Information Verification | 4, 8 and 9 June 2021 | ANSTO | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | N/A |
| 91(b) Statement of Conclusions | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | |||
Material balance area: AS-D (vault storage)
Material balance period: 6 May 2019–2 June 2020
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Physical Inventory Verification | 3 June 2020 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 27 July 2020 |
| Design Information Verification | 3 June 2020 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 27 July 2020 |
| 91(b) Statement of Conclusions (28 August 2020) |
"The IAEA has concluded from its verification activities carried out at AS-D during the material balance period from 6 May 2019 to 2 June 2020, and based on the information available to date in connection with such activities, that all declared nuclear material has been accounted for and that there were no indications of the undeclared presence, production or processing of nuclear material." | |||
Material balance area: AS-D (vault storage)
Material balance period: 3 June 2020–8 June 2021
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Physical Inventory Verification | 9 June 2021 | ANSTO | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | N/A |
| Design Information Verification | 9 June 2021 | ANSTO | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | N/A |
| 91(b) Statement of Conclusions | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | |||
Material balance area: AS-F (OPAL)
Material balance period: 7 May 2019–1 June 2020
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Short Notice Random Inspection | 8–9 October 2019 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 21 January 2020 |
| Short Notice Random Inspection | 3 February 2020 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 6 May 2020 |
| Physical Inventory Verification | 2 June 2020 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 27 July 2020 |
| Design Information Verification | 2 June 2020 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results of the DIV were satisfactory" | 27 July 2020 |
| 91(b) Statement of Conclusions (7 September 2020) |
"The IAEA has concluded from its verification activities carried out at AS-F during the material balance period from 7 May 2019 to 1 June 2020, and based on the information available to date in connection with such activities, that all declared nuclear material has been accounted for and that there were no indications of the undeclared presence, production or processing of nuclear material." | |||
Material balance area: AS-F (OPAL)
Material balance period: 2 June 2020–6 June 2021
| Inspection activity | Date(s) of inspection | Inspection location | Statement of results | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Short Notice Random Inspection | 28 April 2021 | ANSTO | "Based on the activities conducted and the information available to date in connection with such activities, the results from this inspection were satisfactory" | 28 May 2021 |
| Physical Inventory Verification | 7 June 2021 | ANSTO | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | N/A |
| Design Information Verification | 7 June 2021 | ANSTO | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | N/A |
| 91(b) Statement of Conclusions | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | |||
Additional Protocol Assessment Period: 1 January 2019– 31 December 2019
| Date of Complementary Access (CA) | Location | 10(a) Statement of activities | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9 May 2019 | Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre: Buildings 21B Ext, 21E and 21H | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 27 August 2019 |
| 20 May 2019 | Beverley and Four Mile uranium mines (Heathgate Resources) | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 27 August 2019 |
| 8 October 2019 | Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre (PN001-ANSTO): Buildings 80, 41, 88, 54 | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 7 January 2020 |
| 10(c) Statement of Conclusions (9 March 2020) |
"The Agency has concluded from its activities carried out during this period, and based on the information available to date in connection with such activities that access pursuant to Article 4.a.(i) did not indicate the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities at:
|
||
Additional Protocol Assessment Period: 1 January 2020 – 31 December 2020
| Date of Complementary Access (CA) | Location | 10(a) Statement of activities | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4 February 2020 | Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre: Buildings 88, 23A/B, 54 | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 5 March 2020 |
| 11 June 2020 | Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre: Buildings 93, 91 | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 30 July 2020 |
| 28 August 2020 | CSIRO – North Ryde, NSW | "The IAEA was able to carry out all planned activities during the CA" | 20 October 2020 |
| 10(c) Statement of Conclusions (17 March 2021) |
The Agency has concluded from its activities carried out during this period, and based on the information available to date in connection with such activities that access pursuant to Article 4.a.(i) did not indicate the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities at:
|
||
Additional Protocol Assessment Period: 1 January 2021– 31 December 2021
| Date of Complementary Access (CA) | Location | 10(a) Statement of activities | Date statement provided |
|---|---|---|---|
| 28 April 2021 | Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre: Buildings 80, 54 | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | N/A |
| 29 April 2021 | Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre: Buildings 88, 23A/B, 76 | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | N/A |
| 11 June 2021 | CSIRO – Lucas Heights, NSW | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | N/A |
| 15 June 2021 | Honeymoon uranium mine (in care and maintenance, Boss Uranium) | Not available at time of publication of this Annual Report | N/A |
| 10(c) Statement of Conclusions | 10(c) statements of conclusions are provided early in the year following the assessment period | ||
3 See Schedule 3 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987.
4 Published in IAEA document INFCIRC/540 (corrected).
5 Australia's material balance areas for IAEA safeguards are described in Table 3 in Output 1.1.
6 ASNO uses the term 'short notice random inspections' for these inspections because they are performed on short notice on a date chosen by the IAEA at random. These inspections may also be referred to as 'random interim inspections' because they do not coincide with the ending date of a material balance period.
7 Note: under the standard NPT safeguards agreement printed in IAEA document INFCIRC/153 these provisions are in paragraphs 90(a) and 90(b). Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement has an additional paragraph that is not in INFCIRC/153.
